Progressive Strategy Blog

'The Worst Recession for Over 100 Years'

2009-02-11T20:56:00.003-05:00

If this is the case, why aren't governments around the world responding more forcefully to this crisis?

In any case, this is the assessment of Ed Balls, longtime top economic adviser and closest ally of British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, made at a Labour conference in Yorkshire. He was talking about both, the British and the global recession:

The reality is that this is becoming the most serious global recession for, I'm sure, over 100 years, as it will turn out. [...]

The economy is going to define our politics in this region and in Britain in the next year, the next five years, the next 10 and even the next 15 years. [...]

These are seismic events that are going to change the political landscape. I think this is a financial crisis more extreme and more serious than that of the 1930s, and we all remember how the politics of that era were shaped by the economy.

If the Obama administration had made this kind of assessment, its strategy for dealing with this crisis surely would have been more ambitious and hence more adequate.

If you believe James Galbraith, the US stimulus will only work if the bailout succeeds at getting credit flowing again, which is pretty unlikely, given that the Obama administration, just like the Bush administration before it, still seems to be determined not to confront some of the core problems characterizing this crisis.

Obama's Strategic Failure

2009-02-10T12:02:00.003-05:00

This could be the beginning of the end.

Last Friday, Obama tried to pressure Congress by warning:

It is inexcusable and irresponsible for any of us to get bogged down in distraction, delay or politics as usual, while millions of Americans are being put out of work. Now is the time for Congress to act. It’s time to pass an Economic Recovery and Reinvestment Plan to get our economy moving.

Yet arguably, this is precisely what Obama and his administration have done: They waited too long, failed to define the debate, and made unnecessary preemptive concessions. The result is too little, too late, and mostly wrong. In the worst case, this will not only fail to stimulate the economy, but might also lead to a weakening of the Democratic majority in 2010 and to Obama's premature exit in 2012.

As Paul Krugman points out in his latest column, 'The Destructive Center,' it was the failure of Obama's political strategy that led to the failure of his economic strategy, which the next few years are all too likely to most painfully confirm.

Shock and Awe!?

2009-02-05T11:32:00.005-05:00

Is the eloquently and frequently promised 'swift and bold' action turning into 'too little, too late, and mostly wrong'? This worst-case scenario could come true. TARP was and remains fundamentally flawed, and the Economic Recovery and Reinvestment Plan (ERRP) does not look much better.

The stakes could hardly be higher. In order to have any chance of actually working, the stimulus needs to be huge (better to err on the too big rather than on the too small side under these conditions, as even Larry Summers now recognizes), very fast-acting and on target.

On Wednesday, Obama warned:

A failure to act, and act now, will turn crisis into a catastrophe and guarantee a longer recession, a less robust recovery, and a more uncertain future.

In his February 4 post, 'Shock and oy,' Paul Krugman again is pretty scathing in his critique of both the bailout and the stimulus. He quotes Martin Wolf, associate editor and chief economics commentator of the Financial Times:

First, focus all attention on reversing the collapse in demand now, rather than on the global architecture.
Second, employ overwhelming force. The time for “shock and awe” in economic policymaking is now.
…
Unfortunately, what is coming out of the US is desperately discouraging. Instead of an overwhelming fiscal stimulus, what is emerging is too small, too wasteful and too ill-focused. Instead of decisive action to recapitalise banks, which must mean temporary public control of insolvent banks, the US may be returning to the immoral and ineffective policy of bailing out those who now hold the “toxic assets”.

Krugman elaborates:

You know, it was widely expected that Obama would have a stimulus plan ready to pass Congress even before his inauguration. That didn’t happen. We were told that this was because the economic team was working flat out on the financial rescue.

In fact, when it comes to bank rescue it’s hard to see much evidence that anything was accomplished during all that time; the team is still — still! — running ideas up the flagpole to see if anyone salutes. And the ideas look remarkably bad.

On the 'bad bank' approach, Krugman refers to the critique of Yves Smith, who blogs at naked capitalism. Here is what he had to say about this proposal in yesterday's post, 'The Bad Bank Assets Proposal: Even Worse Than You Imagined:'

Dear God, let's just kiss the US economy goodbye. It may take a few years before the loyalists and permabulls throw in the towel, but the handwriting is on the wall.

The Obama Administration, if the Washington Post's latest report is accurate, is about to embark on a hugely expensive "save the banking industry at all costs" experiment that:
1. Has nothing substantive in common with any of the "deemed as successful" financial crisis programs

2. Has key elements that studies of financial crises have recommended against

3. Consumes considerable resources, thus competing with other, in many cases better, uses of fiscal firepower.

In a previous post, criticizing David Broder's talk about stimulus, draws a crucial distinction between Democrat. The 'best ideas' do not come from both parties:

But the part that really got me was Broder saying that we need “the best ideas from both parties.”
You see, this isn’t a brainstorming session — it’s a collision of fundamentally incompatible world views. If one thing is clear from the stimulus debate, it’s that the two parties have utterly different economic doctrines. Democrats believe in something more or less like standard textbook macroeconomics; Republicans believe in a doctrine under which tax cuts are the universal elixir, and government spending is almost always bad.

Obama may be able to get a few Republican Senators to go along with his plan; or he can get a lot of Republican votes by, in effect, becoming a Republican. There is no middle ground.

As noted many times before, this is the whole problem with centrism, aka 'pragmatism' today. The verdict is out: Neoliberalism has failed.

What has happened to the promise of competently executed change? What are the strategic implications of this impending disaster? TARP II continues the fundamental flaws and hence failure of TARP I and ERRP is too small, ill-focused, and might already be too late. Why does Obama still not govern as if he had won?

This reminds of former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's slogan when he came to power in 1998 with the help of the Green Party to not do everything differently but many things better. The US and the world desperately need Obama not only to do things very differently but also much better than his predecessor (which shouldn't be too difficult). So far, however, it is very disappointing. There is much more continuity than change, both in the inadequacy of the policies and the incompetence with which they are being carried out.

If this is not the moment to exercise audacious strategic leadership, I don't when it might be. What is the Obama administration waiting for?

'Make Him Do It' - But How?

2009-02-03T11:51:00.003-05:00

In 'Moving the Political Center,' David Sirota, along with many other left-liberal progressives, argues that congressional Democrats should emulate their Republican colleagues under Bush, and start every policy initiative or modification from as far to the political left as possible. He gives some examples of successful progressive measures concerning the recovery package.

Unfortunately, he does not explore this further, for it is a central strategic question. For example, how could progressives systematically use the Overton window to shift public discourse and opinion even further to the left? More fundamentally, how best to articulate the relationship between progressives and members of Congress, so that the former can exert maximum influence on the latter? How do progressives need to build power in order to achieve that goal?

Trying to gain 'strength in numbers' is often insufficient and can even be misleading. For instance, the Congressional Progressive Caucus (CPC) is the biggest caucus in the House, and with 71 members represents about a third of the House Democratic Caucus. Yet it can't point to a single accomplishment on its website. The same is the case for state Houses around the country.

Clearly, simply electing more progressives, even if they are 'genuine,' is not enough. Progressives have to find a way to hold them consistently accountable, and to nudge them to the left.

Are We All Lemons Now?

2009-02-02T14:09:00.004-05:00

'Lemon socialism' - it's the oldest political game in town: You privatize benefits and socialize costs.

In his post 'Bad' of January 29, Paul Krugman tells a joke about a very serious matter, which rings all too true:

As the Obama administration apparently prepares to launch Hankie Pankie II — buying troubled assets from banks at prices higher than they will fetch on the open market — it occurred to me that an updated version of an old Communist-era joke may be appropriate: under Bush, financial policy consisted of Wall Street types cutting sweet deals, at taxpayer expense, for Wall Street types. Under Obama, it’s precisely the reverse.

Update: Maybe I was too cryptic. The original joke was, “Capitalism is the exploitation of man by man. Socialism is the reverse.”

His initial impression seems to be confirmed. In his latest column, 'Bailouts for Bunglers,' he now gives what might be the best short description of Obama's approach to the second half of the bailout:

Question: what happens if you lose vast amounts of other people’s money? Answer: you get a big gift from the federal government — but the president says some very harsh things about you before forking over the cash.

More than a week ago, Robert Reich made the same argument in his post, 'How America Embraced Lemon Socialism.'

So if, by many accounts, Obama has shown some smart progressive leadership on the stimulus & recovery package - though the full extent of which still remains to be seen - why this centrist caving on the second half of th bailout? Is there a larger political strategy behind this?

In any case, since we are now in the midst of lemon socialism, might as well do the real thing, and do it right, because that might be the only adequate response: The nationalisation of quite a number of banks. But of course the question again will be an quintessentially political one: Who gets what, when and how?

Barack Obama, Ideologue-In-Chief? or What Centrists Fail to Understand

2009-01-24T14:25:00.008-05:00

What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them — that the stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long no longer apply.

So-called 'pundits' such as John Freehery, founder and CEO of the Freehery Group, 'a boutique strategic advocacy firm' in Washington DC, and blogger at The Hill's Pundits Blog, understands this to be the most important line from Obama's inaugural address for Republicans, for it is them for whom the ground has shifted. They now face a huge challenge to reposition themselves. The background to this interpretation is what could be called the archetype of the core centrist credo:

We are a centrist country with conservative leanings. And if you don’t appeal to the vast middle, especially that part of Middle America that lives in the suburbs, your party loses seats, influence, access to money, and perspective
The center revolted against the partisanship of the last 20 years. They threw their lot in with Obama because he talked to them, appealed to them, excited them and promised them a post-partisan world where all would work together for a more perfect union.

Who could possibly be against that ideal?

Obviously all those who don't share that 'ideal' to begin with and question the whole concept of 'centrism,' such as Thomas Frank below.

At the other end of the political spectrum, further to the left, Victor Navasky, along with many others, 'prefers to believe' that Obama might be 'a liberal wolf in centrists sheep's clothing.' The formulation 'prefer to believe' betrays a classic case of projection that sill seems all too common among progressives today. It's wishful thinking.

The reverse seems to make more sense: Obama appears to be 'a centrist sheep with a rather thin progressive veneer.' If this is the case, the key challenge for left-liberal progressives is to develop a strategy that allows them to nudge Obama to the left.

The above line from Obama's speech only needs to be slightly modified to more accurately describe what really has happened in the US and the world in the past 30 years and to begin to make sense and become politically useful for left-liberal progressives. For the ground that has shifted is nothing less than 'reality,' primarily in its economic and environmental dimensions, less so in its politics:

What the centrists fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them — that the stale political arguments of centrism that have consumed us for so long no longer apply.

Progressives such as Glenn Grennwald, Paul Krugman, Robert Reich, George Lakoff, Christopher Hayes, Guy Saperstein, David Sirota, and Rick Perlstein - just to name a few - have argued for a long time that centrism is a sham. Reich explicitly did so back in 2004 in his book Reason: Why Liberals Will Win the Battle for America, in chapter 5, Winning: It Will Take More Than Reason, in the section appropriately named 'The Sham of Centrism,' (pp. 196-201). 'Centrism' is a particularly pernicious form of political ideology, precisely because it passes itself off as 'the reasonable and sensible middle,' or these days as 'pragmatism.' Plus, it is shifting all the time, and the right very successfully has shifted it in its direction. For the same reason, 'leading from the center' doesn't make sense, because picking people up where they are supposedly at, is the opposite of leadership.

According to Politico, Obama wants 80 Senate votes for his recovery plan. Given that there are 58 Democrats in the Senate now, why does he want an additional 22 Republicans? In order to get them, and all the Blue Dog Democrats, he will have to make a number of centrist/conservative concessions. In addition, this will likely delay the adoption of the bill, during a daily deepening crisis where time is of the essence. Why would he do that? Why doesn't he instead 'act like he won'?

Today, Obamaian 'pragmatism' and 'post-partisanships' are just new words for 'centrism,' which is now obsolete, having been surpassed by developments around the world. As Glenn Greenwald recently documented, 'centrism' is anything but new. In fact, this is what most Democrats have been doing, ever since Dukakis in 1988, who said 'this election isn't about ideology. It's about competence.' Greenwald explains:

The central tenets of the Beltway religion -- particularly when a Democrat is in the White House -- have long been "centrism" and "bipartisanship." The only good Democrats are the ones who scorn their "left-wing" base while embracing Republicans. In Beltway lingo, that's what "pragmatism" and good "post-partisanship" mean: a Democrat whose primary goal is to prove he's not one of those leftists.

Whatever else one might want to say about this "centrist" approach, the absolute last thing one can say about it is that there's anything "new" or "remarkable" about it. The notion that Democrats must spurn their left-wing base and move to the "non-ideological" center is the most conventional of conventional Beltway wisdom.

In his excellent column at the Wall Street Journal, 'Obama Should Act Like He Won,' Thomas Frank presents one of the best definitions and critiques of centrism that I have read in a long time. It is scathing and right on target:

There is no branch of American political expression more trite, more smug, more hollow than centrism. [...]

Centrism is something of a cult here in Washington, D.C., and a more specious superstition you never saw. Its adherents pretend to worship at the altar of the great American middle, but in fact they stick closely to a very particular view of events regardless of what the public says it wants.

And through it all, centrism bills itself as the most transgressive sort of exercise imaginable. Its partisans are "New Democrats," "Radical Centrists," clear-eyed believers in a "Third Way." The red-hot tepids, we might call them -- the jellybeans of steel.

The reason centrism finds an enthusiastic audience in Washington, I think, is because it appeals naturally to the Beltway journalistic mindset, with its professional prohibition against coming down solidly on one side or the other of any question. Splitting the difference is a way of life in this cynical town. To hear politicians insist that it is also the way of the statesman, I suspect, gives journalists a secret thrill.

Yet what the Beltway centrist characteristically longs for is not so much to transcend politics but to close off debate on the grounds that he -- and the vast silent middle for which he stands -- knows beyond question what is to be done

As this should remind us, the real-world function of Beltway centrism has not been to wage high-minded war against "both extremes" but to fight specifically against the economic and foreign policies of liberalism. Centrism's institutional triumphs have been won mainly if not entirely within the Democratic Party. Its greatest exponent, President Bill Clinton, persistently used his own movement as a foil in his great game of triangulation.

And centrism's achievements? Well, there's Nafta, which proved Democrats could stand up to labor. There's the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. There's the Iraq war resolution, approved by numerous Democrats in brave defiance of their party's left. Triumphs all.

Essentially, 'centrism' is a political ideology that combines and articulates neoliberalism and 'liberal' interventionism. It is all the more powerful the more it succeeds to delude people with its pretension that it is 'post-ideological.'

It cannot be repeated enough: 'Post-ideological' and 'post-partisan' politics is utter and dangerous nonsense. I am just waiting for the Obamaniacs to push it further and start talking about 'post-politics.' It is a myth, but a very powerful myth, that has served 'centrists' exceedingly well. It is high time to burst this pretentious bubble, especially right now that it is being vigorously reinflated.

Likewise, there is nothing 'radical' about the 'radical middle' or 'radical centrists.' And today more than ever the 'third way' is a deadend street, a slow-motion trainwreck, given the economic and ecological crises facing us. 'Centrism' means sustaining the unsustainable. It tends to reduce democracy to technocracy, a tendency that critical theorists have critiqued for decades, foremost among them Juergen Habermas.

Christopher Hayes, drawing pragmatist philosophy in his recent reflection on what kind of 'pragmatist' Obama might turn out to be, put it really well:

Dewey's pragmatism was reformist, not radical. He sought to ameliorate the excesses of early industrial capitalism, not to topple it. Nonetheless, pragmatism requires an openness to the possibility of radical solutions. It demands a skepticism not just toward the certainties of ideologues and dogmatism but also of elite consensus and the status quo. This is a definition of pragmatism that is in almost every way the opposite of its invocation among those in the establishment. For them, pragmatism means accepting the institutional forces that severely limit innovation and boldness; it means listening to the counsel of the Wise Men; it means not rocking the boat.

These two kinds of pragmatism, what I would be tempted to call the 'fake,' so-called 'common sense' pragmatism of the establishment, and the 'real' philosophical and historical pragmatism, are opposed to each other. Obama has staffed his administration almost exclusively with members of the now discredited ancien regime of neoliberalism and interventionism. His early positions on a whole range of issues, from the 'bailout' to 'entitlement reform,' and from Pakistan to 'clean coal,' also reflect these obsolete approaches. Many of his other policies represent only a return to the historical norm. Some progressives may be forgiven, after these exceptional eight years, for mistaking these changes for genuine progress. Doing less harm is not the same as doing good.

One can make the strongest case for the argument that for the US to adequately address not only its current crises, but also the ones that will be the defining challenges of the 21st century, it needs to radically change many of its major policies in a quasi-revolutionary shift to a sustainable environment, economy and society. Conservatism and 'centrism' have proven to be failures to even begin to address these challenges, only making them worse. Progressivism is the only viable alternative left that at least stands a chance of beginning to respond semi-adequately to systemic challenges such as catastrophic climate change, peak oil, a hyper-militarized foreign policy and an utterly unsustainable world economy, that threaten the very foundations of human civilization. This is how much the ground has shifted.

Even such a corporate outfit as the World Economic Forum, in its latest report, 'Global Risks 2009,' now acknowledges that global risks today are so 'interlinked,' that they necessitate much more coherent and effective global governance, which of course is a form of collective action at the highest level that, if anything, only progressivism can achieve, with its systematic emphasis on the need for more coordination, cooperation and integration.

Thomas Frank concludes his column by quoting from former House Majority Leader 'the hammer' Tom DeLay's 2007 memoirs that Republicans under his leadership learned 'to start every policy initiative from as far to the political right as we could,' thereby moving 'the center farther to the right.'

President-elect Obama can learn something from Mr. DeLay's confession: Centrism is a chump's game. Democrats have massive majorities these days not because they waffle hither and yon but because their historic principles have been vindicated by events. This is their moment. Let the other side do the triangulating.

Something tells me that Obama knows all this already. So why doesn't he act accordingly? The 'chump's game' of 'centrism' should insult both his intellect and his seriousness, assuming that he actually is serious about finding workable solutions to critical problems, and not primarily concerned with keeping if not expanding his majority in the 2010 midterm elections and getting re-elected in 2012.

And here's the rub: The crises we are facing now, and will continue to face in one form or another for the rest of the 21st century, can only be adequately addressed through radically changed policies, which must be consistently applied for decades. But in a political system that is geared towards winning elections every two to four years, this is almost impossible to achieve. But saying that we are already doomed and that it is too late to change guarantees that nothing will be done, and thus this assessment becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Obama just got elected President in this political system, which will continue to severely constrain his actions, no matter how brilliant and well-intentioned he may be. It is for this reason that progressives must develop a strategy that allows them to change both the structure of the political system and the ideology that supports it.

In short, politics is inescapably ideological, 'centrism is for phonies,' and 'post-partisanship' is bogus. At least for the next four years, Obama will be, not Pragmatist-In-Chief, as he and others would like us to believe, but unavoidably Ideologue-In-Chief. If progressives don't manage to develop and act on a strategy that allows them to at least nudge him to the left, early indications are that he will turn out to be yet another triangulating Centrist-In-Chief, and the results cannot possibly be better than some version of Clintonism 2.0. Given the enormous challenges, they are almost guaranteed to be worse. The stakes could not be higher.

'Approximately the Bush Position'

2009-01-23T19:33:00.004-05:00

In an interview with Democracy Now! today, Noam Chomsky characterized Obama's first substantive statements yesterday on the crisis in Gaza and Israeli-Palestinian relations more broadly as representing 'approximately the Bush position.' Likewise, he criticized the first statements by Obama's new Middle East envoy, George Mitchell, as basically continuing US policies that have been failing for decades to resolve the conflict.

Chomsky criticized them in particular for carefully omitting any serious criticism of Israel concerning its violation of international law, expansion of settlements in the West Bank and the fragmentation of Palestinians into what Ariel Sharon called 'bantustans,' and the brutal oppression of Palestinians. Until the US stops supporting Israel's policy and starts pressuring it to significantly change, Israel will continue doing what has been its official policy for decades:

JUAN GONZALEZ: Noam Chomsky, I’d like to ask you about the enormous civilian casualties that have shocked the entire world in this last Israeli offensive. The Israelis claim, on the one hand, that it’s the unfortunate result of Hamas hiding among the civilian population, but you’ve said in a recent analysis that this has been Israeli policy almost from the founding of the state, the attack on civilian populations. Could you explain?
NOAM CHOMSKY: They say so. I was just quoting the chief of staff—this is thirty years ago, virtually no Palestinian terrorism in Israel, virtually. He said, “Our policy has been to attack civilians.” And the reason was explained—you know, villages, towns, so on. And it was explained by Abba Eban, the distinguished statesman, who said, “Yes, that’s what we’ve done, and we did it for a good reason. There was a rational prospect that if we attack the civilian population and cause it enough pain, they will press for a,” what he called, “a cessation of hostilities.” That’s a euphemism meaning cessation of resistance against Israel’s takeover of the—moves which were going on at the time to take over the Occupied Territories. So, sure, if they—“We’ll kill enough of them, so that they’ll press for quiet to permit us to continue what we’re doing.”
Actually, you know, Obama today didn’t put it in those words, but the meaning is approximately the same. That’s the meaning of his silence over the core issue of settling and takeover of the Occupied Territories and eliminating the possibility for any Palestinian meaningful independence, omission of this. But Eban [inaudible], who I was quoting, chief of staff, would have also said, you know, “And my heart bleeds for the civilians who are suffering. But what can we do? We have to pursue the rational prospect that if we cause them enough pain, they’ll call off any opposition to our takeover of their lands and resources.” But it was—I mean, I was just quoting it. They said it very frankly. That was thirty years ago, and there’s plenty more beside that.

[...]
So, OK, we can have—in fact, you know, the first Israeli government to talk about a Palestinian state, to even mention the words, was the ultra right-wing Netanyahu government that came in 1996. They were asked, “Could Palestinians have a state?” Peres, who had preceded them, said, “No, never.” And Netanyahu’s spokesman said, “Yeah, the fragments of territory that we leave to them, they can call it a state if they want. Or they can call it fried chicken.” Well, that’s basically the attitude.
And Mitchell had nothing to say about it. He carefully avoided what he knows for certain is the core problem: the illegal, totally illegal, the criminal US-backed actions, which are systematically taking over the West Bank, just as they did under Clinton, and are undermining the possibility for a viable state.

At least so far, there is hardly any indication that any major change will occur in US policy concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Like any communication, political communication is highly selective. Its selectivity is largely determined by the structure of the system in which it takes place. The structures of social systems are cognitive, normative, and reflexive expectations. Cognitive expectations are anticipations of what is likely to happen and how things are likely to work. Normative expectations express what should happen. If we understand, with Harold Lasswell, values as desired goals, we can understand both values and norms, and interests as normative expectations. Finally, reflexive expectations are expectations of expectations. Once you understand how systems are structured, patterns of communication and behaviour become pretty predictable.

If we apply this to Obama's and Mitchell's most recent positioning on the the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we get something like this: Given the structure of US foreign policy, and the fact that the basic understanding of what constitutes 'US interests' in the Middle East has not changed, the result is the continuation of the traditional policy: Form follows function. To change the form (structure) of US policy, one needs to change its function. Yet this is very difficult to achieve, since structures have grown and solidified for many decades, and are full of vested interests and deeply entrenched positions.

It is this structure that determines the selectivity of communication and action. This explains how systems reproduce themselves over time, how they not only get from one moment to the next, but more importantly how they get from this position to that position. This is why Obama sounds very similar to Bush on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Mitchell sounds basically like Dennis Ross, Director of Policy Planning in the State Department under Bush 41 and Middle East envoy Clinton, who was rumored to also take up that position under Obama as well, and now is one of his top advisers on Middle East policy.

Here is what Chomsky has to say about Ross:

And you can understand it [the continuity from Bush to Obama] when you look at his advisers. So, say, Dennis Ross wrote an 800-page book about—in which he blamed Arafat for everything that’s happening—barely mentions the word “settlement” over—which was increasing steadily during the period when he was Clinton’s adviser, in fact peaked, a sharp increase in Clinton’s last year, not a word about it.

What is important to understand is that US policy has continued not because of the continued presence of people like Ross (that would be getting cause and effect reversed), but because the overall structure of US policy has not changed. 'Ross' and 'Mitchell,' just like 'Bush' and 'Obama' are just names, and what, after all, is in a name? What matters are not so much individuals and their differences (which can be considerable, of course), but structures and their continuity. This raises the fundamental question to what extent individuals can change social structures such as function systems, organizations, and networks.

The implication of all this for progressive strategy is that it should concentrate its efforts on changing those organizations in which resources and decision-making power is concentrated, i.e. governments and corporations. Organizations are by far the most powerful social actors because they can mobilize and bundle resources in collective action. This requires progressives in turn to strengthen their own organizations and networks and better coordinate their activities.

The Political Limitations of Obama's 'Big Brain'

2009-01-22T11:20:00.005-05:00

Robert Scheer is concerned that some of Obama's actions indicate that he is more likely to continue some of the major failed Bush policies, rather than changing them significantly. He singles out Obama's lobbying for the second half of the bailout, which is a crass example of corporate welfare at taxpayers' expense, and the escalation of a failing strategy in Afghanistan.

The good news is that we have a big-brain president. The question is: Will he use it?

That is good news indeed, especially after what we've had the last eight years. Obama may well be one of the most intelligent and intellectual presidents so far.

But the question is not whether he will use his immense intellect. Of course he will, just like he has in the past. The question is which of his ideas he can communicate and act on effectively, given the constraints within which he operates, and what might be called the 'logic' of US politics, which has a mind of its own, as it were.

For instance, he might actually believe that TARP should be changed significantly in order to do what it supposedly was intended to do, but so far has utterly failed to achieve. But he might be unlikely to say so, because this would jeopardize his support from Wall Street, from which he raised more money than any other president (His chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel, was one of the House members who raised the most from the same sources).

And probably he knows that 'clean coal' is a dangerous contradiction in terms, and yet feels constrained to support it, because that's how you win elections and get re-elected. Or that nuclear is unlikely - at tremendous costs and huge risks - to significantly reduce dependence on fossil fuels or emissions.

Again, the question is not what Obama, or any other politician, 'really' thinks - we will never for sure anyway. The question is what he can communicate politically, and political communication is highly selective in the statements it accepts and rejects. If people in general, and perhaps progressives in particular, better understood the very strict limits imposed by highly structured and scripted political communication and rhetoric, they could save themselves a lot uncalled for excitement and disappointment stemming from unrealistic expectations, and could instead invest those resources in changing the limits of what is politically not only acceptable, but actually stands a reasonable chance of success.

In other words, the political system has its own rationality, and it tends to be very different from the rationality of individuals and that of other social systems such as the economy, law, education or moral discourses. For example, the Kyoto Protocol, which aims to reduce GHG gas emissions, has failed to do so, in part because it is very difficult for the political and legal communication to lead to actual economic and environmental changes.

More fundamentally, this focus on individual rationality overestimates the capacity of individuals - and be they the most intelligent, best intentioned, and most resourceful - to change social systems that have their own rationality and are self-organized, and therefore are very difficult to 'steer.'

The traditional and still dominant understanding of politics is that it's the 'head' or the 'tip' of society, able to steer society in a certain direction. However, we can see more and more clearly that a globalized, functionally differentiated world society can't be effectively steered, because there is no position from which a collectively binding description of the world, its problems and its solutions could be formulated and implemented.

The implications of the functional differentiation of world society for the potential and limitations of political strategy are important, and we have only begun to think them through. It raises the core strategic question of where best to concentrate scarce resources.

Obama, a 'Liberal Wolf in Centrist Sheep's Clothing'?

2009-01-21T22:09:00.003-05:00

Victor Navasky disagrees with all those pundits calling Obama a 'centrist:'

First, as our friend and backer Paul Newman used to remind us, The Nation was valuable because it helps define where the center is. The center can shift. When Obama added to his ritualistic description of America as "a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus" a new category--"nonbelievers"--it was almost unbelievable, as he quickly helped redefine where the center was.
Second, based on what we know about Obama--his books, his initial intuitive stand against the war in Iraq, his Senate voting record, his campaign, his inaugural speech--I don't believe it. At most, he seems to me a liberal wolf in centrist sheep's clothing.

And finally, faced with the ever-more-dire economic crisis, his commitment to a Keynes-based economic stimulus and renewed regulatory rigor (see his inaugural reference to not letting the market "spin out of control") suggests that, at a minimum, he flunked Centrism 101.

Rather, I prefer to believe that his reach across the aisle, his cabinet appointments and his opening to the renegade Joe Lieberman and his erstwhile opponent John McCain himself are part of his pragmatic plan to advance an agenda that goes beyond anything the so-called center might contain. Whether or not it will work, that is the question.

All this of course remains to be seen. Obama's first day was certainly encouraging. But somehow I find it difficult to think of Obama as a 'liberal wolf in centrist sheep's clothing.' Perhaps it's more the other way around? Does Navasky's formulation, 'I prefer to believe,' perhaps still betray too much wishful thinking, as has been pretty common on the left lately concerning Obama's inclinations?

Divergent Fiscal Philosophies

2009-01-20T22:57:00.003-05:00

Bob Kuttner is concerned that Obama may buy into the conservative argument for 'gutting' Social Security and Medicare. This storyline has been pushed by Robert Rubin's Hamilton Project and the Concord Coalition for a while, and has received a recent boost by the newly formed Peter G. Peterson Foundation and the Peterson-Pew Commission on Budget Reform. Kuttner convincingly counters that this is essentially an ideological and not a fiscal debate.

Kuttner concludes:

So, just how will President Obama define fiscal responsibility, who will he choose to showcase, and to what end? It will be interesting to see whether his fiscal summit features people like Pete Peterson, David Walker, and Robert Rubin, and lends credence to their story--or whether he also gives the floor to their critics.
You can understand why, as matter of fiscal tactics, Obama would need to signal that it is possible and necessary to rely on large deficits in 2009 and 2010 to avert a recession, and then to get serious about fiscal discipline over the next decade once the economy has returned to decent growth. He needs to argue this to reassure the Blue Dogs in his own party, to win over some Republicans, and to get support of opinion leaders for his recovery strategy.

But there is more than one road to fiscal discipline. One entails gutting the few program that have survived the rightwing assault on social insurance. The other involves filling in the appalling gaps in social insurance and achieving fiscal balance by restoring the principle of taxation based on the ability to pay.

Once again, our new leader, who has inspired so much hope and who so wants to be a post-ideological president, needs to grasp that these are deeply ideological questions. To pretend otherwise is to allow the conservative version of the story to govern by default.

This is an excellent point, for these are fundamental strategic decisions about the future of this country, not just tactics. And questions of political strategy are always inescapably ideological,
because they are about what kind of world we are living in and about what kind of world we would like to live in.

You cannot not have an ideology in the sense of a worldview (Weltanschauung) and preferences. You can be 'post-ideological' as little as you can be 'post-partisan.' You might as well claim that you are 'post-political,' which would be even more nonsensical. Politics is precisely about positioning yourself, in term so how you see things and whether or not you would like to change them, and if so, how, and why this way and not that way? So how will Obama position himself, given how he has positioned himself? Where you stand very much depends upon where you sit.

The core insight of pragmatism is that since we cannot know for certain how the world 'really' is and could be, we should describe it in a way that furthers our values, interests, and preferences. Truth is what is better for us to believe in. Needless to say, it is obvious that the goals pursued by different types of progressives are irreconcilably divergent.

Of course, ideology is the most powerful when it is not perceived as such, but instead is passed off as 'common sense pragmatism', as it were, as simply a question of what works and what doesn't, without asking the primordial political question of who benefits and who loses? Is this what Obama is up to with all his rhetoric about pragmatism?

There is reason to be concerned, for Obama very deliberately placed all Rubinites in key economic positions: Summers, Geithner, and Orszag.

The Influence-Peddling Inauguration

2009-01-20T21:55:00.005-05:00

The the total cost of the inauguration is estimated to be more than $150 million. In comparison, Bush's 2005 swearing-in 'only' cost $42 million. Of that total amount, which some estimate at $170 million, 'only' $45 million come from private donors, but about 80% of these donations come from only some 200 wealthy bundlers, many of the them from Wall Street, according to a report by Public Citizen, The Presidential Inauguration, Brought to You by the Few, the Wealthy:

"It’s no wonder that Wall Street is pouring so much money into this inauguration," said David Arkush, director of Public Citizen’s Congress Watch division. "The executive branch has given bailouts worth trillions of dollars to Wall Street firms and is considering trillions more. Wall Street has a lot at stake. ...

"No doubt many donors give simply because they want to be part of history," said Craig Holman, government affairs lobbyist for Public Citizen. "But donors and bundlers who represent special interests with business pending before the government and who dole out five-figure checks to the inaugural committee usually want a seat at the table with the new administration. ...

"The inauguration is the last chance for big donors to throw money at the feet of the president," said Joan Claybrook, president of Public Citizen. "Inaugural festivities should not be a day of influence-peddling. The inauguration should be a time for peaceful transition in government, paid for with public funds.

In an interview with Democracy Now!, Obama's Inauguration, Sponsored by the Few, the Wealthy, Holman provides some more background:

And what do you suppose Wall Street wants in return for all this, for paying for all these activities? It’s pretty clear. I mean, Wall Street is right in the middle of the largest bailout program we’ve ever seen of the financial sector. Obama is going to be presiding over that bailout program in just a matter of a couple hours. And it’s Wall Street that wants a seat at Obama’s table, when it comes to deciding the nature of the bailout program.

As noted yesterday, there is overwhelming evidence that the 'bailout' has failed to encourage lending, and that Obama is committed to continue this form of corporate welfare at the expense of taxpayers. The way the inauguration has been financed provides further evidence.

Is Triangulation Back?

2009-01-20T00:35:00.003-05:00

Norman Solomon, board member of Progressive Democrats of America, already detects The Return of Triangulation:

The mosaic of Barack Obama's cabinet picks and top White House staff gives us an overview of what the new president sees as political symmetry for his administration. While it's too early to gauge specific policies of the Obama presidency, it's not too soon to understand that "triangulation" is back.

In Solomon's view, Obama is a 'centrist' and 'pragmatic' politician who will seek and occupy the center of political gravity. He quotes his biographer David Mendell, who describes Obama as

an exceptionally gifted politician who, throughout his life, has been able to make people of wildly divergent vantage points see in him exactly what they want to see.

Criticizing progressives for projecting their worldviews on Obama, he is concerned that the progressive base will again be frustrated and demobilized under Obama's triangulation, just as it had been under Clinton's in the 1990s.

Therefore, progressive grassroots need to move the center to the left, by reframing crucial policy choices, such as health care, Afghanistan, etc. This approach is very similar to what progressives like John Nichols recommend, and suffers from the same deficiencies.

Reframing of course is reminiscent of Lakoff's approach to framing and his Rockridge Institute, which had to close last year due to a lack of funds. The whole notion that the Left can change policies by changing public opinion through reframing issues has not been very successful, and needs to be fundamentally reconsidered.

Politics in large part is about the concentration and centralization of resources and decision-making power in organizations. Political power is largely organized power, and organizations are structures of power.

Therefore, progressives need to build and strengthen their own organizations and infrastructure more generally, in order to gain greater influence over and ultimately break into centrist and conservative power structures.

In other words, progressives can frame and reframe issues and policies all they want; as long as they don't have the organized power to make credible demands on those in power, all this activity is unlikely to lead to positions of strength, from which more power could be built.

'What Obama Should Read'

2009-01-19T23:47:00.003-05:00

Now that's progress! A president who likes to read! After all, it has been known for a long time that George W. Bush did not even read the one-page executive summary of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, only to turn around and trash it in the media.

The Washington Monthly has asked 19 of its favorite writers and thinkers to suggest the books Obama should read. The result is an interesting list of 25 books.

Joel Garreau, fellow at the New America Foundation, recommends The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World by Peter Schwartz, published in 1996. Here is how Garreau summarizes it:

It’s still the most accessible guide to thinking rationally, systematically, and strategically about futures you can’t possibly predict. Scenario planning is the antidote to the kind of futures bravado that caused us to roll into Iraq thinking there was no other possibility but that they’d throw rose petals at our feet. As change accelerates, you’ve got a lot more strange stuff coming at you, Mr. President. This is the conceptual guide on how to prepare.

While coming from a business and consulting perspective, it is good to be reminded of the importance of scenario planning for developing strategies for an unpredictable future.

Obamanomics: 'Wall Street Voodoo' and 'Kleptocracy'?

2009-01-19T21:42:00.008-05:00

The current bailout is unlikely to encourage more lending, because that's not what it's designed to do, and there does not seem to be a need for it, certainly no 'urgent' one, much less an emergency. Rather, it appears that Obama is likely to continue what Bush started, albeit in more subtle ways. At least for now, corporate welfare will continue unabated under Obama, and it makes sense, for he has raised more from Wall Street than any other president, and the donors who benefit most from the bailout are financing his inauguration. It's payback and party time, on the back of the taxpayers! Since the bailout cannot possibly be justified on its merits, it has to be sold differently. This is where voodoo comes in.

One day before the inauguration, Paul Krugman, in Wall Street Voodoo, suggests that Obama may be condoning a new kind of voodoo economics, primarily designed to avoid the 'N-word' (nationalization), and increasing the likelihood of failure:

Old-fashioned voodoo economics — the belief in tax-cut magic — has been banished from civilized discourse. The supply-side cult has shrunk to the point that it contains only cranks, charlatans, and Republicans.

But recent news reports suggest that many influential people, including Federal Reserve officials, bank regulators, and, possibly, members of the incoming Obama administration, have become devotees of a new kind of voodoo: the belief that by performing elaborate financial rituals we can keep dead banks walking.

[...]
What I suspect is that policy makers — possibly without realizing it — are gearing up to attempt a bait-and-switch: a policy that looks like the cleanup of the savings and loans, but in practice amounts to making huge gifts to bank shareholders at taxpayer expense, disguised as “fair value” purchases of toxic assets.
Why go through these contortions? The answer seems to be that Washington remains deathly afraid of the N-word — nationalization. The truth is that Gothamgroup and its sister institutions are already wards of the state, utterly dependent on taxpayer support; but nobody wants to recognize that fact and implement the obvious solution: an explicit, though temporary, government takeover. Hence the popularity of the new voodoo, which claims, as I said, that elaborate financial rituals can reanimate dead banks.
Unfortunately, the price of this retreat into superstition may be high. I hope I’m wrong, but I suspect that taxpayers are about to get another raw deal — and that we’re about to get another financial rescue plan that fails to do the job.

To learn about what Obama should be doing instead, read Krugman's What Obama must do: A letter to the new president, the cover story of the current Rolling Stone.

In Bailout a windfall for bankers, if not borrowers, in yesterday's International Herald Tribune,
one reads:

A review of investor presentations and conference calls by executives of some two dozen banks around the country found that few cited lending as a priority. An overwhelming majority saw the bailout program as a no-strings-attached windfall that could be used to pay down debt, acquire other businesses or invest for the future. ...
But a congressional oversight panel reported on Jan. 9 that it found no evidence the bailout program had been used to prevent foreclosures, raising questions about whether the Treasury has complied with the law's requirement that it develop a "plan that seeks to maximize assistance for homeowners."

The report concluded that the Treasury's top priority seemed to be to "stabilize financial markets" by simply giving healthy banks more money and letting them decide how best to use it. The report also said it was not clear how giving billions to banks "advances both the goal of financial stability and the well-being of taxpayers, including homeowners threatened by foreclosure, people losing their jobs, and families unable to pay their credit cards."

David Sirota, in A brief note to those who still insist the current bailout will spur more lending... on Open Left, describing how 'Obama partisans' try to make themselves feel better and calling this latest approach 'kleptocracy,' which really is not that different from what the Bush regime did for eight years, but perhaps more sophisticated, described as 'new voodoo' by Krugman above:

If you read news about the bailout very carefully, you'll see that the entire goal of the current bailout is to protect bank shareholders - not the taxpayers, homeowners or the financial system as a whole. ...
This is why progressives have been pushing for far more oversight, transparency and restrictions on what the bailout money can - and cannot - be used for. If the bailout was structured differently, it might start helping the economy. If our government was a bit less corrupt, we might have a much more effective bailout with strings attached - maybe, as the New York Times reports, we'd do what the British are doing by forcing bank executives to "sign legally binding agreements requiring them to provide more loans to consumers and businesses." But those are big ifs.
Sure, I know it makes Obama partisans feel better to tell themselves that the current bailout the president-elect endorsed is really designed to stop an imminent emergency, not just to raid the federal treasury on behalf of the Wall Street donor class. But the evidence - whether from the GAO, the Congressional Oversight Panel, and now from the banks themselves - continues to prove that this bailout is kleptocracy in its most naked form.

In Obama pushing bailout without solid plan in place, Sirota provides more background on why
president-elect Obama has threatened to veto any bill rejecting Bush's request to release the remaining $350 billion of the bailout fund:

This isn't much-ballyhooed "change" - it's money politics by a different name. How do we know? Because neither Obama nor anyone else is genuinely trying to justify the bailout on its merits - and understandably so. Even the most basic queries prove such merits don't exist.

This bizarre dynamic is anything but the "pragmatism" Obama rhetorically fetishizes - and America's anti-bailout majority knows it.
Sure, Obama might believe he's deft enough to seem courageously populist while using his White House to perpetuate kleptocracy. Perhaps he thinks the gravity of a veto threat will, for a second time, trick the nation into reluctantly accepting theft.

Or maybe before attempting more sleight of hand, Obama should take a moment away from studying Lincoln's speeches and Roosevelt's fireside chats and recall the irrefutable sagacity in one of the most (in)famous Bushisms of all.

"There's an old saying in Tennessee," the outgoing president said early in his first term. "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me (twice) - you can't get fooled again."

So exactly who is fooling whom here?

The January 9, 2009 report of the Congressional Oversight Panel notes that the government has 'not yet explained its strategy.' This, at least, is consistent, for it has none; and neither does Obama.

Does the world want to be betrayed? It sure seems like it. Never underestimate the allied powers of denial and wishful thinking.

And since much of the country on this eve of the inauguration seems to be in an ebullient and enthusiastic, if not euphoric party mood about the potential and promise of this great country, the following Bacchic metaphor seems justified: So far, the Obama administration shapes up to look like old wine in new wine skins. No 'new politics.' Instead old politics with a rather translucent 'post-partisan' veneer.

Towards a Realistic Left Strategy

2009-01-19T17:35:00.005-05:00

Last week, John Nichols, Washington correspondent of The Nation, published How to Push Obama in The Progressive.

Nichols recalls how he first covered Obama in the mid-1990s when he ran for the Illinois state senate as a candidate endorsed by the labor-left New Party. Nichols affirms that Obama self-identifies as a progressive, and quotes him:

I am somebody who is no doubt progressive. I believe in a tax code that we need to make more fair. I believe in universal health care. I believe in making college affordable. I believe in paying our teachers more money. I believe in early childhood education. I believe in a whole lot of things that make me progressive.

According to Nichols, Obama knows 'the specifics' of 'the left-labor-liberal-progressive agenda,' but is cautious, 'because knowing the ideals and values of the left is not the same as practicing them,' which Obama certainly hasn't.

So here is Nichols' main recommendation of how 'progressives' should 'push' Obama to the left:

The way to influence Obama and his Administration is to speak not so much to him as to America. Get out ahead of the new President, and of his spin-drive communications team. Highlight the right appointees and the right responses to deal with the challenges that matter most. Don't just critique, but rather propose. Advance big ideas and organize on their behalf; identify allies in federal agencies, especially in Congress, and work with them to dial up the pressure for progress. Don't expect Obama or his aides to do the left thing. Indeed, take a lesson from right wing pressure groups in their dealings with Republican administrations and recognize that it is always better to build the bandwagon than to jump on board one that is crafted with the tools of compromise.
Smart groups and individuals are already at it. [...]

The examples he gives are critiques of the bailout, and advocacy for civil liberties and single-payer health care.

Now, unfortunately, but rather predictably, this is really nothing new, because the Left has been criticizing policies and advocating for alternative policies for decades, with very little success.

It reminds me of the famous definition of insanity as 'doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results,' which is alternatively attributed to Albert Einstein or Benjamin Franklin.

One day before Obama's deeply historic and highly symbolic inauguration, it is high time for the Left to ask itself a very basic but also very important strategic question: Not only: Are we doing things right, but more importantly: Are we doing the right things? In other words, it is high time that the Left not only improves tactics, but changes strategy.

A good starting point for the Left is to remind itself that, in the words of Frederick Douglass,

Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will.

Effective strategy begins with a sober and realistic assessment of the current situation, including one's own position and resources. The sad truth is that the Left is simply not in a position to demand much of anything of Obama. It is simply too weak, if not to say marginal.

It lacks the leverage, and therefore the bargaining power to make demands on the Obama administration. Its 'threats' of withholding support lack credibility, because the consequences are simply not significant enough.

So the big strategic question the Left needs to answer is how to build power cumulatively and long-term, starting from a position of weakness, and how it can make use of the Obama administration in gaining strength, as opposed to the lost decade under Clinton.

Until the Left has adequately addressed this critical strategic question, it will simply continue doing what is has done for decades, with hardly any structural effect: It will criticize, complain, express outrage, suggest alternatives, etc. - but who is listening?

Obama will continue to tell leftists that he hears them loud and clear, and will, from time to time, give them the impression that he, in some ways, is really a leftie himself. But he won't listen to them, much less act on their recommendations, because he is constrained to operate in a very centrist if not conservative political and social structure.

To be fair, Nichols emphasizes the importance of changing public opinion. He could have used Lincoln's famous quote, which in recent months has been used ad nausea:

With public sentiment, nothing can fail. Without it, nothing can succeed.

And indeed, the left-liberal every day is filled to the brim with critiques, advocacy, alternatives, outrage, etc. This is what publications such as The Nation, The American Prospect, Dissent, Harper's, Mother Jones, TPMCafe, Campaign for America's Future, AlterNet, Common Dreams, Daily Kos, OpenLeft, etc. do, frequently recycling materials quite a bit, which leads to quite some redundancy.

But who is reading these publications, and more importantly: Who is acting on all this information? I think it is likely that the readership for all these publications is small, is more or less the same for each one of them, and that they hardly have any influence on the mainstream, much less on political decision-making.

Further to the left, let's say with the CounterPunch crowd, the typical take on Obama is that he is a centrist and the best you can hope for is Clintonism 2.0. Instead of dismantling the empire, he will simply manage it more efficiently. Instead of shifting from neoliberalism and the failed Washington Consensus to neo-Keynesianism (or better yet: full-fledged social democracy), he will simply sell neoliberalism with a social touch. Obama represents a new style rather than new substance.

But where do all these unrealistic assumptions and expectations come from in the first place? I suspect the blinding effects of ideology and wishful thinking play an important role. It is also much easier to continue coming up with laundry lists of desiderata, of all the things that should happen, just like you have done for years if not decades, instead of asking yourself why the Left is still so marginal, and developing a strategy to become less marginal. Further to the left, the better can easily become the enemy of the good: Since Obama won't overthrow capitalism, why bother?

Nichols concludes, as is very typical these days, with FDR's famous response to labour leaders after his election in 1932:

I agree with you, I want to do it, now make me do it.

In the case of the relationship between Obama and the Left, each of these three statements is questionable and problematic: What do Obama and the Left actually agree on, what does Obama really want to do that the Left wants him to do, and, most importantly: How should the Left 'make' Obama do the things it would like him to do, and why this way, and not another way?

Nichols' understanding of all three components of this statement are symptomatic of too many people on the left. Too many left-liberals actually believe the first two parts, and continue to think that essentially more of the same (more 'pressure,' more 'pushing') will nudge him to the left. Too many further to the left completely disagree with the first two parts, and therefore don't even need to try or do anything differently, because it is hopeless anyway, which of course if very convenient. They can just continue scoffing and sneering more or less cynically or become increasingly apathetic in what has been called 'sophisticated resignation.'

To better be able to analyze and characterize European foreign policy, Christopher Hill of the London School of Economics in the 1990s developed the concept of the 'capabilities-expectations gap,' which describes the relationship and gap between capabilities and expectations and how it has evolved historically. It might be useful to apply this concept to the relationship between the Left and Obama and to progressive strategy more generally.

There are two basic options. Either you maintain your high expectations, and try to strengthen your capabilities to better be able to realize them, or you reduce your expectations in the hope of better being able to meet them with capabilities that are likely to remain limited for a long time. The problem with too much of the Left today is that it maintains unrealistically high expectations and/or has still not found a viable way of strengthening its capabilities in a sustainable way. And so it continues to remain in lamentation mode as described above.

Just yesterday, Obama said again what he has said many times before, that in a country called America, 'everything is possible.' What is possible for the Left in the US under Obama's leadership? Such a realistic strategic assessment is fundamental for the Left today if it wants to stop squandering preciously scarce resources on both lamenting and dreaming, which are equally ineffective, and start concentrating its efforts on realistic goals. Above all, the Left needs to determine what not to do, and then actually stop doing it:

The essence of strategy is choosing what not to do. (Michael Porter, my emphasis)

Why Scale Back Successful 50-State Strategy?

2009-01-19T17:03:00.004-05:00

Howard Dean's 50-state strategy has been widely credited not only with effectively strengthening the Democratic Party across the nation, but also with helping Obama win the election. Some say that Obama went so far to tell Dean on election night that he couldn't have won without him.

Dean has just been replaced by Tim Kaine as chair of the DNC. Many believe that once Obama chose Emanuel as his chief of staff, Dean's fate was sealed, given Emanuel's criticism of the 50-state strategy in the past. Dean is clearly disappointed that Obama did not offer him a position in his administration:

"Obviously, it would have been great," Dean said in a telephone interview from his home in Burlington, Vt. "But it's not happening and the president has the right to name his own Cabinet, so I'm not going to work in the government it looks like."

But why has Kaine now decided, after first praising the 50-state strategy for its overwhelming success, that it would be scaled back? Because

You never should just do what you did yesterday.

This unconvincing justification has been appropriately mocked in the blogosphere.

But what might be the real reason? Perhaps Obama wants to leverage his extensive campaign network to gain greater control over the Democratic Party, which could be similar to the approach he took after winning the primary when he asked donors not to fund 527s so that his campaign could further centralize control over organization and messaging?

How to Strategize in Times of Crisis?

2009-01-18T17:52:00.003-05:00

Sunday, January 18, 6pm

In his Washington Memo, 2 Years After Campaign Began, a Different World, David E. Sanger reflects on the major changes that have happened since Obama declared his candidacy and wonders: 'So while the world has changed, Mr. Obama has changed with it. But how much?'

He quotes G. John Ikenberry, a leading scholar of international relations, who co-authored a study of the national security agenda facing the next president:

He’s facing the classic problem of having to handle a number of crises before he’s really got time to set out a long-term architecture.

Madeleine Albright expressed a related view, when she recently compared Obama's task to

redesigning the airplane while you’re flying it.

Indeed, the argument is frequently made that politics basically always takes place under time pressure, all the more under crisis conditions, and there certainly is no shortage of crises facing Obama: From Iraq to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea to the global economic crisis and the twin problems of peak oil and climate change.

Hence the crucial question: How do you develop a coherent strategy, much less a grand strategy, if the environment in which you want to implement it constantly changes and the future is fundamentally uncertain and unpredictable? In these circumstances, instead of making predictions, the best you can do is think systematically about the basic issues and trends and their strategic implications.

Still, politics in general and crisis management in particular, tend to be rather reactive - simply because political systems are forced to respond rapidly (just take the current economic crisis as an example), and always under conditions of less than perfect information concerning the situation, preferences, likelihood of outcomes, etc. But reacting to events and developments is in many ways the exact oppposite of acting strategically, which aims precisely at shaping the environment in which actors operate.

Given the many differences between Barack Obama and George W. Bush, it will be very interesting to see how much their strategies will differ in response to the challenges they face. Of course, the very challenges administrations choose to face are the result of their hopefully more rather than less strategic assessments. For example, while Bush ignored climate disruption, Obama has vowed to make it a priority.

And yet, given how much politics is about having to react to developments that are oftentimes largely out of control (including the unintended and unforeseeable consequences of deliberate policies), and within tight political and material constraints, it is understandable why many practitioners and theorists question the usefulness grand strategy under these conditions.

Analogously to Gandhi's famous response to a journalist's question of what he thought of Western civilization, some might be tempted to respond to the same question about grand strategy identically: 'I think it would be a good idea.'

Politicians such as long-term German chancellor Helmut Kohl, who was in power for 16 years, gave 'muddling through' ('Durchwursteln,' in German) a good name, and it certainly served him well, if not necessarily his country - an assessment which of course depends on your point of view.

Obama can only serve for eight years. If he should - and many hope he will - this will at least in part be due to his political strategy. The big question is, whom that political strategy will serve better, him or his country? After all, Bush also served for eight years ...

Given continued functional differentiation, can these two very different, and in some ways opposed political logics still be reconciled? And can a political strategy, can any political strategy, bridge the gap between one political strategy that focuses on gaining, maintaining, and expanding political power, and another, while also wanting to build power, does so in order to 'do good,' or at least to reduce harm?

On the eve of Martin Luther King Day, and two days before the inauguration of the first African American president, it seems appropriate to recall King's quote, which serves as the motto of this blog:

Power is the ability to achieve a purpose. Whether or not it is good or bad depends upon the purpose.

Yes, we have come a long way; and yes, we still have a long way to go. Where will, where can Obama lead us, and with what kind of strategy? What is the purpose of his power?

'Forgive and Forget?'

2009-01-17T18:01:00.003-05:00

Saturday, January 17, 2009

This is the title of Paul Krugman's latest column, in which he criticizes Obama's apparent inclination not to investigate and prosecute the Bush administration's systematic abuse of power.

Not holding them accountable sets a fatal precedent. It sends the message that it is acceptable to violate the Constitution and get away with it without any consequences, thereby increasing the likelihood that it will happen again. It would confirm that they are indeed above the law. Krugman concludes:

And to protect and defend the Constitution, a president must do more than obey the Constitution himself; he must hold those who violate the Constitution accountable. So Mr. Obama should reconsider his apparent decision to let the previous administration get away with crime. Consequences aside, that’s not a decision he has the right to make.

For confirmation and more details on this approach, see Glenn Greenwalds January 15 post, Establishment Washington Unifies Against Prosecutions.

Given the parallel to how Bush Sr. dealt with the Iran-Contra Affair during the Reagan era, this suggests much more continuity than change. Why is that? If this is not the time to hold members of the Bush administration accountable for what must be among the most extensive and egregious abuses of power, when could there ever be the right time?

Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that years of investigations and prosecutions would prove too divisive, as Krugman suggests, and would interfere with Obama's strategy of building a new, 'post-partisan' coalition with significant Repbulican participation.

UPDATE, Sunday, January 19, 2009

In today's post, Binding US Law Requires Prosecutions for those Who Authorize Torture, Glenn Greenwald, after presenting a series of undisputed premises and inescapable conclusions, himself comes to the conclusion that the evidence is so clear and overwhelming that the Obama administration has no choice but to investigate and prosecute.

He approvingly quotes from Hilary Bok's Some Facts for Obama to Consider of January 15, 2009:

It seems to me that these facts imply that if Barack Obama, or his administration, believe that there are reasonable grounds to believe that members of the Bush administration have committed torture, then they are legally obligated to investigate; and that if that investigation shows that acts of torture were committed, to submit those cases for prosecution, if the officials who committed or sanctioned those acts are found on US territory. If they are on the territory of some other party to the Convention, then it has that obligation. Under the Convention, as I read it, this is not discretionary. And under the Constitution, obeying the laws, which include treaties, is not discretionary either. (Greenwald's emphasis)

Greenwald himself concludes:

While those who argue that the US was right to torture because it's the US that did it are expressing a repugnant form of exceptionalism, at least they're being honest -- far more so than those who argue that Bush officials shouldn't be investigated or prosecuted while paying deceitful lip service to "the rule of law" and the idea that "no one is above the law."

The Potential of Web 2.0 for Social Movement Organizing

2009-01-16T14:11:00.003-05:00

'Social Movements 2.0' explores the potential of the emerging Web 2.0 for social movement organizing, including a list of five reasons for its relevance and of eight questions that are still open.

It refers to Global Labor Strategies, which looks very interesting, and Sally Kohn's alternative view, 'Real Change Happens Offline.'

The 43 Who Helped Make Bush One of the Worst Presidents

2009-01-16T13:46:00.003-05:00

The always informative Progress Report just published this depressing list of 43 of his appointees who helped him create one of the worst US presidencies ever. It is ranked, presumably by harmfulness.

This list makes you wonder what kind and how much change Obama's 'new team' will be able to bring about, given Bush's disastrous legacy and the crisis the country is in.

The Left's Wishful Thinking and a Failing Strategy

2008-11-24T23:00:00.004-05:00

Wishful thinking is a poor substitute for strategy.

William Greider puts it really well in his comment in The Nation today, with perhaps a hint of self-criticism, that easily could apply in much larger measure to The Nation more generally:

A year ago, when Barack Obama said it was time to turn the page, his campaign declaration seemed to promise a fresh start for Washington. I, for one, failed to foresee Obama would turn the page backward. The president-elect's lineup for key governing positions has opted for continuity, not change. Virtually all of his leading appointments are restoring the Clinton presidency, only without Mr. Bill. In some important ways, Obama's selections seem designed to sustain the failing policies of George W. Bush.

This is not the last word and things are changing rapidly. But Obama's choices have begun to define him. His victory, it appears, was a triumph for the cautious center-right politics that has described the Democratic party for several decades. Those of us who expected more were duped, not so much by Obama but by our own wishful thinking.

What is more, as Greider points out, the Rubinites Summers, Geithner, Orszag and Furman are more likely to merely better manage a failing strategy than to change course:

Wasting more public money on insolvent mastodons is the least of it. The real scandal is it doesn't work. It can't work because the black hole is too large even for Washington to fill. Government should take over the failing institutions or force them into bankruptcy, break them up and sell them off or mercifully relieve everyone, including the taxpayers.

The more things "change," the more they stay the same? As German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt used to say, 'if you suffer from visions, go see a doctor.'

Michigan, the Ohio of 2008?

2008-09-19T16:34:00.009-05:00

Will Michigan and Motown decide the presidential election?

"If he carries Michigan, many routes to victory are open for Barack Obama. Without Michigan, he's got a big problem," said E. J. Dionne Jr in the Washington Post. "Michigan could be to this election what Ohio was in 2004 and Florida was in 2000."

Pollster Stanley Greenberg, who is said to have studied the state for years, points out that its economy has suffered the most (with 9% it has the highest unemployment rate in the country), and voters are angry and blame both parties, which makes it very difficult for either to win.

Obama hopes to win big in Detroit, but this has been made much more difficult by the scandal surrounding former mayor Kwame Kilpatrick.

The "Big Bailout" - a "Historic Swindle"

2008-09-19T16:34:00.005-05:00

Friday, September 19, 2008: This is one for the history books, as they say. The response by the US government to the greatest financial crisis in US history risks being too little too late and does not adequately address the root cause. And it does it in a way that continues one of the oldest games in town: Privatize profits and socialize costs. Long live the moral hazard! To put this into historical perspective, take a look at this very useful time-line from 1929 to 2008, aptly titled Deregulating Our Way to Disaster.

To be sure, it is historic:

As Senator Christopher J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut and chairman of the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, put it Friday morning on the ABC program “Good Morning America,” the congressional leaders were told “that we’re literally maybe days away from a complete meltdown of our financial system, with all the implications here at home and globally.”
Mr. Schumer added, “History was sort of hanging over it, like this was a moment.”
When Mr. Schumer described the meeting as “somber,” Mr. Dodd cut in. “Somber doesn’t begin to justify the words,” he said. “We have never heard language like this.”

More to the point, according to William Greider, it is on track to end up as a a "historic swindle:"

Let me be clear. The scandal is not that government is acting. The scandal is that government is not acting forcefully enough--using its ultimate emergency powers to take full control of the financial system and impose order on banks, firms and markets. Stop the music, so to speak, instead of allowing individual financiers and traders to take opportunistic moves to save themselves at the expense of the system. The step-by-step rescues that the Federal Reserve and Treasury have executed to date have failed utterly to reverse the flight of investors and banks worldwide from lending or buying in doubtful times. There is no obvious reason to assume this bailout proposal will change their minds, though it will certainly feel good to the financial houses that get to dump their bad paper on the government.

One might think that those who contributed to the crisis and benefited the most all along, should bear the cost of the recovery. But instead of the investors and speculators, the taxpayers will pay - business as usual.

How Obama and McCain manage to be perceived in this crisis will likely be the most important factor deciding this election. So far, it seems to favor Obama.

In any case, the consequences of this mega-bailout are disastrous. It will make it virtually impossible to finance a progressive agenda:

As for costs, he [Henry Paulson] said no more than it will involve a significant investment of taxpayer dollars. A better adjective than "significant" might be "staggering." The economic tar pit is so deep and so sticky it may be necessary to sacrifice wildlife programs, preschool education and scientific research. Even without knowing the numbers, we can kiss health insurance goodbye. If and when Obama gets in, he will discover the cupboard is bare.

Political Marketing versus Political Persuasion

2008-08-06T15:18:00.003-05:00

Please note: This is a comment by S. M. Miller, Senior Fellow at the Commonwealth Institute, on Progressive Arguments Win Big by Mike Lux, President of Progressive Strategies, and on public opinion research more generally. It is also posted on the blog of the Grassroots Policy Project.

The focus group-polling approach of Drew Westen-Stan Greenberg-Mike Lux is certainly more sophisticated and more technically developed than usual political polling techniques. Nonetheless, it still suffers from contextlessness: the responses of the opposition and events in the nation are ignored. Furthermore, it is short-term election-oriented; based on a consumer marketing approach that assumes that political behavior operates as does consumer behavior (only words and imagery count).

Hidden in the approach is that it assumes that the progressive task is only/mainly to elect Democratic/progressive candidates rather than to persuade a majority of voters to progressive outlooks, causes, policies. For example, the Clinton Administration did not fail progressives but progressives failed to convince Clintonites that the majority of voters demanded progressive policies. Progressives did not persuade voters, a longer-term task than increasing the number of Democratic elected officials.

Certainly, short-term political marketing can persuade/change voters’ outlooks, understandings, demands. Such changes are unlikely to be substantial, widespread and persevering as the opposition responds. Needed is a long-term strategy to persuade voters (and to attract non-voters) to progressive perspectives and proposals.

Great, revolutionary changes have occurred since 1960 in regard to race, gender, sexuality, much beyond what anyone then would have predicted. These transformations did not depend on nor derive from marketing approaches or even key words or phrases.

True, these changes were largely political (voting exclusion) and cultural (social relationships) though they did have significant economic impact, pressuring for once-excluded people to move into job niches from which they had been excluded. These great achievements did not much increase support for progressive ideas about the economy. For example, more people support a flat tax (everyone paying the same percentage of their income) rather than a progressive income tax where the tax rate increases as income rises); similarly, a strong (?) majority favor low or no taxes on estates. More than a key word will be needed to change such outlooks.

A favorite irritation of mine: Some months ago Secretary of Defense Gates told Congress that the Defense Department started its annual budget preparations by assuming that four percent of gross domestic product (no matter how rapidly GDP grows) should go to the Department, rather than deciding what its necessary or prospective needs would be. (Special needs like an invasion or a new technological development require additions to the four percent funding ) That outrageous, nonsensical formulation received very little notice (it was reported but not editorialized in the New York Times but not much elsewhere then or since).. A telling, perhaps humorous, phrase to undermine this way of thinking would be useful. More would be needed, however, to persuade the American people and Congress to act to require a more sensible DOD budget and military role, perhaps extending to American foreign policy outlooks.

An example of a needed progressive persuasion effort is improving attitudes toward American governments’ quality and performance. While the Bush II administration has performed effectively in tarnishing the reputation of the federal government, generally negative assessments of government have long prevailed: “they waste our tax dollars.” Again, some evocative phrasing could help, but people do respond to ways in which government acts, not just to words. Actual improvement of governmental functioning has to be the basis of long-term and durable changes in attitude.

Marketing or response triggering within a persuasion campaign can be useful but it is not a substitute for persuasion. Too much emphasis on response triggering can block the long-run need to work on persuading the American people to new progressive outlooks. That effort probably requires much more long-term organizing at grass-roots levels as well as effective performance by Democratic and progressive officials (and advisors).

S.M. Miller, Senior Fellow, Commonwealth Institute

Progressives Need a More Appealing Alternative Narrative

2008-08-01T14:52:00.005-05:00

Ira Chernus, professor of religious studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder, expresses his concern in his latest contribution to Tom Dispatch, War Meets Values on Campaign Trail: Will the Big Winner of 2008 Once Again Be a Conservative Culture-Wars Narrative?

He suggests that "the so-called culture wars" have shifted from social issues to national security, and that this is McCain's "only chance" to win. He argues that McCain will increasingly try to attract the so-called "values voters" by referring to his "experience," with which they can more readily identify than with Obama's.

Pundits and activists who oppose the war in Iraq generally assume that the issue has to work against McCain because they treat American politics as if it were a college classroom full of rational truth-seekers. The reality is much more like a theatrical spectacle. Symbolism and the emotion it evokes -- not facts and logic -- rule the day.

This is an important consideration for progressive electoral strategy, and for progressive strategy more broadly. Perhaps progressives have to abandon their assumption that if people only knew the facts and gained enough insight, they would adopt their positions. Indeed, as psychologist Drew Westen argues in The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation (2007), emotions and symbolism play a key role in politics, and especially in elections. But symbolism and emotions cut both ways, which is clearly evidenced by both the excitement and the lingering concerns surrounding Obama, and McCain's enduring appeal.

In a section appropriately entitled "Creating New Stories," Chernus makes a number of important points and suggestions that progressives would to well to take into consideration and act on.

He starts out by pointing out that there is nothing "natural" about many Americans sharing a conservative understanding of certain values. Rather, it is the result of cultural evolution, which can be influenced, at least to some degree. This is very much a question of the relative power of different groups over public discourse, making their ideology more or less hegemonic.

Yet there is no law of nature that says the "ordinary American," white working class or otherwise, must value individualism, self-reliance, patriotism, and war heroics while treating any value ever associated with the 1960s as part of the primrose path to social chaos. In reality, of course, the "ordinary American" is a creature of shifting historical-cultural currents, constantly being re-invented.

Chernus attributes that fact that a conservative interpreation of certain core values is still so widespread among the white working class at least in part to progressives having neglected to develop "alternative narratives" that could address their concerns in meaningful ways. In short, their failure is in good part their own fault.

But the 1960s does indeed remain a pivotal era -- not least because that is when liberal, antiwar America largely did stop caring much about the concerns and values of working-class whites. Those workers were treated as an inscrutable oddity at best, an enemy at worst. Liberals didn't think about alternative narratives of America that could be meaningful across the political board. Now, they reap the harvest of their neglect.

It does no good to complain about "spineless Democrats" who won't risk their political careers by casting courageous votes against war. Their job is to win elections. And you go to political war with the voters you have. If too many of the voters are still trapped in simplistic caricatures of patriotism and national security created 40 years ago -- or if you fear they are -- that's because no one has offered them an appealing alternative narrative that meets their cultural needs.

It does no good to complain that such working-class views are illogical or stupid or self-destructive. As long as progressives continue to treat "ordinary Americans" as stupid and irrelevant, progressives will find themselves largely irrelevant in U.S. politics. And that's stupid, because it doesn't have to be that way.

Indeed, there is still way too much sterile scoffing going on on the left. Not that critical analysis isn't important; indeed it is essential. But if this is the main if not the only thing you do, it is counterproductive, for there is a huge opportunity cost: If you spend all the time criticizing, you don't have any resources left to develop viable alternatives. I am afraid this is in part due to convenience, if not laziness, for it is so much easier to complain and to lament than to develop realistic alternative strategies for how to achieve significant change.

What can be done to change this picture? Facts and logic are rarely enough, in themselves, to persuade people to give up the values narratives that have framed their lives. They'll abandon one narrative only when another comes along that is more satisfying.
Democrats started looking for a new narrative after the 2004 election, when the media told them that "values voters" ruled the roost and cared most about religious faith. The result? Democrats, some of them quite progressive, are creating effective faith-oriented frames for their political messages.

Yes, framing issues by using language and symbols that evoke positive emotions and that appeal to peoples' faith is important. Indeed, framing was Lakoff's favorite tactic, but he has fallen from grace, and his Rockridge Institute had to close due to a lack of funding. Apparently, framing is not enough, and this tactic should not be confused with strategy. And it remains to be seen how far Westen's ideas on emotions and politics will go.

Isn't this precisely what Obama is trying to do by appealing to our "better angels" with his emphasis on "hope" and "change," and by reaching out to religious communities? But will it be enough? As Obama himself continues to point out, there are some differences between him and McCain that he can't change: Black/white, young/old, different names, etc. What difference will these differences make in the perception and behavior of voters? Nobody knows, but some forecasing models quantify "ballot-box racism" with up to ten percentage points ...

Be that as it may, the task for progressives remains to systematically develop alternative narratives that speak to conservatives, and especially the white working class, in meaningful ways. But a change in discourse by itself is not enough. It has to be accompanied by a simultaneous change in government and policies that allow people to experience the benefits of public policies.

The problem in articulating semantic and structural changes is that the latter take much longer to bring about than the former. Perhaps this is one reason why many progressive funders seem to prefer projects that promise to change discourses: They achieve their results so much faster. But since they typically don't lead to structural changes, while valuabe in and of themselves, their effects tend to dissipate and don't build anything lasting in a cumulative way. Perhaps this is one of the reaons why the left has remained so weak over the past 40 years.

In sum, raising consciousness and changing discourses are necessary but by no means sufficient steps to achieve structural change. They need to be integrated into a larger strategy that manages to build power cumulatively in the long-term from a position of weakness. This starts with a realistic assessment of progressive resources, and requires a theory of change that can make a credible case for what tactics and operations will lead to which change and why - but this is the subject of a future post.

"New and Not Improved"

2008-07-04T15:46:00.004-05:00

This is the appropriate title of today's editorial in the New York Times, criticizing Obama for his reversal on several major issues since winning the primary:

We are not shocked when a candidate moves to the center for the general election. But Mr. Obama’s shifts are striking because he was the candidate who proposed to change the face of politics, the man of passionate convictions who did not play old political games.

Since winning the primary in early June, Obama has indeed repositioned himself on major issues in significant ways: Fundraising; public-finance; interest groups, for now in the form of faith-based initiatives; and illegal wiretapping. The Times also expresses its dismay with his position on gun control and the death penalty.

While it is typical for Democrats to tack right after the primary to resposition themselves to win the general election, the debate about Obama's reversal is more heated than usual since he portrayed himself as a new type to politician who would transcend the old ways.

But his shift in positions so far suggests that he might actually be what some were worried about he was all along: A centrist camouflaged as a transformational politician, and not the other way around!

Also see yesterday's post on this. This is a debate that will go on for a long time as people try to figure out who Obama "really" is. There can be no doubt that he is new; but is he really different? Or perhaps better: How different can a candidate for the US Presidency in 2008 really be?

Perhaps he could allow himself the 'luxury' of portraying himself as being 'above' if not 'beyond' politics-as-usual only during the primary; or perhaps he even had to in order to win it. Be that as it may, it is more than ironic for such a shrewd politician as Obama to pretend to be post-political. To be political means, among many other things, to take a position. One can be as little post-political as one can be post-positional, as it were.

Whether you like it or not, and whether you know it or not, you are always already positioned, simply by virtue of being in the world. One cannot not have a position. We all occupy a location in space and time, and more importantly in society and culture, including the economy, politics, law, education, what have you. More often than not, it seems that where we stand depends on where we sit ... - but that is, I was going to say, a different debate, until it occured to me that it actually is quite relevant.

In order to win the presidency, there is a certain number of things you have to do. But by doing all these things, chances are you come to conform almost totally with the system. Perhaps the system has come to function in such a way that it only allows those to run successfully who don't fundamentally challenge and threaten it, as commentators such as Alexander Cockburn have suggested. It should come as no surprise that candidates such as Ralph Nader or Dennis Kucinich never make it very far. But if the contemporary US political system operates in such a way that it almost automatically and necessarily co-opts the candidates, how can it be changed? How can you lead if you have to follow the demands of the system most of the time? How can you change the system if even trying to do so is precisely what will make you loose?

In any case, if you don't assume and defend your positions, especially in politics, others will do it for you - and that's of course the last thing you want to happen, especially in the midst of a campaign. So whenever you communicate, make decisions, take measures, allocate resources, vote, etc., you position yourself, for everyone to see in bright daylight. And now we can see how Obama is repositioning himself. Do actions still speak louder than words? And what is the relationship between rhetoric and action, between slogans and decisions, between words and deeds? Does it still make sense to talk about 'integrity' in this context?

Quo vadis, Obama?

2008-07-03T15:16:00.010-05:00

In his column of June 30, 2008, noting how similar the current election feels to those of 1980 and 1992 Paul Krugman reflected on a set of important and related questions regarding Obama's "real" agenda: If elected, would be "a Ronald Reagan of the left," bringing about significant change, or "just another Clinton"? Is he moving to the right, as he has done in recent weeks, because he thinks he has to in order to win big, which would then allow him to bring about major change? Or does his "triangulation and poll-driven politics" actually make it harder for him to win? What is the relationship between how a candidate campaigns and how he governs? And perhaps most importantly, is Obama a "transformational figure behind a centrist facade," like so many progressive activists would like to believe, or actually a centrist behind a transformational facade. How much is substance and how much is style?

To these important questions, Krugman tentatively suggests a few answers. They are also relevant for progressive strategy and the ongoing debate on how best to nudge Obama to the left, difficult as this is likely to be, especially if he doesn't move much by himself.

For now, Krugman concludes, Obama looks more like Clinton, and pretty centrist. The parallels between Clinton and Obama are indeed noteworthy: Projecting the image of transcending traditional divides; not more but smarter government; the economic plan; etc.

Krugman concludes:

In any case, what about after the election? The Reagan-Clinton comparison suggests that a candidate who runs on a clear agenda is more likely to achieve fundamental change than a candidate who runs on the promise of change but isn’t too clear about what that change would involve.
Of course, there’s always the possibility that Mr. Obama really is a centrist, after all.
One thing is clear: for Democrats, winning this election should be the easy part. Everything is going their way: sky-high gas prices, a weak economy and a deeply unpopular president. The real question is whether they will take advantage of this once-in-a-generation chance to change the country’s direction. And that’s mainly up to Mr. Obama.

Indeed, there has been the concern all along that Obama raises very high expectations in trying to win the election, which he then can't meet once in office, because of the power structure he enters, and because of the very bad shape this country is in. I wish I could share Krugman's optimism that it is "mainly up to Obama" which direction this country takes. I am afraid that even a very progressive Obama could only do so much.

This is precisely where progressive strategy comes in. While for electoral strategists getting Obama elected is the ultimate goal of strategy, in our understanding it is, if not the beginning, at best one component. For immediately, the question becomes: Now what? How to move Obama to the left? This raises the crucial strategic question of how best to articulate what we call movement-electoral strategies to get progressives elected, and then, once in office, how to hold them accountable to a progressive agenda.

The Obama Phenom: Movement or Fan Club?

2008-05-14T13:09:00.008-05:00

It's all about control, isn't it? That's what modern politics is largely about, especially when it comes to campaigns: Controlling the organization, controlling the money, controlling the message, shaping perceptions, managing expectations, etc. This of course is opposed to the idea of a movement which literally moves politics in a certain direction. More broadly, a strong argument can be made that democracy is about the distribution of power and wealth, precisely to counter their concentration. Another word for control of course is power.

There is an ongoing debate about whether what the Obama campaign is building is a movement that genuinely transforms the Democratic Party, US politics and ultimately US society in a genuinely progressive way or whether it essentially is a fan club whose ultimate goal is to get him elected and is likely to crumble once this goal has been achieved. I am afraid to say that so far it looks more like the latter, though it might have the potential to become an actual movement. Needless to say, the strategic implications of this assessment for movement-electoral strategies are enormous.

Top blogger and Obama supporter Matt Stoller claims that

Obama is both transforming Democratic politics through aggressive and hypercompetent web-based organizing on a scale we've never seen, and centralizing power around his campaign by cutting down outside groups.

This is his summary of a longer post he did on May 7 on Obama's Consolidation of the Party, in which he emphasizes that Obama is already the new party leader who "dominates" the party.

At the same time, he refers to the Obama "movement." Curiously, he does not address the contradiction between a top-down approach that centralizes power, in large part precisely to control the message of "unity and hope and change," and a social and political movement that by definition emerges and operates from the bottom up. According to some, a key characteristic of a movement is precisely that no one is in control of it, and least of all the great leader at the top. On the contrary, the leadership might be scared, if not concerned, precisely because it is afraid of losing control. Of course, in election campaigns, you can't have that. In fact, this is probably your greatest fear. You don't want to get "swiftboated," as Kerry did in 2004. Hence the inherent tension between campaigns and movements. Some go so far as to argue that therefore you can't build a movement around a campaign. But perhaps a campaign can contribute to the emergence of a movement?

According to Stoller, the desire of the Obama campaign to control the whole operation does not stop at messaging and framing, but of course includes organization and funding. The Obama campaign has made it clear to donors, including the Democracy Alliance, that they prefer to support their campaign directly, and explicitly freeze out 527s, such as America Votes, which is still around, and the newly founded Progressive Media USA, among others. So the priority to centralize everything within the campaign applies to both voter mobilization and media operations. Interestingly, McCain is trying to do the same, though much less successfully. Again, the ultimate goal seems to be to concentrate control over the message as much as possible. Stoller refers to a piece by Ben Smith and an article in the Washington Post for more details on this effort to marginalize 527s.

Stoller, as do many other bloggers and lots of young people in general, seems to accept Obama's message and runs with it; but he appears to be taking it too fast, and too far, and perhaps too literally: The old style of partisan politics is over, and is now being replaced by a new style of post-partisan (and, very conveniently, also post-racial) politics, reminiscent of third way politics a la Blair and DLC. This is like taking politics out of politics, and what you end up with is post-politics, "politics" after the end of politics, which is largely symbolic politics at the expense of substantive politics.

The problem is that it does not work. Politics means to take sides. As soon as you position yourself, you are located somewhere on the political and ideological spectrum, whether you know and like it or not. It is unavoidable. If you are for privatizing social security, that is your position. If you are in favor of single-payer health care, that is where you stand, etc. Politics is like breathing, you cannot not do it, at least not for very long.

This last point is also emphasized by Adolph Reed, who argues that you can't really build a movement around a campaign. He points out that the movements that moved FDR and then JFK and LBJ in certain directions had organized for many years, long before those politicians came to power. Indeed, as is well known from the history of the civil rights movement, organizing began back in the 1930s in the South, gained momentum in the 1950s, and finally came to fruition in the 1960s. For Reed, the Obama campaign is not a movement; it is a fan club.

By the way, Reed also argues that Obama is not electable essentially because he is making the same mistake that all Democratic presidential candidates have made, which is to run as centrists only to realize that this is not credible enough for too many centrists and conservatives. According to Reed, Clinton was no exception to this pattern; he was saved by Perot. While I am not as pessimistic, looking at Obama's coalition and electability, this is certainly one of the major obstacles to be concerned about.

Be that as it may, perhaps the Obama campaign is a new kind of hybrid between campaign and movement, combining elements of both. This is what Micah Sifry suggests in What is Obama's Movement?

In response to Stoller's Obama's Consolidation of the Party, he partly echoes my own thoughts:

I'm not sure I agree with all of his conclusions about Obama's dominating and remaking the Democratic Party, but there's surely huge potential in their blending of top-down message discipline, net-centric outreach, Alinsky-UFW-Ganz-inspired field work, Camp Obama trainings, Obama Organizing Fellows, and a new 50-state voter registration effort.

And he goes on to pose what is perhaps the key question:

Will the Obama movement be a real movement that pushes its leader to keep his promises? Or will it be more of a personalized movement of followers attracted to a charismatic star? Will the network talk laterally and organize pressure upward? We don't know the full answer yet.

Of course, after the above critique of Stoller's (and many others') celebration of Obama's presumed post-partisan politics, this immediately raises the follow-up question: Keeping which promises exactly, given that the campaigns so far have been largely about symbols at the expense of substance. Given that campaign strategy tends to influence governing strategy - if "only" to get re-elected the next time around - this raises concerns about how Obama might govern and what he would and would not be able to achieve - but that is a topic for another post.

In sum, a campaign is largely about control, and Obama increasingly is in control, not only of his campaign, but of the Democratic Party; a movement is something that is out of control. You have to control a campaign, but you cannot control a movement. Can the two be productively combined? And if so, how?

Progressive Grand Strategy: Goals - A Response to Shai Sachs

2008-04-15T14:34:00.005-05:00

This is a preliminary response to Shai Sachs' Outlining a Progressive Grand Strategy, Part I - Goals and Assessment (full disclosure: Shai is a personal friend). We are very happy about his response, which is in part inspired by our report, Finding Strategy, which he also reviewed, because one of our goals is to stimulate discussion of grand strategy, which unfortunately we have not been able to find much of so far. Our basic premise is that a more systematic and sophisticated approach to progressive strategy can contribute towards making it more effective in building power over the long-term, in a cumulative and comprehensive way.

Shai differentiates between political and cultural goals, and begins to analyze both of them. The distinction between these two types of goals is useful - more on that later. Indeed, as Shai points out, most progressive focus on political goals. This is very important, because strategies are very much goal-driven, and as goals diverge - as they do significantly between different types of progressives (centrists/moderates, liberals, left-liberals, leftists) - so do strategies: Neoliberalism, for instance, is very different from social democracy, and everything that comes and goes with these two, in many ways diverging traditions.

We have begun to address this in our report by differentiating between three major types of strategy: Electoral, movement, and movement-electoral. It seems to me that these types of strategy tend to correlate somewhat with the ideological orientation of their proponents, though this is by no means a hard and fast rule: Centrists/moderates seem to be primarily interested in winning elections, and tend to focus on methods and tactics that they think are most likely to achieve this goal (polling, sociodemographic analyses, framing, messaging, voter mobilization, etc.). On the other end of the progressive spectrum, as it were, those primarily if not exclusively interested in building movements, if not the movement, essentially through grassroots organizing, tend to be further to the left. Finally, there seems to be a growing number of progressives who increasingly focus on how best to combine movement and electoral strategies, and how to articulate their relationship most effectively. Here, progressives seem to be coming from both ends of the spectrum, and it seems that this offers the greatest potential.

Paul Wellstone used to emphasize what might be called a 'progressive trinity:'

There are three critical ingredients to democratic renewal and progressive change in America: good public policy, grassroots organizing and electoral politics. [...] Electoral politics without grassroots community organizing is a politics without a base, community organizing without electoral politics is a marginal politics, and electoral politics and community organizing without good, sound public policy is a politics without a head.

I'd be tempted to develop this metaphor further, hopefully without pushing it too far, into a kind of progressive body politic, as it were. Thus, movement and infrastructure are the legs that move politics (and culture) in a progressive direction. Elected officials and politicians at the local, state, and national level are the arms and the hands that change policies at that level. And there already is an abundance of excellent progressive thinking on public policy. So the head of the progressive movement, the collective intelligence, as it were, with the vision and the ideas, already exists (The Progressive Strategy Brain understands itself as a contribution to this.). The main challenge is to integrate these three components into a functioning body of strategy, so to speak. And again, this is a very hard challenge for progressives, because on all three levels - grassroots, elections, and policy - there are significant differences between and among progressives. Grand strategy requires a lot of coordination, cooperation, and ultimately integration.

Closely related to this progressive trinity is another trinity, the differentiation of power developed by Steven Lukes, and known as the three faces (or levels, dimensions) of power, which has strongly influenced the strategic work of the Grassroots Policy Project, among others:

Decision-making power, i.e. the visible, highly institutionalized and organized governing and ruling power of governments
Non-decision-making power, referring to agenda-setting and the closely related infrastructural level
Ideological power, arguably the most important level, since the ability to influence the self-understanding of people, their ideas, attitudes, interests, and desires of people is the most effective way of exercising power

These three levels of power identify another set of key challenges progressives are facing, and that progressive strategy needs to address systematically. The relative weakness of progressives on all three levels is well known. Given scarce resources, including time, attention and energy - and not only money and personnel - a key question in strategy always concerns prioritizing and sequencing, in other words: Where should progressives start, and what aspect should they privilege, necessarily at the expense of others - and which ones? Especially in strategy, there is always a very significant opportunity cost, and in a very fundamental way: Not only that one can spend every dollar only once, but also that one can effectively only pursue one progressive grand strategy, and not two; and which one should it be? In any case, it doesn't exist yet. What we have are fragments, but it is increasingly urgent to begin to put them together. Who is going to do that important work? Someone once told me that the reason that so few progressives concentrate on grand strategy, because hardly anyone considers it to be his or her job - and in a very literal sense: They don't get paid for it. Why isn't there more funding for progressive strategy?

Lukes emphasizes that ideology/worldview is the most important dimension of power; it is also the hardest to change. But the increasing difficulties faced by conservatism provides a good opportunity for progressives to restore their values, principles and priorities in society. Shai rightly emphasizes the crucial connection between politics and culture. In fact, a good starting point might be to slightly paraphrase a famous motto: The political is cultural, and the cultural is political. Indeed, many progressives understand themselves as 'culture workers.' While culture is very important, it is much harder to operationalize it for the purposes of progressive strategy, a challenge Shai clearly addresses.

Indeed, lots of work need to be done in this highly contested terrain. How do you change a culture? What even is culture? One fruitful, and probably rather unfamiliar approach would be to conceive of culture as a form of second-order observation. Inspired by second-order cybernetics, the key idea is to understand culture not only as a structure of cognitive and normative expectations that shape perceptions, communication, and behavior, but also always as a form of observation that not only observes what social actors do, but also observes how they observe, and how the way they observe any phenomenon determines what they observe, how they relate to it (or not) and how they deal with it (or not) - and always with respect to the contingency of any observation, i.e. the fact any observation is a social construct: One can observe and behave that way, but one does not have to do so. In short, it is always selective, depending on one's perspective, if not to say: ideology/worldview, which is where we come full circle! I know, this all sounds terribly abstract, if not irrelevant; but my hope is that this constructivist approach opens up new ways of thinking about and changing culture. Although I do have to admit that I am somewhat skeptical when it comes to changing a whole culture, given how hard it is for progressives to transform a comparatively simple organization such as the Democratic Party into a more progressive organization ...

In the next installment, I will address strategic assessment. I very much hope others will join us in this important conversation.

A Map of Progressive Strategy and Politics

2008-03-24T17:08:00.003-05:00

So today we finally published the Progressive Strategy Brain (PSB), a dynamic map that connects some 4000 entries to show the complexity of progressive strategy and politics, to help progressives to become more aware of strategic considerations, in order to make progressive strategy more self-reflective, and ultimately more effective. We hope that over time it will contribute to the emergence of a 'progressive strategic community,' with PSB as its main reference.

Clearly, just like progressive strategy itself, PSB is very much a work in progress, and in many ways necessarily so. This is why it will be updated every Monday, so as to make it more accurate, relevant and comprehensive.

We very much hope that you will help us in the process. In fact, please feel free to post your response to PSB here.

The unusual format will probably take some getting used to. If you don't find what you are looking for right away, just keep clicking, you might be surprised what you find along the way! Indeed, clicking through PSB somewhat playfully might help you discover new connections that you haven't thought of before.

Unfortunately it does not yet have a search function, but that will hopefully be available soon. This will make it much easier to explore PSB, and to find specific information. For those of you interested in the developers of this great software, please go here.

In the meantime, we thought it would be a good idea to do a series of posts to introduce people to different contents of PSB and how best to use it - in lieu of a more standard user's guide, the beginning of which you can already find here.

In fact, every single one of the 4100+ entries in PSB has its individual URL. So what I will do below and in future posts is to link to certain areas of PSB that might make for good entry points and/or appear to be of particular interest.

So here we go. First, you can adjust the display by clicking on the small red arrow in the upper left-hand corner. You can also move the horizontal dividing line between graphics and text up and down. Sometimes, not all the related thoughts can be displayed, because they simply don't fit on the screen (I always found this to be a good expression of the limits of our ability to effectively deal with complexity, intellectually and practically). Be that as it may, the way to make the thoughts appear is to move the bar that appears on the sides in such cases.

For starters, in addition to the entries visible on the opening page, you might want to explore Finding Strategy, our survey of contemporary contributions to progressive strategy. As with over 1000 other entries, the full-text (typically pdf or html) and/or the web link are available. So this makes PSB a continuously growing archive, especially for documents that are harder to find or tend to disappear from the web after a while. Right beneath Finding Strategy, you find linked the entry Finding Strategy (2006) strategists, which are the individuals and organizations we reviewed in our report. Click on their names to further explore their publications, institutional affiliations, etc.

What you will find it that there are clusters of people, ideas, and organizations that are much more densely connected than others. I hope this not only reflects my selection criteria, but actually says something interesting about the structure of various progressive networks revolving around progressive strategy.

Conversely, this also applies to the many challenges facing progressive strategy. I have begun to list those under entries such as Progressive Challenges. More importantly, over time they will be increasingly well reflected in the very link and contents structure of PSB itself: The weaknesses will show themselves more and more clearly by the fact that they remain largely empty and are not well connected to other Progressive Strategy Components.

Ultimately, the goal is that the map that is PSB resembles more and more closely the actual territory of progressive strategy. The problem with this of course is that the map is not the territory, cannot be the territory, and should not be the territory, because then, among other things, it would be useless. Beware of reification!

Alternatively, you can start with Progressive Strategy Literature. Please note that I have discontinued Progressive Strategy Articles, because there were too many; so I decided to group them mostly by month and author, institution, etc. You can get pretty quick access by starting with Publications (by year).

Or you can further explore other dimensions of PSB, such as Progressive Strategy Types. In fact, I increasingly try to develop typologies to make better sense of certain areas of progressive strategy. For instance, in my taxonomy, Progressive Inside-Outside Strategies are one type of Progressive Movement-Electoral Strategies, which was a category that emerged from the research for our report, Finding Strategy, mentioned at the beginning of this introduction to PSB. It is this self-reference which I find very intriguing, as I hope do others. Of course, no internal without external reference, but this is what mapping, thinking, communicating, and braining, so to speak, is all about.

For now, I guess, my message is this: If you don't find something right away, keep clicking and discover new things along the way. Chances are it actually is in PSB. If not, please let me know, and I'd be more than happy to add it. But again, the added value of PSB is not only what it contains but also in how it links its contents - always with a view to improving strategic thinking, discussion, and action.

So this is a start. Please stay tuned. There is more to come.

Beyond Exceptional Funding

2008-03-22T22:12:00.001-05:00

One symptom of American exceptionalism is the degree to which its progressive left is dependent for resources on foundations. For the most part foundations are projects of the rich, so why would the American left allow itself to become so dependent on the largesse of a class of people most of whom will line up against the left when the left starts winning real change? Yes, five or ten percent of the rich may support the left, but to the extent the left is successful the majority of the rich are likely to respond by investing their resources in the right.

A strong American left will only have the resources it needs if the majority of its funds come from the lower and middle classes. There are currently only a few organizations of the American left that have those demographics of support – most of these are in the labor movement where members pay dues which provide steady income. The bad news for the left, of course, is that union membership has been declining for fifty years.

What does the American progressive left need in order to change this picture?

We need to renew a movement culture of active membership supporting regular contributions to organizations we identify with and trust. Imagine an expectation in progressive culture that every progressive gives five to sixty percent of income (on a sliding scale) to movement organizations.

There have been progressive movements with such cultures of resource gathering. We just don’t have it now and therefore it is hard to imagine.

What would it take to recreate such a culture of progressive giving? For one, we’d have to teach ourselves to become engaged members of movement organizations. It would no longer be enough to have progressive opinions, no matter how well informed or how passionately held. Rather, progressive culture would expect people to join organizations, struggle for and with a democratic decision-making process and work together for change.

Sustaining a culture of joining will require changes in our organizations. Organizational leadership can’t be remote. Leaders must have real responsible relationships with members. We must build greater trust in our organizations which only grows from dependable reciprocity. And our organizations must win tangible benefits and achieve inspiring goals.

Then the investment of time, money and spirit by members who are rarely rich will be worth their while. Then the progressive left will grow – with or without the foundations.

Charles Knight is director of the Progressive Strategy Studies Project at the Commonwealth Institute. He has thirty years experience raising money from foundations for progressive organizations and has spent some time helping organize the rich to support the left.

'Movement-Building: Finding Common Ground' (Left Forum 2008 panel)

2008-03-19T13:24:00.004-05:00

This was the description of that panel in the program: 'Drawing on organizing experience across race, ethnic, gender, and generational lines, panelists will discuss what kind of movement we need to build, how we can bridge theory and practice, how to raise difficult issues, and how older activists can make themselves useful to the young.'

Again, like with so many panels at the Left Forum, this sounded promising and relevant for what we call movement strategies. Unfortunately, the panelists did not systematically address the above issues, but only in a rather ad hoc, if not to say improvised fashion. Only one apparently had prepared a paper, only to run out of time before being able to present the full paper. Again, from my limited experience of the Left Forum in the past two years, there seem to be way too many unprepared panels. Still, this was one of the better panels, if only because the chair actually introduced the presentations and actively moderated the discussion, which also seems to be the exception.

Susan Wilcox, co-executive director of Brotherhood/SisterSol, a youth development organization in Harlem, spoke on 'Youth development for social change.' Cidra Sebastien, associate director of Brotherhood/SisterSol, talked about its Liberation Program. And Howie Machtinger, of Heirs to a Fighting Tradition, a North Carolina social justice project, presented on 'Intergenerational politics: Legacies of the sixties. It was moderated by Suzanne Pharr, who describes herself as an 'organizer, strategist, educator, author, and political handywoman.' She has worked with Highlander, a popular education and research center based in Tennessee, and co-founded Southerners on New Ground (SONG), an LGBT organization.

The presentations and discussion appeared to converge around the following main points. The starting, like with so many panels, was the recognition that the left continues to decline, and the question of how best to reverse that trend. Related to this was an emphasis on the importance of finding more effective to ways to move from a growing sense of isolation and individualism to a greater sense of interconnectedness and collectivity. The emerging theme, in short, was one of transformative politics as opposed to the more traditionally ideological approach. The key to this, as other panels emphasized as well, was to build personal, long-term relationships. The one way to achieve this that was most explored was active listening and especially story-telling, which is also emphasized by scholar-activist Marshall Ganz. In general, all panelists and most participants agreed, organizing needs to shift its emphasis from issues to relationships, which necessarily always involve multiple, interrelated issues, as reflected by the intersectionality of place, race, ethnicity, gender, and generation. This was also seen as one way to break out of the issue-siloes, which tend to solidify as a consequence of increasing competition for dwindling resources.

This conflict between traditional organizing privileging ideological purity and organizational independence, and this different type of organizing emphasizing interdependence and personal transformation, was illustrated by an extended discussion between a former member of the American Labor Party, and the panelists and the rest of the participants. This difference was also noticeable in other panels, with some calling for the creation of an independent labor party, and others focusing on building transformative personal/political relationships.

The Interplay of Movements and Electoral Politics (Panel, Left Forum 2008)

2008-03-17T10:50:00.004-05:00

Strange how predictable some things are. The Left Forum, probably the biggest leftist conference in the world, yesterday evening concluded a whole weekend of panels and discussions, and it is not mentioned at all, and not only in the mainstream media, but not even in the leftist media, with this exception, a podcast of a panel on the prospects of a more coherent left. This is very ironic, because coherence is one of the many things not only the left is lacking, but also most of the presentations I attended at the Left Forum.

What is going on here? What a missed opportunity, all the more that it coincided with the Fed bailing out Bear Stearns, which some call 'the ultimate financial scam,' probably with more to come. Most leftists would agree that capitalism is in crisis, and yet the biggest anti-capitalist conference in the world gets no coverage!

From my rather limited experience at the Forum, one of the many problems is the often stark discrepancy between panel descriptions and panel performance, which was certainly the case here. This was the description: 'Focusing on particular movements, the perennial dichotomy between doing electoral work or movement work will be examined, as will what can we learn about the impact of electoral politics on political movements, and the impact of political movements on electoral politics.' Sounds promising, doesn't it? That's what I thought, too.

Alas, the promise was not kept, for hardly any of the issues were addressed, much less systematically. Curiously, none of the attendees seem to mind. Is this lack of professionalism a more general problem on and of the left? In any case, this is really too bad, because these are really important questions, and are being addressed by what in our report, Finding Strategy, we termed 'movement-electoral strategies,' which try to articulate these two components. Perhaps most well known is one variant of this type of strategy, the inside-outside strategy, especially as practiced by Progressive Democrats of America.

Dorian Warren, political scientist at Columbia University, said that Frances Fox Piven had asked him to talk about 'Electoral/movement dynamics in the labor movement,' adding that she would have been much better on this topic. He then proceeded to talk primarily about the perennial question of why an influential labor party never emerged in the US, and in very general terms. Potential 'solutions' to this problem include reforming the electoral system to make third parties viable, focusing on the local rather than the national level, and promoting municipal socialism. Unfortunately, as generations of political scientists have conclusively demonstrated for decades, the prospects for creating viable third parties are very close to zero. As Domhoff and many others have suggested, it is strategically much more effective to concentrate on transforming the Democratic Party into a more progressive organization by forming left-liberal alliances.

Howard Hawkins, Teamster, and former candidate of the Green Party in New York, and editor of Independent Politics: The Green Party Strategy Debate (2006), emphasized how important it was to build an autonomous left party. He concluded: 'Basically, we have to build a vast party of the left.' This sentiment seems to be widely shared at the Forum in general.

This is remarkable: After more than a century of failure, many leftists still pursue this chimera. This leads to an important question: How long do strategies have to fail before they are being abandoned in favor of more realistic ones? Apparently, for all too many, a century of failure is not enough. What a terrible waste of precious resources, and what a huge opportunity cost. Just imagine what could have been achieved instead. This is a key strategic insight: Strategy is as much - or perhaps even more - about what what you don't do rather than about what you do. There are still way too many losing strategies being pursued on the left. It is high time to abandon them.

Ron Scott, member of the Detroit Black Panther Party and a TV producer, primarily talked about the importance of building long-term personal relationships in building a movement. The other two panelists did not show up.

Cracks in the Edifice?

2008-03-15T07:24:00.003-05:00

So here I finally go. Originally I wanted to blog live from the last Left Forum, exactly one year ago, if only because hardly anybody else did. Left Forum emerged in 2005 from a split with the Socialist Scholars Conference over strategy, governance, and personalities, according to reports.

While the Left Forum describes itself as the largest annual gathering of leftists in North America, and presumably in the world, it not only gets no coverage in the mainstream media, but is not even mentioned in the leftitst media. Last year, all The Nation did, was to announce it. Interestingly, while it called it 'one of the country's premiere progressive events,' it did not cover it at all. Neither did any other leftist media.

Why is that? Is it because of a lack of resources and/or a lack of professionalism in promoting it? After all, it does not take very much to post a news release. Or does it accurately reflect just how marginal the left remains, both in the US and globally?

At last year's opening plenary, Cornel West openly admitted that the left simply lacks the resources, in terms of finances, personnel, and infrastructure generally, to move beyond its marginal status. This however did not keep a number of panels and participants to enthusiastically debate how best to organize the revolution, and how to decide who should be part of the leadership once the movement reached critical mass. This kind of attitude always reminds me of Seymour Lipset's famous remark they overcompensate their political irrelevance with excessive rhetoric.

In any case, last year's motto was 'Forging a Radical Political Future,' and this year's theme is 'Cracks in the Edifice.' In both cases, there is a palpable sense of frustration with 'the system,' and a great desire to change it radically, and not only 'superficially' through reforms. Understandably, given the socialist background, the ultimate goal is not merely to reform capitalism and imperialism, but to overcome them. However, the main thrust of the contributions is one of criticism, protest, and resistance, and unfortunately there is very little on what to do, and especially on how to do it in a strategic sense. There frequently is a big disconnect between big picture analysis and criticism, and punctual and sporadic initiatives and activities on the ground.

Yesterday evening's opening plenary featured speeches by Tariq Ali, Adam Hochschild, Mahmood Mamdani, and Naomi Klein. They were encouraged by Left Forum to identify 'cracks in the edifice' and specifically address how to use those opportunities to bring about change. As was to be expected, with the exception of Hochschild, they were primarily critical.

Ali spent most of the time criticizing US foreign policy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and ended by pointing out that the regional cooperation in Latin America could serve as a model for the Middle East.

Hochschild drew parallels between the late 18th century, emphasizing abolitionism, and today. He highlighted what today's activists can learn from that movement, focusing on the importance of new organizing tools and on never giving up ...

Mamdani criticized the Save Darfur campaign for egregiously exaggerating mortality rates, according to a 2006 study by the General Accounting Office. All of the $14 million spent by a professional advertising company on the campaign was spent outside of Sudan. His larger criticism was that Americans prefer to feel good by doing something about Darfur, however inadequate, instead of risking to feel guilty by organizing against the Iraq occupation. He emphasized how remarkable that discrepancy is, and concluded by insisting that Save Darfur has become one of the biggest obstacles to progress in Darfur. He is currently working on a book on this subject.

Klein declared that key points of the conservative ideology, especially concerning the economy, have been discredited by developments over the past 35 years, and especially most recently. This crumbling of neoliberalism opens many opportunities, but unfortunately she did not go beyond exhorting the audience to take on these forces and resist them. This is the same mode in which she wrote her most recent book, The Shock Doctrine.

Leftists tend to be strong on analysis and criticism, but weak on strategy. This is one of the main reasons why the left has not made more progress. This year's Left Forum would be a great opportunity to engage in what is known as SWOT-analysis: Systematically identifying the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats, both of and for the left, and of and for its adversaries. This would be an important first step towards formulating and implement realistic and effective strategies. Regrettably, not a single one of the 116 or so panels seems to do this, at least not in explicit terms.

Of course it is so much easier to ridicule Obama's rhetoric of hope and change, and deride his record. Fortunately, some pointed out that the left also has itself to criticize for failing to build a movement that would lead to more genuinely progressive and viable candidates.

JoAnn Wypijewski's Response to 'Is there a Left left'?

2007-11-02T15:15:00.000-05:00

Please note: This is JoAnn Wypijewski's response to my post on 'Is there a Left left,' a talk she and Alexander Cockburn gave at UMass Amherst on October 15, 2007. It is posted here with JoAnn's permission.

I just saw your blog about the talk. Too bad we didn't get to meet at the event. The question 'Why hasn't the Left done better at organizing around these key issues?' presupposes there is a coherent force in the country that can be called by that name. I don't think there is, in the sense of any potent organized force, let alone mass movement or even mini-movement that is challenging the fundamental terms of the system and is equal to the moment. And this -- the disequilibrium of movement to moment -- I think, is the cause for so much despondency (secret and not-so-secret) among American leftists, who certainly are alive even if some identifiable political and ideological home with a clear project, "The Left", is not.

There are a lot of reasons for this -- obvious ones, like the long-term effect of the imploding of the Soviet Union, the long-term effect of a reigning ideology in the West that 'there is no alternative', the demobilizing effect of Clintonism on vast sectors of progressive America, disorganization and disarray of the black community as a result of repression/criminalization, deindustrialization and split level economic conditions (economic catastrophe for part of the community, McMansions for another part), the continuing long slide of organized labor, a generalized sense of insecurity (economic and personal) that lends itself more to caution than to daring, and so on.

I don't think there is any magic formula, any set of approaches, to 'fix' this, and it would have been presumptuous or dishonest or both to say there was. Why, for instance, is the antiwar movement basically nowhere on campuses? I don't know, and the people on campuses I've spoken to don't have good answers either, but it's up to them to answer that. They were disappointed when the war wasn't stopped before it started after the Feb. 15 worldwide demos. They were disappointed when it wasn't stopped after that, and after a few more marches. They were disappointed and demoralized when Bush was re-elected. They can never get more than 15 people for a meeting and 5 are pushing a sectarian agenda, 5 want to talk only about Palestine and 5 can't get past identity politics. This last, admittedly, I've only heard from Columbia students, but the point is the institutionalized leadership of UFPJ and ANSWER isn't being challenged by a younger generation pushing itself to the lead. And that institutionalized leadership is exhausted. Friends who work for UFPJ every day as volunteers say privately, "It's hopeless." Work goes on, the demos get planned, people do their vigils.

The only force with any juice, it seems to me, are the military families, the counter-recruiters, the antiwar vets. I don't believe some tactical adjustment will change this -- ditching "Support the Troops", ditching big demonstrations, embracing the Moratorium idea of doing one small thing every day on the same month in the same place, ditching UFPJ, ditching any engagement at all with electoral politics, throwing all effort into electoral politics, waving the flag of the Mahdi Army or whatever faction one wants to choose of the Iraqi resistance.

All of those tactics have been proposed by various people. We can discuss till we're blue in the face the various merits or demerits of such ideas, but I think it's foolhardy to think any one or combination of them is going to invigorate the antiwar movement into an edgy potent force. I'm not meaning to be glib. The antiwar movement is in a weird position: it's job is not to sway public opinion, since a majority of Americans agree with it; but nothing changes, so people are demoralized. They're not illogical in their demoralization. And there is neither the wild courage nor the organization to throw a spanner in the works to disrupt the war machine -- not from labor (though some unionists on the West Coast and internationally are trying to see what they might put together toward this end), not from the campuses, and only so far among the soldiers. The latter are the most promising, but are nowhere close to the situation of mass mutiny of drafted armies past. At this point it looks as if the war will end when the Iraqis punish the US beyond endurance or the generals mutiny or both, but I don't think we should have illusions that that will be a glorious day for the Left.

I see you have an entry about a meeting with Naomi Klein. I don't think either that cheerleading -- we need the will! we need the courage! another world IS possible! -- is much of a solution to anything, though I wasn't at that meeting so I won't presume that reflects the whole of it. There are world historical forces afoot here, and one of the jobs of anyone who considers herself on the left is to try to understand them.

I don't think the Left in the heady days of empire really thought too much about the privileges and distortions being children of the empire conferred on it, except to say, in some quarters, We don't want any part of it! But opting out only goes so far, and is delusional even if understandable. Now that the empire is exhausted at the top -- and we could disagree about that, but I think the signs are more indicative of fundamental weakness than of strength even if the US can still kill everyone in the world many times over and still 'afford' billions of dollars a day doing that in one way or another -- radicals are feeling what it means to be part of the general decline. How do we deal with it? That's not an idle question, or one that has an obvious answer.

What I was suggesting was that there was a certain amount of chauvinism attached to the American Left in the sixties, a sense of being at the center of the political universe even if people did make their trips to Hanoi or Ghana or Paris. And part of that was even justified, because America at the time could be said to be "swinging", as I quoted Andy Kopkind from 1967. It's not swinging now, but at the same time it's awfully narrow to have to think of 'the Left' as something that's bounded by national borders. And if we look beyond our borders, there is clearly a Left, in the sense of powerful movements or currents challenging the fundamental terms of the world economic system.

So if one asks, Is there a Left left? the answer is clearly yes, but not necessarily within our borders. So then how do we engage with that? What does solidarity and internationalism, as opposed to rad-tourism, demand today? What can we learn from those who have set out a task of developing "socialism for the 21st century" or autonomy and freedom from the neoliberal chokehold? And how can we support those efforts, while not abandoning organizing at home that might not rattle the world, at least not this minute, but is still necessary if one has any sense of politics as being a long walk?

You ask, in reference to my comments on Latin America, is this something Americans should 'imitate'? and then say isn't it doing that on countless blogs? Come on, you have massed organizations of peasants, workers, farmers, indigenous people in Bolivia toppling two governments, facing bullets and suffering casualties to do so, asserting in the most powerful way claims against the force of privatization, deregulation, immiseration, etc. You have the Zapatistas arising from seemingly nowhere on the eve of NAFTA's implementation saying No, everything is not finished; it is still possible to put up a fundamental fight -- and changing Mexican politics. This is not akin to blogging. And it's not something that can just be 'imitated', which I never suggested. Nor is it something -- either in Bolivia or Mexico or Ecuador or Venezuela or Argentina or Cuba or Brazil -- that is perfectly realized, without contradictions, without setbacks, weaknesses, disappointments and more likely ahead. Most of all it is not something to be romanticized.

But it is, I believe, where the center of political energy has shifted. It is where what Eqbal Ahmad called "the logic of daring" is at work. And it is the original homeland of millions of people now in this country whose movements and organizing here may be uneven, may not conform strictly to some notion of the Left but do bear attention and support from the rest of us. I don't believe I used the term 'new energy' in the pollyannaish sense you imply, but certainly in the realm of labor, organizing by immigrants is where most of the action is. I think one can with justice say that May 1, 2006, was the closest thing to a general strike that the US has seen in a long time, to take the most obvious example.

Now that movement is fractured too, and has its contradictions, and has come under severe repression. That there has been no wider Left in the US to defend immigrants, to articulate the rights of people not only to move across borders (mobility of labor) but also to stay in their homelands and survive -- and to link the international experience with the domestic experience of dispossession on any number of fronts (the most glaring being Katrina) -- indicates that there is a task at hand considerably more robust than blogging in the fight for a world fit to live in.

There are people and groups chipping away at a piece of this here and there, but I'm certain they don't think it will be realized off a breezy checklist of 'things to do' and I doubt you would have been any more satisfied with the talk if Alex or I had suggested that it could be.

Is There a Left Left?

2007-10-16T09:01:00.000-05:00

This was the title of an event I attended yesterday evening, October 15, 2007, at the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, which is part of a tour they recently participated in. Alexander Cockburn, columnist at The Nation and co-editor of CounterPunch, and JoAnn Wypijewski, former editor of The Nation and now contributing writer to Harper's and Mother Jones, talked about the current state of the Left in historical perspective. They did a similar tour back in 1995, called Left Alive.

I was initially attracted by the catchy title, which reminded me of all the debates about what was left of the Left after the end of the Cold War, and expected to learn something new about why the Left in the US has been so weak for such a long time, and how best to rebuild its strength and power. The waY PERI framed the debate on its website made sense: Given the growing opposition to the Iraq war and rising inequality, why hasn't the Left done better at organizing around these key issues, and what needs to be improved in order to do so? Instead, I heard mostly a string of anecdotes, with very little analysis. Is this symptomatic of one of the many problems of the Left, i.e. the fact that there is an overabundance of criticism and lament, coupled with a shortage of feasible alternatives? Making people aware of how bad things are is clearly necessary, but it is not sufficient for building something new.

Cockburn's main message was that there was much more optimism on the Left back in the 1960s and 1970s, compared to today, where many seem to be 'shell-shocked by history.' Back then, many leftists actually believed that a better society was not only possible but that they would soon achieve the positions of power necessary to bring it about. Why didn't it happen and what can we learn from this for efforts at rebuilding the Left today? Unfortunately, he did not address this question. Instead, he illustrated his historical overview with lots of examples and anecdotes, ranging from all the initiatives and projects (decolonization, banning the bomb, the nuclear freeze 'movement' and Randy Forsberg, the New World Economic Order, etc.) to the many disappointments and countervailing trends (the rise of the 'catastrophe' of neoliberalism, the disenfranchisement of voters ... up to the demobilization of the Left in the Clinton 1990s). In short, 'a lot went on,' and leftists back then had much more 'zap.' Again, why did all that energy dissipate, and where did it all go?

Today, Cockburn concluded with a 'downbeat message,' the Left is merely 'around.' How to reinvigorate it? Cockburn emphasized that the Left needs 'bigger and better ideas,' needs to articulate 'coherent restatements' of the big questions, such as who owns what, the role of the banks and industries, etc., and to link local struggles to the larger picture. Again, regrettably he did not elaborate on what precisely this means and how to go about putting it into practice.

After sharing her pessimism about the prospects for change coming of age in the 1970s, JoAnn Wypijewski came to a similar conclusion, but in addition highlighted the 'new energy' coming primarily from immigrants, related to the need to regain the awareness of the Left as an internationalist phenomenon. Here she joined Cockburn in emphasizing all the important developments in Latin America, particularly in Bolivia. At least, 'the people in Latin America are asking the big questions, challenging neoliberalism.' Is that what the American Left should imitate? Isn't it doing it already, in fact on a daily basis, in publications such as The Nation, TomPaine, AlterNet, many 'progressive' blogs, etc.? But apparently to not much avail.

Her overall assessment, however, was equally pessimistic as Cockburn's. 'There hasn't been a Left in this country for a very long time,' she said. Her main thesis was that because the American empire is increasingly exhausted, so is the American Left. Hence the need to redefine what the Left is, especially in today's more global context. Here, she emphasized the need to not loose hope and to keep on fighting ...

During the discussion, however, Wypijewski very candidly acknowledged: 'Let's not fool ourselves: Who really cares about what we have to say? Nobody! It's infinitessimal!' Unfortunately, I couldn't agree more, especially if you don't have that much to say to begin with. That's what this event, like so many similar ones, felt like: Preaching to the choir. So what? What else is new? The real question of course is: Now what? And in particular: How to strategically build power for the long-term.

Are Progressives Lacking Courage or Power?

2007-08-16T14:13:00.000-05:00

This past weekend at the annual conference of the American Sociological Association in New York City, Canadian author and journalist Naomi Klein, who is close to the so-called 'anti-globalization movement,' gave a speech entitled 'From Think Tanks to Battle Tanks,' which appeared to be based on her new book which will be published this September, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism.

The theme of the ASA conference was 'Is Another World Possible?' It explicitly refers to the motto of the World Social Forum, 'Another world is possible.' Klein criticized the timidity of the conference's title. It seems like she would like to add several exclamation marks to that slogan and emphatically emphasize the 'is.' The motto of the first US Social Forum in Atlanta at the end of June was 'Another world is possible. Another US is necessary.' So how can progressives make the necessary possible, which is, after all - at least according to some - what politics as the art of the possible, is all about?

For Klein, the problem seems to be essentially a moral and perhaps a psychological one, and her solutions appears to be similar. Essentially, she wants to encourage and build the confidence of progressives by reminding them of their history. The main problem for progressives is not a lack of ideas or money, but a lack of confidence, courage, and passion. If only progressives had more of it, they could 'scare' elites into progressive action. This discouragement stems from the conviction that progressive ideas have already been tried and turned out not to work. However, the opposite is true: They did work and were popular. Understanding that progressives 'never lost the battle of ideas' but instead were crushed is the best way of building the confidence necessary to succeed.

The real problem, I want to argue today, is confidence, our confidence, the confidence of people who gather at events like this under the banner of building another world, a kinder more sustainable world. I think we lack the strength of our convictions, the guts to back up our ideas with enough muscle to scare our elites. We are missing movement power. That’s what we’re missing. “The best lacked all convictions,” Yeats wrote, “while the worst are full of passionate intensity.” Think about it. Do you want to tackle climate change as much as Dick Cheney wants Kazakhstan’s oil? Do you? Do you want universal healthcare as much as Paris Hilton wants to be the next new face of Estee Lauder? If not, why not? What is wrong with us? Where is our passionate intensity?

While she mentions 'movement power' once, she does not further explore this. This is unfortunate since according to many, the key problem for progressives is not a lack of confidence and courage, but a lack of resources, infrastructure, and power, and the lack of a strategy that would allow progressives to more effectively put these pieces together and build power in the long term. In short, the main problem for progressives is not moral but intellectual, material, and organizational. For power is concentrated in organizations, which bundle resources, and are the most effective social actors since they are most capable of collective decisions and collective action.

It's the Emotion, Stupid!?

2007-07-17T08:09:00.000-05:00

Will Drew Westen succeed George Lakoff as the new "guru" of the Democratic Party or is it just another unfortunate case of confusing tactics with strategy? Now that Lakoff supposedly has taught all Democrats how to properly "frame" issues, is it time now for them to learn how to talk more emotionally and passionately about issues as a new strategy and not just as a different way of talking about issues, as USA Today put it rather bluntly (see below)?

Drew Westen's new book, published in late June, The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation, is getting a lot of attention these days; some even hail it as some sort of panacea for Democrats. However, there are also some important criticisms.

Iterestingly, the original subtitle apparently was meant to be "How People Vote, and How to Change Their Minds," which of course sounds much less grandiose, if not to say dramatic, than the subtitle that was eventually chosen. Perhaps this illustrates the very message of the book, to use more emotionally appealing language. But perhaps the original subtitle more precisely expresses its purpose.

Westen is a psychologist at Emory, a guest blogger at HuffPost, and the founder of Westen Strategies, a consulting firm with the motto "Persuasion is about Networks and Narratives."

This motto is also the main thesis of his book. Essentially, Westen claims, Democrats have operated for too long with the wrong theory of mind. According to Westen, the mind is not disapassionate but passionate. Voters are primarily driven by emotions, and Democrats need to adjust their rhetoric accordingly in order to win elections. The brain is a highly complex network of associations, and Democrats have to articulate the kinds of narratives that most effectively activate those networks that get them elected. Democrats need to learn how to use a new language, one that is less laden with arguments, stats and facts, and instead filled with more emotion and passion. In short, Democrats have to become less intellectual and more passionate in their public rhetoric, especially on the campaign trail.

There are some rave reviews of Westen's book out there, with no shortage of superlatives. Some even suggest that all Democrats have to do is to read and act on this book, and the country will be theirs. See, this is how easy (electoral) strategy has become. So what's all the debate about? Just read the book and you are all set:

This is the most interesting, informative book on politics I've read in many years. - Bill Clinton

In 2008 we will win the presidency if our candidate reads and acts on this book. - Howard Dean

The Political Brain is the most illuminating book on contemporary American politics I've ever (my emphases) read. By explaining how voters actually process information, Drew Westen lays bare the connection between political technique, political conviction, and the Democrats' habit of bungling winnable elections. If every leading Democratic politician reads this book, we could have a decent America back. - Robert Kuttner

Praising the journal he writes for, Ezra Klein of the The American Propect says that Westen was "largely discovered" by Kuttner, who according to USA Today, also introduced him to key Democrats. Moreover, as Klein points out, it was the Prospect that first popularized Westen's work.

According to an article in USA Today, whose title summarizes Westen's book rather nicely, "Democrats get advice on how to talk about issues," Westen is also working with the progressive think tank, Third Way (see previous post), on a "strategy memo" (my emphasis), to get candidates to focus less on what they are saying and more on how voters understand what they are saying.

This is very similar to the main recommendation in Frank Luntz's new book, "Words That Work: It's Not What You Say, It's What People Hear." Luntz, a communications "strategist," has been a longtime advisor of Newt Gingrich and other Republicans.

I highlight how the term "strategy" is used because I find it problematic. In very widespread usage, certainly in mainstream media and political discourse, it is consistently confused with tactics. This is not only a matter of semantics. The fact that not even this most basic distinction is made reflects the rather mediocre state of strategic political reflection, especially when compared with much more advanced strategic thinking in military or business affairs. This fundamental problem is compounded when one takes the interdependence, divergence and variation of means and ends into consideration.

In any case, so if Westen's insights and recommendations are of such crucial importance for Demcrats, how come no less a commentator than Kevin Drum, in one of the earliest reviews of the book, formulates what seems to be a rather devastating critique of Westen's book that - if correct - would severely limit its applicability:

The problem is that his made-up speeches are practically parodies. They're so insanely belligerent that no politician in his right mind would give them. (my emphasis) Even the wingiest of the wingnuts doing their late-night CSPAN schticks don't give speeches as aggressive as Westen's.

So, is that the case? Is Westen going too far? Is the rhetoric he recommends excessively emotional, to the point of making it impractical? If so, would that really be a problem? Isn't there much more that Democrats need to do in order to not only win elections, but make policies genuinely and lastingly - and I would be tempted to say: progressively - more progressive? After all, according to many progressives, the realization of the Clinton/Gore slogan, "It's the Economy, Stupid!," did not go far enough. How far will and can the new slogan go, "It's the Emotion, Stupid!"?

For the answer to that question depends on where you want to go, not only on how to get there. Strategy asks, are we doing the right things? Tactics only asks, are we doing things right? Again, as we find so often in these pages, how you get there depends on where you want to go. In other words, strategies vary according to ultimate objectives, and these continue to diverge between and among progressives and Democrats. How far can "we" go, with or without Westen?

Mark Schmitt on How People Can Organize and Aggregate Power

2007-07-06T15:25:00.000-05:00

Yesterday, Mark Schmitt commented at TPMCafe on two other posts, one by Nathan Newman on campaign finance reform, and another by Dan Cantor of the Working Families Party on fusion voting (The Working Families Party is also included in our report on contributions to progressive strategy, "Finding Strategy").

He is not just agreeing with both of them, but uses his commentary to argue that they represent an important and new way of

thinking about the political process, and steps toward reform, that puts people back in -- people, and the possibilities of organized power.

His emphasis on how to enhance the capacity of people to organize and aggregate power is very relevant for our project. The question of how to aggregate power is of particular interest for our project, because most strategies rarely address it. How can progressives accumulate power over time?

I have included the below excerpts to illustrate his approach, and have annotated them from the perspective of our project:

Money, organization, collective debate and action is not bad for democracy but precisely what makes it work:

It's the fundamental hostility to politics that reformers of democracy are prone to. They tend to hold an implicit view of democracy as a process of isolated rational decision-making that must be shielded from bad influences -- money, organized groups, passion.

But those are the very things that make democracy work: participation, and the ability of people to exercise power collectively, to debate and act together. If you see the question in those terms, then things that enhance people's ability to organize and aggregate their power -- whether it is the Wisconsin Right to Life committee or ACORN or a union or the Sierra Club or a political party or moveon.org -- become the solution, not the problem.

Schmitt hopes that progressives will manage to build broader coalitions to move beyond "single-issue politics." But he cautions that such coalitions are fragile, whereas a party is "the ultimate coalition," with the ballot line being a key asset. Fusion voting appears to be an effective way of using that asset:

There will be issue groups, of course, on the right and left, trying desperately to use money and/or membership to be heard, and sometimes being effective. And there will be attempts at broader coalitions, like moveon.org and USAction, and I think (hope) the trend is toward broader progressive coalitions and away from single-issue politics. That's long overdue. But such coalitions, especially at the state level, are fragile, they demand continued energy and there are always as many forces pulling people away as pulling them together. But over time it becomes apparent that the ultimate coalition is a political party. A party is not a letterhead alliance; it's a substantive ongoing operation with a significant asset: a line on the ballot. With fusion, it can share that line or use it for its own purposes. The party can exist both within and outside of the other major parties, as the Working Families Party does in New York. It is a way of organizing people's political passion and power that, for a change, does not depend completely on money.

At the end, he makes a very important suggestion:

The first thing we should ask about any reform is, does it help or hurt the ability of citizens to organize themselves in a political context?

So the challenge for progressive strategy is to generate reforms that not only achieve their substantive goals, but do so in a way that enhances peoples' collective capacity for political organization. Strategy in this sense is as much about process as it is about objectives. This indeed appears to be crucial when it comes to aggregating power in the long run.

A New Blog to Advance the Conversation among Progressives

2007-07-03T16:38:00.000-05:00

Mike Lux, a consultant for progressive organizations, today announced the creation of a new blog, OpenLeft.com, to advance the conversation among progressives. OpenLeft is not yet active, but will be launched next week. He will be joined by two of the leading progressive bloggers, Chris Bowers and Matt Stoller, who previously blogged at MyDD. In August 2005, they published "Emergence of the Progressive Blogosphere: A New Force in American Politics," the first report on the role and potential of the netroots in progressive politics.

In his article, he expresses their intention to bring together his expertise within the Democratic Party and establishment with their experience of blogging and organizing to contribute to the formation of a lasting progressive movement and majority.

This is very similar to what we refer to in our report as "movement-electoral strategies," and what Progressive Democrats of America (PDA) call their "inside-outside" strategy. Likewise, Bill Domhoff also considers the transformation of the Democratic Party into a more progressive organization as the best option progressives currently have. It is striking how similar these approaches are. An In These Times article in May, "Dancing Into the Majority," reported primarily on how PDA, but also other grassroots organizations are making progress in working together with the Democratic Party. The current editorial of The Nation, "Get In It to Win It," suggests a similar approach.

Here is how Lux articulates his credo and approach (in excerpts):

We are all strongly committed to building a strong and progressive movement and an enduring progressive (not just Democratic) majority. We are all weary of politics as usual and an elite political establishment that cares more about staying comfortable and less about really making most Americans' lives better. We are all believers in the ground-up and democratizing movement-building power of the netroots, and are excited about the innovative strategies of that movement. That unity in terms of values and mission will make OpenLeft.com a powerful place to do movement-building and strategic initiatives. (...)

I have always believed that the progressive movement needs both kinds of folks. I am convinced that when big changes have happened in American history, it is at the intersection of dialogue between insiders and outsiders, between the sympathetic people inside the party structure and the outside movement beating impatiently on the door, between blunt and angry agitators and diplomatic bridge-builders. (...)

When progressivism fails, it is a failure of both the party insiders and the movement -- political leadership that is too comfortable with the status quo, outside movements whose organizing is lethargic, and bad strategy for both. That is the story of the last three decades. Fortunately, things are beginning to change, and OpenLeft.com wants to be at the center of that conversation: how can the progressive movement best rebuild and revitalize ourselves? How should progressive institutions change? How should Democratic politicians make their party both more strategically effective and better at delivering on the things that will really make a difference in the lives of their constituents? Those kinds of questions, and more, with honest and open dialogue about what the answers are, will be discussed daily at OpenLeft.com.

We are happy to find so many references to strategic considerations, and are looking forward to participate in the conversation on how best to transform the Democratic Party into a more progressive and more powerful organization.

Chomsky on Progressive Strategy

2007-07-03T13:46:00.000-05:00

[Please note: This summary of an interview with Noam Chomsky on progressive strategy has first been published at Common Dreams on June 29, 2007. As of July 3, 2007, it has received 45 comments. I hope you join the discussion at Common Dreams and/or continue it here. To make it more user-friendly, I have added more links and references.]

Noam Chomsky is one of the key figures on the American and global left. He is said to be one of the most widely quoted intellectuals in the world. In 2005, readers of AlterNet voted him MVP (Most Valuable Progressive). And he remains very close to many activists.

For all these reasons, we were very excited when we finally had the opportunity in late May to interview Chomsky for 25 minutes about his thinking on progressive grand strategy for building political power on the American left. More specifically, and in keeping with the main interest of our Progressive Strategy Studies Project, we asked him whether he finds it useful to think about how to build power in strategic terms.

Glancing at the list of individuals and organizations that we included in our first report, “Finding Strategy: A Survey of Contemporary Contributions to Progressive Strategy ,” he noted that there was more “extensive and far-reaching” thinking on progressive strategy than what was reflected in our report.

Throughout the interview, he mainly referred to the work of Gar Alperovitz, Michael Albert, and Robin Hahnel, and Joel Rogers (the latter is included in our report), on how to democratize the economy and the workplace through worker self-management, cooperatives, etc. In particular, he referred to Alperovitz’ latest book, America Beyond Capitalism: Reclaiming our Wealth, Our Liberty, and Our Democracy (Wiley 2004), and a number of books by Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel on participatory economics and broader sociopolitical issues. Hahnel's latest book on participatory economics is Economic Justice and Democracy: From Competition to Cooperation (Routledge 2005), and Albert's is Realizing Hope: Life beyond Capitalism (Zed Books 2006). Chomsky considers their work to be very important, particularly for activists.

He started out by emphasizing that the US is “a one-party state with two wings, Democrat and Republican,” and claimed that both were “way to the right of the majority of Americans” on many crucial issues. According to Chomsky, social scientists like C. Wright Mills, Thomas Ferguson, and Bill Domhoff (who also is included in our report) are pretty much right: Corporations dominate the power structure and hence US politics. In the US this is even more so the case than in other countries because of the much more brutal suppression of labor. Quoting Dewey, Chomsky noted that in the absence of economic democracy, “politics is the shadow cast on society by big business.”

Since the state, having become so thoroughly co-opted by corporate interests, is part of the problem, it is difficult to significantly change it from within through elections or public policy reforms. While short-term, pragmatic change remains possible and desirable, systemic change would require a transformation of power relations within society through a democratization of economic decision-making.

Criticizing the recent health care reform in Massachusetts as overly complicated precisely because it has to respond to too many corporate interests, Chomsky noted that, even though a large majority of the population favors straightforward changes, the US can’t even achieve a real health care reform. While pragmatic change is better than nothing, it pales in comparison to the kind of change a country like Bolivia has been able to achieve, “something the US and other Western societies can only dream of.”

Serious progress towards a truly functioning democracy requires democratizing the economy. Traditionally, labor has been the main agent of change, but today it is, as Chomsky put it, “smashed,” and struggles to survive. Who can fill the huge gap that labor has left behind? Chomsky admits that other actors, such as churches and universities, are weak, if not marginal, though there has been impressive growth of popular movements, many of them quite new and promising. They offer considerable promise and opportunity for those willing to keep working hard at “building the cells of a future society.”

Is the 2008 Presidential Election a Great Opportunity for "Progressives"?

2007-07-02T15:47:00.000-05:00

In its latest editorial, Get In It to Win It, The Nation suggests that because of its "volatility" the 2008 election offers

perhaps the best opportunity in a generation to nominate a genuinely progressive candidate - a candidate who can win next November.

And that's precisely the crux of the matter: A "genuinely progressive candidate ... who can win." In the US of 2007, isn't this necessarily an oxymoron? Much of this of course depends on how you define "progressive." I have addressed this question in a previous post, Who is Progressive? For a more recent and more extensive discussion, see What does it mean to be "progressive"? at TPMCafe.

Just to underline the main point: Who is a "genuine progressive" and electable at the same time? For example, many believe that people like Dennis Kucinich and Ralph Nader are genuine progressives; yet few think it very likely that they could ever get elected. In fact, some think that their campaigns are counterproductive, because they take precious resources and votes away from better-placed candidates.

Likewise, many progressives don't consider Hillary Clinton to be really progressive, and some doubt whether Obama really is, all the more since his platform is not very well defined yet. (For a series of probing questions concerning Obama, see David Sirota's post from today). Yet for the past thirty-some years, whoever raised the most money was eventually nominated to run. Depending on where you stand, this is either a huge problem for "progressives" or not a problem at all.

Since hardly anyone dares to call him-/herself liberal anymore, almost everybody on the left is a "progressive" now. The problem remains that this includes a whole spectrum of "progressives," ranging from rather conservative centrists to pretty hardcore leftists, with very different and ultimately irreconcilable agendas. Since strategy is primarily goal-driven, and since "progressive" goals diverge so significantly, there necessarily have to be painful trade-offs when it comes to uniting behind a candidate and an agenda. There is no easy way out of these strategic dilemmas.

The Nation editorial further opines:

The point is not to organize for a particular contender but rather to assure that whoever wins is accountable to our stances against the Iraq War and for restoration of civil liberties, a robust response to global warming and universal healthcare.

Yes, but this is one of the key questions: How can progressives effectively keep candidates accountable to a progressive agenda once they are in office? One would think that the fact that they were elected with their support would help. It would help even more if they were "one of them," so to speak. Many had hoped that this would be the case of Deval Patrick in Massachusetts, only to be rather disappointed once he assumed office. Could that happen with Obama on a national scale? How deep does his experience as a community organizer in Chicago reach, of which he claims that it was the best education he has ever received (including Harvard Law School). Or is this an irrelevant question?

Finally, The Nation appears to advocate for what we call a "movement-electoral strategy" in our survey (pdf) of progressive strategy, which includes Democracy for America and Progressive Democrats of America:

The progressive voice on these issues will gain traction only if MoveOn.org, Democracy for America and Progressive Democrats of America, as well as unions, environmental groups and other issue-focused organizations, rapidly expand into a cohesive movement. New technologies make it easier than ever to organize voter lists and to communicate with voters about the candidates and the evolving dynamics of the race. In partnership with innovative state-based organizations, MoveOn.org, unions and other national groups should prepare interventions throughout the process. Such interventions are essential.

Interestingly, Dan Berger also identifies the beginning of a "mass movement" from his experience at the first US Social Forum. Yet if you compare the agenda of the Forum with those of the leading "progressive" candidates, you can measure the distance that separates very different understandings of what it means to be "progressive."

Very appropriately, the motto of the Forum is "Another World is Possible. Another US is necessary." But how do make the necessary possible, when the leading candidate is Hillary Clinton? Though it is hard for some progressive to accept, politics, it seems, stubbornly if not necessarily, remains the art of the possible.

And please don't forget to be "realistic" when it comes to political strategy.

Nader the Narcissist: Unsafe in any Election

2007-06-22T11:10:00.000-05:00

Please note: This post has also been published at TPMCafe, and has received 25 comments as of July 3, 2007. I hope you are going to join the discussion at TPMCafe or continue it here.

The first half of this title is inspired by Tood Gitlin's criticism of Nader running as an independent in the 2004 election: From Tragedy to Farce, concluding that his narcissism knows no limits:

So, when all is said and done, leave aside Nader's wishful thinking -- his hallucination of ideologically aroused masses, his prayer that the Electoral College system might vanish. What Nader's decision amounts to is not logic but an exercise in monomania by a man who once accomplished great things and now believes that whatever he claims to accomplish is great by virtue of the fact that he claims it. Quixotic Nader, whose first run was tragedy, now tries farce. It's not funny.

This conclusion is as true today as it was three years ago. In fact, it might even be more true and potentially more tragic, and even less funny, because apparently he is seriously thinking about running again in 2008!

In 2000, Nader arguably helped Bush defeat Gore. As a reminder, Gore lost to Bush in Florida by only 537 votes, whereas Nader received 97,448. Most analysts agree that many of those who voted for Nader would otherwise have voted for Gore had Nader not run, at a minimum 538. In 2004, his role was insignificant. What will his impact be in 2008, if he decides to run again?

He has started calling Hillary Clinton a "coward," and, in his recent article, Hillary's Hypocrisy, criticizes what he calls her "twofer strategy:

So she travels around the country with her twofer strategy - pandering to powerful audiences and flattering gatherings of Democratic voters. She has watched Bill’s lack of political fortitude win elections in this two-party, elected dictatorship against the hapless Republicans. Why should she be any different?
If she wins the primary and the November elections the country will get another kind of twofer in the White House. Here they’ll go again.

In an interview with Politico.com, Nader Ponders Run, Calls Clinton "Coward," he gives all the familiar reasons for running yet again, essentially revolving around the necessity to offer a real alternative to what he sees as the two party duopoly and the corporate interests that dominate the political system.

Nader believes that the Democrats are likely to win the presidency and maintain their majority in Congress. And yet, he still wants to run.

What third parties can do is bring young people in, set standards on how to run a presidential election and keep the progressive agenda in front of the people. And maybe tweak a candidate here and there in the major parties.

For a persuasive explanation of how futile if not counterproductive third parties tend to be in a two-party system and an electoral system based on plurality, and a devastating critique of Nader's justification of his 2000 campaign, see Bill Domhoff's Why Third Parties Don't Work (March 2005). From a progressive point of view, what does this mean for the future strategy of the Green Party? Indeed, a very strong argument can be made that running as a third party candidate in the US tends to be counterproductive.

For the most part, Nader's attempts were pretty much irrelevant; but in 2000 they were fatal. Beyond spoiling the election of Gore, the deeper issue seems to be that Nader is not sufficiently concerned with the effects that a conservative presidency has on precisely those less privileged people that he claims to care about so much. For he must have known how close the election was going to be, both in 2000 and 2004; and likely also in 2008. And how credible is his emphasis on how indispensable third parties are in the US while running as a an independent candidate in 2004, and not as a candidate of the Green Party, as he did in 2000?

Most importantly, how much does the progressive agenda really matter to him when deciding to run? From a strategic point of view, running as a third party candidate takes away precious resources and attention from those candidates who actually do have a chance of winning and therefore can advance the progressive agenda much more effectively.

Nader is 73 now. No one denies the crucial role he has played in advancing progressive causes. But it is high time for him and all other progressive third party candidates to start behaving more responsibly in elections, if not more strategically in politics in general. Quo vadis, Nader?

Bloomberg: Perot Redux?

2007-06-19T19:24:00.000-05:00

New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg changed his party status today from Republican to unaffiliated. This is widely seen as a further step towards running as an independent in 08, which would significantly alter the whole race.

Bloomberg has been a lifelong Democrat and only switched his affiliation for his first mayoral run. A billionaire and former CEO (estimated net worth: $5 billion), he could easily fund his own campaign. Pointing to his record as mayor of New York City, he frequently claims how well "nonpartisan" politics works. Just yesterday, he emphasized yet again:

"The politics of partisanship and the resulting inaction and excuses have paralyzed decision-making, primarily at the federal level, and the big issues of the day are not being addressed, leaving our future in jeopardy"

Given his moderate positions, some think he is likely to take away more votes from the Democratic candidate. A Republican strategist in New York, Greg Strimple even goes so far to predict:

"If he runs, this guarantees a Republican will be the next president of the United States. The Democrats have to be shaking in their boots."

After all, Ross Perot getting 19% of the popular vote in 1992 certainly helped Clinton defeat Bush. This time around, however, the Democrats would be more likely to suffer.

Others, such as former Democratic Party Chairman Donald Fowler, expect that he would get more Republican votes, because "Republicans are more disenchanted than Democrats."

In any case, according to independent pollster Scott Rasmussen, "He could have a significant impact on the campaign. Nationally there's a significant segment of the electorate that would give serious consideration to Bloomberg as a candidate." (For all references, see this AP article.)

If Bloomberg entered the race, what would this mean for progressive electoral strategy?

The Peace Movement can only win with a strategy: a comment on Wittner's "How the Peace Movement Can Win"

2007-06-01T07:28:00.000-05:00

In April 2007 Foreign Policy in Focus published an essay by Lawrence S. Wittner called How the Peace Movement Can Win. In May Foreign Policy in Focus published responses by eleven peace activists and scholars.

Lawrence Wittner and Foreign Policy In Focus have begun an important discussion about peace movement strategy and institutional structures. We really can't expect to have an effective peace politics in the US unless it is guided by a widely shared strategy and the construction of organizations/institutions capable of carrying out that strategy...especially when the opposition is so politically powerful and artful.

The peace movement is made up of many disparate tendencies and so the road to a common strategy will be very difficult. Many of the peace movement tendencies don't share common goals and objectives which is the starting point of strategic analysis: how do we get from this undesirable place to a desired place?

None the less, there is probably a significant sub-set of the peace movement that would agree that one objective should be to contend effectively in the arena of national security policy. If that is the case, nothing short of a serious long-term strategy will do. The forces in opposition to peace politics are well organized and have thousands of professionals employed to advance their cause. If this part of the peace movement proceeds without strategic coordination it will be defeated at almost every turn.

Although Peace Action may be the largest membership-based peace group in the US, it is not structured to lead a strategic challenge to the national security establishment...or to even develop a strategy. Peace Action has an organizational model suitable to running campaigns around selected issues. To the extent it has a democratic process it is limited to its active members.

Peace Action could, and probably should, play a role in developing an effective peace politics strategy. It could join with other organizations in convening a broad and diverse group of progressive leaders (activists, scholars, and even a few trusted politicians) to begin the process of strategic development with the goal of changing US foreign and military policy.

Such a strategy will probably take years to develop and will be implemented over decades; and the sooner it begins the better, especially for the victims-yet-to-be of the current policies.

Charles Knight

Bill Clinton, Strategist in Chief

2007-05-25T14:37:00.000-05:00

In New Role, Senator Clinton's Strategist in Chief was published in the New York Times on May 13, 2007. This article is interesting insofar as it reflects a widespread understanding of "strategy" that we have noticed all along. This is all the more interesting since this article presents Bill Clinton not only as a mere strategist, but as some sort of super strategist. Accordingly, one might be forgiven to expect to learn something about the long-term goals and big picture thinking of this super politician. But there is nothing of this sort. Instead, strategy is reduced to electoral strategy and, as is frequently the case, is being confused with tactics.

The following excerpts are supposed to illustrate this point:

Bill Clinton's connections, and his endless supply of chits, only begin to capture his singular role in his wife's presidential candidacy, advisers and friends of the couple say. He is the master strategist behind the scenes; the consigliere to the head of ''the family,'' as some Clinton aides refer to her operation; and a fund-raising machine who is steadily pulling in $100,000 or more at receptions.

So far, his roles have unfolded in private as he provides ideas to his wife and makes sure she paces herself, and as he acts as something of a field general with donors, instructing them on how to talk up Mrs. Clinton.

The Clintons mostly talk about strategy, not campaign management, advisers say. (my emphasis)

Now, when I read this sentence, I got excited, expecting to hear something about strategy; I was all the more disappointed when I read on to see how the paragraph continued:

He receives polling data from Mr. Penn, who was his pollster in 1996, and the two men speak regularly. He sometimes looks over drafts of Mrs. Clinton's major speeches, and he gives her feedback on her performances.

Advisers say his advice to her can be boiled down to a few broad themes. He urges her to remember that the biggest person gets elected (in other words, the one who rises above political pettiness) and that the most optimistic candidate wins. He has encouraged her to talk about average people who work hard and play by the rules, classic Clintonian language. And she has, using those phrases and other themes in talking, for example, about regular Americans who are ''invisible'' to the Bush administration. (Advisers say Mr. Clinton did not devise the invisible line.)

So apparently this is how the leading paper in the country understands strategy, essentially as polling, framing, and messaging. Interestingly enough, in a profile of Hillary Clinton's top strategist, Mark Penn, the other leading paper in this country, the Washington Post, exhibits a similar understanding of strategy. Clinton's PowerPointer: With Data and Slides, a Pollster Guides Campaign Strategy of April 30, 2007, appeared in the Post's series "The Gurus: The professionals who manage the machinery of American politics."

With the same pollster in charge of "strategy," a very similar network of advisers and a very similar platform, one should not be surprised to get with Hillary what the country got with Bill: Clintonism 2.0, the updated version. Not surprisingly, apparently one of the Clinton campaign's major concerns is whether the country is ready for yet another Clinton or whether there is still too much "Clinton fatigue" around.

One way for progressives further to the left to respond to this state of progressive "strategy" is to quote the great strategist Sun Tzu: "Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat." For indeed, the sad truth is that winning elections is the be all and end all of centrist strategy. Getting Clinton (or Obama, or ...) elected is the ultimate goal. By the way, it is rather sobering to contemplate that if Clinton got elected and re-elected, that would give us 28 years (almost three decades!) of uninterrupted rule by the two most powerful political machines in the country.

For more liberal progressives however, this state of affairs is precisely part of the problem, not part of the solution. For them, getting yet another centrist elected is "tactics without strategy," is "the noise before defeat," because this is not the way to significantly change the country. You win a battle, but you lose the war. Hence the urgent need to develop a strategy that allows us to win the war.

By necessity, this strategy goes far beyond election cycles. That seems to be one of the reasons why hardly anybody is thinking about it. What you find much more is something along those lines: 'Bush is so bad, we absolutely have to get a Democrat elected in 08! Now it is even more urgent than in 2004!! This must be our absolute priority!! Electability is everything!!!' -- And then what?

"Third Way is the Wrong Way"

2007-05-24T12:45:00.000-05:00

This article by Guy T. Saperstein, a partner at the Democracy Alliance, which he describes as "a center-left organization that is attempting to build progressive political infrastructure," is a criticism of Third Way's strategy, an organization that calls itself "a strategy center for progressives."

His core argument is that centrism is a counterproductive and self-defeating strategy that undermines progressives' efforts. According to Saperstein, Third Way's political philosophy is best articulated in The Politics of Polarization, a report that was published in October 2005, and that was presented as a "new study of electorate [that] updates seminal work by Galston and Kamarck." It was written by William Galston and Elaine Kamarck, with the assistance of Scott Winship. Kamarck and Galston also wrote The Politics of Evasion in 1989, which is said to have had a significant impact on Bill Clinton's campaign. Now similar things are being said about the new study's influence on Hillary Clinton's platform. Galston is a political theorist at the University of Maryland and at the Brookings Institution, and a co-editor (together with Stanley Greenberg and Ruy Teixeira) of The Democratic Strategist. Elaine Kamarck is a lecturer in public policy at the Kennedy School of Government. Scott Winship is managing editor of The Democratic Strategist, chief blogger of The Daily Strategist, and recently became Senior Policy Advisor at the Third Way. I only point this out to illustrate how tightly knit the centrist universe seems to be ...

In any case, according to Saperstein, Third Way's strategy

is predicated on one core premise - a premise that I think is not only utterly fallacious, but one which attempts to lead Democrats in the wrong political direction. The core premise of "The Politics of Polarization" is that more people self-identify as "conservatives" (32%) than "liberals" (20%), so polarizing the electorate favors Republicans, not Democrats. Thus, Democrats must trend toward the center and/or conservative positions to attract the "moderates," and avoid supporting clear, but polarizing, "liberal" positions.

Indeed, the writings of Galston and Kamarck emphasize this key premise again and again, and not only as a description of how things are, but also as a prescription of what progressives should do and what direction they should move in. The fact that more voters self-identify as conservatives rather than as liberals should come as no surprise, given the growing success of the conservative infrastructure in shaping the ideological climate according to their interests (which is precisely what the Democracy Alliance tries to counter by building progressive infrastructure). But since the center has thus significantly moved to the right, moving towards the center necessarily comes at the expense of more liberal positions and hence undermines the progressive agenda.

Instead of pandering to an elusive center by abandoning more liberal positions, progressives should do what conservatives have successfully done: Rather than accepting the status quo by essentially strengthening core conservative positions, they should challenge it in order to change the terms of the debate and its underlying assumptions. The way to do this is to unambiguously confront conservative positions by presenting clear progressive alternatives. It means mobilizing the base rather than pandering to moderates, which is precisely what Republicans have done, based on the advice of Matthew Dowd and Karl Rove. According to Saperstein, this is easier in ideological terms and more effective and sustainable in the long term.

Saperstein illustrates his argument with two examples, the Iraq War and public housing policy. On Iraq, Saperstein shows that by accepting "the fundamental assumptions that underlay Bush's war," Third Way "managed to lag behind the Democratic Party on Iraq," thereby adding to the public's confusion about where Democrats stood on Iraq. In short, by being too close to the center, Third Way "has been in the way, not leading the way."

On public housing policy, Saperstein refers to a presentation by Third Way's President, Jon Cowan, to the Democracy Alliance. In it, he emphasized that when he was at the Housing and Urban Development Department, he worked to "blow up public housing," and characterized it as "modernizing" progressive ideas. According to Saperstein, he failed to mention that much of what he blew up

was sitting on valuable urban land and was replaced, not by low-income housing, but by developments of mid and high-priced condominiums, while the poor were moved farther from cities, and that some of the blown up housing had been recently built and was in good condition. More significantly, Cowan failed to acknowledge that the number of replacement units did not match the number of housing units blown up and thousands of low-income tenants were left homeless by this "modernization." The next day, Deepak Bhargava, Executive Director of Center for Community Change, an organization that works on behalf of low-income people, called this demolition of public housing, with the insufficient housing replacement, "immoral."

Blowing up public housing and leaving thousands homeless may be Third Way's idea of "modernization," it may even appeal to some Democratic real estate developers, but there is nothing progressive about it.

Saperstein concludes that the question for progressives is not whether but how to influence Democrats:

The question for progressives is not whether we want to influence the Democrats -- of course we do. The question is do we want to invest precious time and resources on inside-the-Beltway cautiousness, bad policy analysis that makes no waves, takes no chances and doesn't differentiate itself from the conservatives, or do we work to build something more real, vital, honest and progressive -- based on better policy -- ideas that change America because they change the terms of debate, not simply pander ineffectively to a mythological, out-dated concept of the "center." If we don't, if we think that type of ideological myopia is counterproductive, we better keep watch on Third Way.

This seems to be a step in the right direction; the question is, does it go far enough. According to Saperstein, the goal of the Democracy Alliance is to build progressive infrastructure in order to change the ideological climate and ultimately public policy in a more progressive direction. Again, as we do find ever so often, strategy in the final analysis is driven by the ultimate objectives it pursues, and varies according to them.

To put it differently, looking at the presidential elections, does it make a difference to "progressives" whether Hillary Clinton is elected, which most of the New Democrats, including Third Way, are said to support, or whether Barack Obama is elected, which some in the Democracy Alliance are said to be tempted to support? Or is perhaps John Edwards the most progressive candidate, at least among the electable ones? No doubt that Dennis Kucinich would be much more progressive, but of course he does not have any chance. Elections are prohibitively expensive, but progressive resources are notoriously and chronically scarce. Politics remains the art of the possible. Does that mean that progressives are necessarily stuck with no good options, only lesser evils? Depends on what you mean by "progressive;" that seems to be the crux of the matter.

Toward a two-tier presidential campaign financing system?

2007-02-24T18:40:00.000-05:00

This is just a brief follow-up on a previous post on the growing importance of money in politics. Yesterday, former Democratic governor of Iowa and chair of the Democratic Leadership Council, Tom Vilsack, dropped out of the presidential race. Here is why:

"It is money, and only money, that is the reason we are leaving today." (my emphasis)

Is this further proof of the emergence of a two-tier financing system, in which all the top candidates opt out of public financing, while the second-tier candidates are stuck with it? Some push this further and wonder whether this is still a democracy or whether we have fully entered the age of plutocracy. Apparently, Evan Bayh also quit for a lack of money. Can public financing, created after Watergate in 1974, be saved?

"Next week, the Federal Election Commission will rule on a special request made by Sen. Barack Obama (D-IL). It would let him raise money for the general election, and still choose to return it and take public financing if he wins the nomination."

A Vision without Power?

2007-02-24T15:18:00.000-05:00

A Response to Sally Kohn's Presentation of the Movement Vision Project
by Ben Healey, Network Organizer, Public Policy Institute

The core pieces of the vision Sally articulated – active (or radically participatory) democracy, an inclusive economy, and international justice – strike me as very smart and truly do capture a broad spectrum of what progressive activists are trying to accomplish, each of us within – and sadly rarely across – our individual issue "silos." The language she employs is powerful and motivating, the values are clear, and overall there's not much within those pieces with which I'd disagree.

Nonetheless, I do take issue with what I see as one significant gap in what Sally presented: there needs to be a much more central place for a theory of power in this work. And by that I mean two separate things: 1) power as the thematic and philosophical linkage between the individual pieces of the shared progressive vision we are working to describe; and 2) power as a strategic goal that cannot be decoupled from the articulation of that vision.

1. Power as a thematic and philosophical link

What underlays – and fundamentally connects – the three big pieces Sally laid out last week is a radically different vision of power: who holds it, how it can be wielded, and why. Deeper democracy, in all aspects of civil society and in our relationship to the state; greater popular (or community) control over the economy; and a neo-cosmopolitan, rather than a nationalist or imperialist, approach to international relations – all of these ideas spring from a left understanding of who can and who should hold power, based on a serious (but underdeveloped, in my opinion) philosophy of personhood. Therefore, as a movement that must be (and at least rhetorically contends that it is) concerned with power, we should not be trying to represent a Kantian, individually-oriented view of autonomy as the end goal. Rather, let us imagine together a community-oriented, heteronomous view that considers all of us to be both mutually interdependent and also fundamentally valuable, as individuals, acting within the various spheres of our lives – where we, as individuals, should have real decision-making power within structures of democratic collaboration.

I use as an example Charles Knight's comments that evening: "We could get 50 Israelis and Palestinians – all committed to peace as an end goal – in a room to discuss what the internationally 'just' solution to that conflict would be, and we still probably wouldn't come out with an answer." He's right. And so I offer up this point: while the solution to the conflict matters immensely, what matters even more – in terms of our shared vision, at least – is that one side doesn't have the power to blow the other up, and thereby dictate the terms of negotiations.

Thus, I believe that we should share this common goal on the left and articulate it whenever we discuss our vision: that we work to transform relations of power so that human beings, working together in democratic structures, determine together how best we can create healthy communities; productive, meaningful and sustainable economies; and an improved quality of life for ever-increasing numbers of people.

2. Power as a strategic goal

Dale Bryan mentioned that Sally left out "conflict" in her analysis. His comment sparked in me this complaint, which is that Sally's analysis seems to operationalize the "progressive vision" only in so far as it is about how we tell our story, how we frame it, and how we seek to authentically actualize it in our organizations' work.

Maybe I'm missing something – but that just ain't enough, and I don't think I'm saying anything that we all don't already know. So why not say it? Our strategy has to be about gaining governing power, so that we can implement our vision. Not about opposition to power, but instead figuring out how our side is going to run the country.

In all facets of our lives, people do not choose to act unless they believe that they have some power (to influence, persuade, decide, etc.), and a movement won't grow unless those who share our goals (or, just as importantly, those who might come to share our goals if we present our vision in a compelling fashion and tell our values-based stories better) recognize that we are actively contesting for power – and that they will have more of it when we win! Sally's strategic trifecta doesn't seem to grapple with this reality, and I'm curious as to why.

Vision = Movement = Change

2007-02-23T16:50:00.000-05:00

This is the summary of the presentation and discussion of the Movement Vision Project of the Center for Community Change with Sally Kohn, director of the Movement Vision Project. It was organized by the Progressive Strategy Studies Project and took place in Boston on February 21, 2007. The summary is based on Sally's handout and the notes that I took during the presentation and discussion.

The progressive movement is clear what it's against - but is it clear what the movement is for? Two years ago, the Movement Vision Project began interviewing social change leaders across the United States about their positive, big picture, long-term vision for the future. How should the economy be structured? What would a just foreign policy look like? Is it possible to end racism and what would it look like if we did? The project interviewed over 165 leaders, including national leaders as well as state and local leaders, from all different backgrounds, working on a range of issues. Informed and shaped by these conversations, the Movement Vision Project has developed a provocative proposal for the progressive community about our vision for the future and how we get from here to there.

We at the Progressive Strategy Studies Project believe that vision and values are central aspects of the 'objectives' component of a progressive strategy. They are a necessary starting place for strategic thought and planning. We are very pleased to host the presentation and findings of the Movement Vision Project in Boston. For more on the components of progressive strategy see our report, Finding Strategy, published November 2006.

Summary of the Presentation

Introduction

Sally started out by noting that pessimism and pragmatism had seeped so deeply into progressives that they typically adopt centrist positions and don't even dare anymore to articulate a vision, a set of bold ideas for the future, which should be a priority. Too many progressives, after fighting primarily defensive battles for so long, have become so used to what they are against, that they have difficulties articulating what they are for.

The results of the 165 interviews with progressive leaders and activists in Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, and on the national level, do not represent a consensus, but naturally include gaps and contradictions.

A. The Progressive Vision for the Future

I. Active Democracy

Guiding principle: Replacing exclusive hierarchy with inclusive participation

Background
The goal is to transform social hierarchies based on privilege and power into pluralistic, participatory structures by addressing issues such as structural racism, structural sexism, etc.

1. Political equality
Create a level playing field for political participation

2. Quality public education
We already know that it works well, if it's well funded. Teach all children to cooperate rather than to compete, to become learners rather than earners.

3. Democratic media
Must become much more diverse in ownership and content. Gave the example of the website Oh My News in South Korea.

II. Inclusive Economy

Guiding principle: Replacing the worship of wealth with the value of community

Background
Wealth continues to be concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, and progressives are complicit in this. On the other side, a large majority of Americans want more community in their lives. The progressive approach should be to not only raise the floor for the poor, but also to lower the ceiling for the rich. In addition, we should be able to work less so as to have more time to cultivate relationships and community.

1. New ownership structures
Progressives should move towards a stakeholder society. Land trusts are just one example.

2. Sustainability
Environmental considerations have to become an integral part of economic decision-making. Progressives should try to keep economies as local as possible.

3. Redistribution

III. International Justice

Guiding principle: Replacing nationalism and imperialism with equality worldwide

Background
According to Kohn, nationalism and imperialism best describe US foreign policy. It is a policy of unilateral domination and exploitation. It needs to be replaced by multilateral cooperation.

1. Global citizenship
Progressives need to develop more comprehensive forms of citizenship. Citizenship in the European Union (EU) is a new form of regional citizenship. Already one third of Europeans between the age of 21 and 35 think of themselves first as Europeans, and only secondly as members of a national community. The UN has the potential to further global democracy, but would need to be significantly reformed for this, which is unlikely to happen anytime soon.

2. Economic balance
Progressives need to work for greater economic balance between countries. Global Exchange, co-founded by Medea Benjamin is one example; the World Social Forum is another.

3. Peace
Progressives need to replace unilateral domination with multilateral cooperation.

B. Strategies to get us from Here to There

Kohn proposes a three-step approach:
1. Analysis of the problem
2. Vision of the solution
3. Strategy to get from here to there

I. Discuss it

Progressives need to talk more about their bold and even radical vision and ideas for the future, in order to refine and better articulate it.

II. Frame it

Progressives need to articulate and understand their vision in terms of shared values of community and interdependence across every issue. Progressives need to emphasize shared values over selfish values. You can also build a movement if it is rooted in common values.

Our values influence how we process information, which in turn shapes our attitudes and behavior.

Progressives need to move from hyperindividualism, emphasizing individual rights and competition in a "dog-eat-dog" world to greater cooperation on the basis of equality and community rights. Education should foster cooperation, not competition.

To put this into practice, the formation of trans-issue coalitions is key.

III. Spread it

Progressives need to move from hypocrisy to authenticity and actuality. Progressives need to bring their vision to life, through authenticity in their organizations, and actuality on the ground.

Kohn concluded her presentation by giving a number of examples to demonstrate that these are not just lofty ideas, but that progressives actually have made progress in realizing them. Progress is possible only if progressives believe in themselves and believe in what is possible.

Summary of the Discussion

In the discussion of the progressive vision, participants emphasized the following:

1. There was genuine excitement about hearing such a radical vision; something that happens all too rarely these days.

2. There was unanimous agreement on the need to have more time to cultivate relationships and community in order to enhance the quality of life, instead of accumulating an ever greater quantity of things.

3. Several participants wanted to hear more about the conflicts involved. People will have to continue to struggle, all the more since their will be massive resistance against the implementation of such a progressive agenda.

In the discussion of progressive strategy, participants emphasized the following:

1. Several people wondered how people from different backgrounds would relate differently to these progressive proposals, and wanted to explore this further.

2. Some people emphasized the need to engage people if progressives want to persuade them of their vision; and they did not feel engaged by the presentation. People have to be able to identify with a vision and to know what they can do about it.

3. Some participants pointed out that the presentation did not sufficiently address how to address the power and resources necessary to realize this vision. Moreover, the presentation did not adequately reflect how fragmented the progressive community is.

Since many participants expressed their interest in continuing the conversation, we thought that posting a summary on our blog and inviting people to comment on it would be a good idea.

If you have a longer comment, it might be preferable to send that to me at wbrauner@comw.org so that I can post it as a separate post on the blog, to keep a better overview of contributions.

Is this a "liberal moment"?

2007-02-20T13:29:00.000-05:00

Or is it a "conservative slump"? What is the momentum of this moment, and where will it lead? Is it just a phase or will it usher in a new era? Leftward, Ho? - The L Word, in the New York Times of February 18, 2007, gives a good overview of theses questions.

Others, such as the sociologist Bill Domhoff, think of the midterm elections not as a success for liberals, but rather as a return to the status quo, with mainly "moderate conservatives" now being in charge again: What Happened in the 2006 Midterm Elections, November 2006.

Bruce Ackerman, professor of law and political science at Yale University, and author of Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism (2006), calls it "an opening:"

"We’re at a moment where I think the disasters of the Bush administration’s domestic and foreign policies are being appreciated" (quoted in the Times article).

Much will depend on which kinds of progressives (more and more of which now dare to call themselves liberal again) will prevail, and how fast conservatives will be able to recover.

On the Primacy of Fundraising

2007-02-19T12:06:00.000-05:00

Senator Evan Bayh (D-IN), last December, after only two weeks, dropped out of the race for the Democratic nomination for President (Rumor has it that one main factor was Obama getting ready to enter the race, attracting so much attention and money).

In an interview with NPR's All Things Considered on February 12, 2007, Bayh spoke very frankly about how much time he had to spend on fundraising. A "non-celebrity candidate" (probably referring to "rock star politicians" Clinton and Obama), he said, without exaggerating, has to spend 80-90% of his/her time raising money.

He went on to describe a typical day: After getting up, his fundraising breakfast is followed by fundraising calls; then there is a fundraising lunch followed by - you guessed right! - more fundraising calls; and then, there is a fundraising dinner and/or reception, followed by yet more fundraising calls to the West coast, depending on where in the country he is.

All this of course is nothing new; but to hear someone who experienced this himself talk about it in such a calm and matter-of-fact way, is still sobering.

It is also well known that any candidate who wants to have a chance in 08, has to raise at least $100 million in 2007 alone. The year having 52 weeks, this translates to roughly two million dollars per week, almost $300,000 per day (assuming, realistically, a seven-day fundraising week), and about $30,000 per hour (assuming, admittedly, a rather short 10-hour fundraising day)! Welcome to contemporary US politics!

While small donations, especially raised online, are increasingly important, the bulk of the money still comes from relative few major donors and donor networks. What most donors are most interested in is whether their candidate can win, which is largely determined by how well he/she does in the polls, which in turn is largely determined by how much money they have to buy airtime to gain name recognition, get their message across, and build an appealing public persona. So there clearly is a circular relationship between fundraising capability and probability of success. Everything else, especially their platform, becomes a function of this absolute priority of having to raise $30,000 per hour.

Since 1976, it has always been the candidate who had raised the most money, who eventually was nominated by his party to run. This means that it's not the people who decide who is running, but a handful of donors. This will be the case all the more this time around because with several big states moving up their primaries, this will be the longest and costliest campaign in history. By this time next year, we will know who is running.

This also means that this pattern is all the more likely to hold in 2007. As of now, by most estimates, Hillary Clinton, together with her husband, and their whole infrastructure, will be able to raise the most. My big concern, like that of many, is that she will be nominated as the Democratic candidate, and then might not win - truly a worst-case scenario.

What does all this mean for progressive grand strategy? It can only mean one thing: It's the money, stupid! The logic is impeccable: You want to win; in order to win, you have to raise the most money; in order to raise the most money, you have to get the biggest donors on your side; in order to get the biggest donors on your side, you have to promise them the kinds of policies that they prefer seeing enacted once you win; etc., etc.

How can progressives even begin to break this vicious cycle, which systemically deforms the US political system?

Already 66 years ago, the liberal Supreme Court Chief Justice, Louis Brandeis, had a sobering answer:

"We can have democracy in this country or we can have great wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we cannot have both." (Labor Journal, October 17, 1941, p. 18)

Unfortunately, this is precisely what has been happening in this country in the last 30 years, and especially since 2001: A greater and greater concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, who use this wealth to literally buy political power and influence. Money is power, and money talks louder than civil society; at least for now.

Legislative Tactics and Party Electoral Politics

2006-11-12T21:49:00.000-05:00

Tactical maneuvers in the legislative process can effect the outcomes of national elections and legislative leaders anticipate gaining advantage over their opponents by adroit positioning in legislative battles years before national elections. So says an article in the Boston Globe on 12 November 2006. We copy it below.

Keep in mind when reading this and any other post-election analysis that 'victory has a thousand authors.' And we might add, victory is made from a thousand crucial tactics. Or so it may seem in hind sight's first glance.

Social Security at roots of shift: Democrats set groundwork in reform fight
by Rick Klein, Boston Globe, November 12, 2006

WASHINGTON -- Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid had a decision to make. President Bush was starting his second term with a brash challenge to a sacred Democratic program -- Social Security -- and the House and Senate Democratic leaders needed a coordinated response, and fast.

Pelosi and Reid, new leaders of demoralized and diminished Democrats in the House and Senate, were caught off guard by the president's gambit, and quickly faced Republican mockery that the Democratic Party could only say "no." Would Democrats offer a plan of their own? Or would they insist on total opposition, brushing aside Bush's not-so-subtle message that Democrats would stand in his way at their own peril?

Top party leaders debated their response in a series of frantic meetings and conference calls early last year, according to aides who spoke on condition of anonymity. Then Pelosi brought up a piece of advice shared by several marketing specialists from the business world she had sought out: You can't build up your brand unless you first take down the competition's.

And so Pelosi and Reid put out the word: There would be no Democratic Social Security plan, and no negotiating with Bush as long as he insisted on privatization. With that move they laid the groundwork for Tuesday's electoral sweep -- a Republican washout that will give Reid the title of Senate majority leader and make Pelosi House speaker in January.

"They never offered a complex counter-agenda," said Stephen Wayne , a government professor at Georgetown University. "They ran on the thing that they all could agree on: that this president and this Congress did not put us in the right direction."

Democrats made huge gains in the mid term elections for a variety of factors -- an unpopular war in Iraq, congressional scandals, frustration with Bush's style of leadership.
But the victory had its roots in that early and successful battle against Social Security reform, which gave Democrats crucial unity and momentum at a time when many pundits were predicting a permanent Republican majority, according to party strategists and veteran Democratic lawmakers.

"We had to fight that tendency that said you needed to have a plan when you're the minority in Congress," said Representative Barney Frank , a Newton Democrat who was elected to a 14th House term last week and is in line to become chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services.

"On Social Security, it was exactly right to say our job is to say 'no' to this," Frank added. "And it turned out that that was also the right answer on Iraq."

The ultimate test for Democrats will be how they use their majority, not how they won it, and on that front the current crop of leaders is woefully untested, political observers say. Democrats haven't controlled the House and Senate in 12 years, and they're coming back to power with a thin agenda.

The closest thing to a Democratic platform for governing -- their "Six of '06" plan -- represents a modest list of priorities that Bush and the Republican Congress had blocked, including a minimum-wage hike and cuts in interest rates for student loans.

It lacks the sweep of the "Contract with America" that Republicans rode to power in 1994, a manifesto that kept Republicans on track in the early days of their new majority.

After Democrats enact their first batch of goals they will have to define their strategy for governing without much of a blueprint, said Julian Zelizer , a congressional historian at Boston University.

"Now it's on their back to put together one, two, three big issues for them to go on," said Zelizer. "People are not as united once you're in the power of governing. That's when the disputes will start to come out."

The chances of a Democratic takeover this year once seemed very small. The 2004 elections were a Republican sweep, with Bush returned to office for a second term with expanded majorities in both the House and Senate.

As the current congressional session started, Pelosi had been House minority leader for barely a year, and Reid had just taken over the minority leader's post after the defeat of his friend, then-senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota.

Though Bush talked on the campaign trail about privatizing Social Security , only after he won the election did Democrats realize it would be his top domestic priority.

The day after his 2005 State of the Union address, he toured the country to build support for shifting part of the program into private savings accounts. He chose states that he had won, but which had at least one Democratic senator -- an implied threat that if Democrats didn't come to the bargaining table they'd pay a price at the polls.

To Democrats, it was a shot in the gut -- an attempt to dismantle the New Deal legacy of a Democratic icon, President Franklin D. Roosevelt. But with memories raw from the 2004 losses, many Democrats were arguing for accommodation, and some analysts warned that sitting out the year's biggest debate could be fatal for the party.

"There's no question that in our caucus, there were a couple of individuals who were prepared to offer alternatives," said Representative Richard E. Neal , a Springfield Democrat who serves on the subcommittee that oversees Social Security. "They thought that we needed a competing view."

Yet Reid and Pelosi resisted those pressures and launched a campaign of their own. They, too, hit the road, with Democratic members of Congress hosting more than 1,000 town-hall meetings on Social Security last year. They coordinated their publicity efforts with Democratic-allied interest groups that also wanted the president's bid blocked.

Last March, Reid persuaded more than 40 Democratic senators to oppose privatization, assuring Democrats of the number they'd need to sustain a filibuster. Pelosi had fewer procedural tools but no less commitment to the cause. One Pelosi aide recalls her giving the same curt response to several colleagues who asked when the party's Social Security plan would be released: "Never. Does never work for you?"

That strategy, of course, meant that Democrats did not seriously engage the president on the issue, despite the looming fiscal challenges faced by the Social Security system as baby boomers begin to retire.

But in the end, Democrats' blocking efforts were so successful that Bush never even introduced a bill. By campaign season, only Democrats were bringing up Social Security private accounts -- as a weapon to use against Republicans. The campaign-style apparatus that defeated Social Security reform was ready to go on behalf of Democratic candidates.

As challenges arose for Republicans -- indictments of House members, the Terri Schiavo affair, Hurricane Katrina, the efforts of a Dubai-controlled company to take over US ports -- Democratic unity left the party well positioned for political gain by keeping the focus on Republican missteps.

Gone were the days in which House Democratic leaders could be wooed into supporting bills, or where a few dozen conservative Democrats could be counted on to vote with Republicans to cut taxes or spending.

That meant every Republican vote was crucial, allowing Democrats to exploit areas of Republican discord and force moderate Republicans into politically difficult votes. "Disunity had been a hallmark of the Democratic Party, but they disciplined the members, and all the factions within the party came together," said Zelizer, of Boston University.

On Iraq, Democrats never did find a plan they could all agree on. But they did find a single message: They would bring about a change of course.

By Election Day, according to polls, more Americans trusted Democrats on Iraq as well as the war on terror -- eviscerating the Republican Party's hold on national security as a political issue.
Nonetheless, many party leaders privately warn that the Democrats' unity will be severely challenged in the coming months.

But the remarkable success Reid and Pelosi had in bringing together their caucuses bodes well for their ability to govern, said Thomas Downey, a former Democratic House member from New York who is close to Pelosi.

"Keeping people together against something is much more difficult than getting them to stay together to vote for something," Downey said.

Original URL: http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/
articles/2006/11/12/social_security_at_roots_of_shift/ (12 November 2006)

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Should Progressives Adopt an Indirect Strategy?

2006-08-23T16:39:00.000-05:00

In Eat Your Hart Out of August 22, 2006, Sean Gonsalves, who writes for the Cape Cod Times, criticizes all those who still cling to the stay-the-course rhetoric on Iraq as empty and counterproductive sloganeering. He does so by quoting from what he calls "THE classic book on military strategy" by the British military historian Basil Henry Liddell Hart, who many refer to as the Clausewitz of the 20th century. Unfortunately, he omits to tell us which of his numerous books he refers to, but it seems safe to assume that it is his major work, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, first published in 1941.

He also fails to mention John Mearsheimer's Liddell Hart and the Weight of History from 1989, in which he argues that much of his work is faulty and of little originality, which casts doubts on Gonsalves' claim that Liddell Hart really was such an outstanding strategist.

Without being able to evaluate these contradictory claims at this time, Liddell Hart's basic approach to strategy seems highly relevant to progressive strategy. Needless to say, we should always be aware of the risks and limits associated with applying military strategy to political strategy.

Liddell Hart's lifelong study of military history and strategy led him to formulate his key insight as the indirect approach to strategy, which consists of two fundamental principles:

1. If the enemy is in a strong position, direct attacks almost never work, because they exhaust the attacker and reinforce the enemy's resistance, and therefore should be avoided.

2. Since the enemy can't be defeated through a direct attack, you first have to weaken his position by upsetting him through unexpected attacks before the main attack can succeed.

In Liddell Hart's own words,

During this survey one impression became increasingly strong - that, throughout the ages, effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had ... indirectness. In strategy, the longest way round is often the shortest way home.

This indirect strategy seems quite applicable to progressive strategy today. Despite the conservatives' mounting problems, their position is still very strong in all three dimensions of power: institutional, infrastructural, and ideological. Given that progressive resources will remain limited for the foreseeable future, a direct attack on the "conservative machine" would be counterproductive, since it would waste precious resources without achieving any significant success.

Indeed,

Self-exhaustion in war has killed more States [sic] than any foreign assailant.

Progressives should remember that they risk exhausting themselves if they continue to spread themselves too thinly. If you want to upset your adversary, you can't afford to squander your resources, and instead have to concentrate them where they are most likely to achieve your objectives.

One of the key challenges for progressive strategy therefore is to find out how best to upset the conservatives' equilibrium in order to loosen their grip on power.

In the civil rights movement, the use of strategic nonviolence succeeded in drawing public attention to unjust practices, and this tactic is still advocated by some today, such as Bill Domhoff. But given that there is no movement today that is remotely comparable to the civil rights movement, one can doubt whether it still can be effective, since there is no larger movement that it can connect to.

The indirect strategy is also reminiscent of Marshall Ganz' emphasis on the critical role of creative and innovative thinking by the leaders of organizations in enhancing their strategic capacity, precisely in circumstances where their resources are structurally constrained. Ganz developed his understanding of strategic capacity and how to improve it in Why David Sometimes Wins: Strategic Capacity in Social Movements (2005), and discussed it at the Third Progressive Strategy Seminar in 2006.

Should Democrats Use Fear-Mongering in 2006?

2006-08-19T17:24:00.000-05:00

Given that the candidates' positioning (or should we rather say: posturing?) on Iraq and counterterrorism will be one of the key variables determining success or failure in the 2006 midterm elections, what message should Democrats adopt vis-à-vis Republicans?

According to Kevin Drum, who writes the Washington Monthly’s blog, Political Animal, the Republican message is straightforward:

‘If you vote for Democrats, terrorists will kill you.’

After all, this formula of the politics of fear has proven successful in 2002 and 2004, so why should it not work in 2006? As is well-known, this is precisely the Rovian approach.

In Scare Them Back (Slate, August 18, 2006), John Dickerson, Slate’s chief political correspondent, strongly recommends that Democrats should fight fear-mongering with fear-mongering, which essentially would come down to a slogan like:

‘If you vote for Republicans, even more terrorists will kill you!’

Dickerson argues, like a growing number of observers, that Bush’s war on terror is actually counterproductive, since it produces more terrorists than it eliminates. Drum, in Fear Mongering (Political Animal, August 18, 2006), agrees with this point, adding:

As with George Bush's domestic policy, it creates the illusion of present-day action at the expense of long-term disaster.

But he doubts whether Dickerson’s approach can be effective, and cautions:

People who are scared want action right now, which means that a strategy of fear-mongering is simply not compatible with the long-term policy of tactical restraint, counterinsurgency, and economic engagement that Democrats need to be selling.

Dickerson is right that fear-mongering helped John F. Kennedy win election in 1960, but it also contributed to the hysterical atmosphere that helped bring us the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, and finally the Vietnam backlash. In the long run, did that help either the country or the Democratic Party?

That's an extremely arguable point. But I'd like to hear those arguments before I buy into fear-mongering as a 2006 campaign strategy.

As far as progressive strategy is concerned, it is important to note that potentially effective short-term tactics can undermine long-term strategy. Will the 2006 campaign be yet another illustration of tactics trumping strategy or has the US electorate become receptive to a more effective strategy against terrorism?

Drum’s use of ‘strategy’ interchangeably with ‘tactics’ and ‘policy’ unfortunately is all too common in contributions to progressive strategy. After all, ‘fear-mongering’ is not a strategy but a tactic, and more precisely a technique of how to frame certain messages. Likewise, ‘killing terrorists’ is neither a strategy nor a tactic. It can be either an objective or an operation. This critique is not only about semantics. Confused strategic thinking leads to confused strategies. Whether implemented in campaigns or in policies, they always risk being counterproductive.

The Divergence between Progressives and Centrists and its Strategic Implications

2006-08-17T17:33:00.000-05:00

This is a brief analysis and commentary on the single most important schism among Democrats – that between progressives and centrists - its recent aggravation, how this plays out in terms of policy and party politics, and its implications for progressive strategy. The crucial question is whether there is enough potential for convergence or whether the divergent orientations will be further exacerbated. In large part, this will be determined by two variables: Whose infrastructure is stronger and whose message resonates better with the US public. As before, we again find the interdependence of objectives, analysis, and tactics.

Underlying this divergence is the crucial question of whether progressives can continue to keep their central promise of significantly expanding opportunities for the poor and middle class in the age of globalization, which I analyzed in a previous post. To the extent that the American Dream has ever really worked – and there is considerable controversy on this point – is it still credible that it will work even better in the future? If not, what are viable alternatives for progressive strategy?

In the last month, we have seen the gulf between progressives and centrists widening. Three key events were the controversy over the DNC’s 50-state strategy, the publication of the 2006 report on the DLC’s American Dream Initiative, chaired by Hillary Clinton, on July 24, and Ned Lamont’s victory over Joe Lieberman in the Connecticut Democratic primary on August 8, and the revealing responses to those developments.

These events accentuate the familiar divergence between the centrist New Democrats, clustered around the DLC and related centrist think tanks, closer to Clinton, and what is referred to as the progressive grassroots ‘movement’, reinforced most recently by the netroots, and closer to Howard Dean and the DNC’s 50-state strategy.

This conflict manifests itself in a struggle over primacy in the Democratic Party and over policy. The battle over dominance in the Democratic Party is primarily between Clinton and Dean, and their respective networks. The controversy over policy concerns both domestic and foreign policy. While Clinton appears to have proven that she can unite centrists on socioeconomic issues, she is far from doing so on foreign policy and the crucial question of Iraq. Here, she seems stuck between a hawkish DLC and progressives who are highly critical of a unilateral and militaristic foreign policy. And while some proposals in the American Dream Initiative point in the right direction, for many progressives they don't go far enough.
On July 24, 2006, the DLC published the 2006 report on the American Dream Initiative, and Hillary Clinton gave a major speech on the topic. In 2005, DLC Chair Gov. Tom Vilsack asked Clinton to chair the project to ‘address the central economic challenge of our time – saving the American Dream.’ The DLC prides itself on the fact that ‘a broad and unprecedented coalition of progressive think tanks took part in developing this agenda: the Democratic Leadership Council, the Progressive Policy Institute, the Center for American Progress, NDN, and Third Way.’ Indeed, this cluster of the top five centrist think tanks and advocacy organizations represents what could be called the institutional core of the self-described New Democrat Movement.

In The Dream and the Nightmare (Huffington Post, July 25, 2006), Bob Borosage, co-director of the Campaign for America’s Future and president of the board of Progressive Majority, points out that Clinton tries to ‘navigate the currents’ between the centrist DLC and the rising tide of progressives representing a ‘growing majority of Americans,’ by emphasizing areas of agreement and by avoiding positioning herself on areas of disagreement, most importantly the Iraq war. It is not entirely clear to me whether the 'nightmare' only refers to Iraq or whether it also means that the centrist version of the American Dream represents a progressive nightmare ... Be that as it may:

It omits mention of the Iraq War or foreign policy. It tiptoes around America's failed global economic strategy. It focuses on areas where Democrats agree - making college affordable, expanding access to health care, home ownership, retirement security. It drops the old DLC swagger - embracing an increase in the minimum wage that the DLC once disdained. Its proposals on college affordability have the scope to make a difference. Its "Baby Bonds" - a $500 savings bond at birth and at age ten for low-income families - could be politically attractive.

But otherwise it is characteristically cautious. Its health care proposals would do nothing for most uninsured Americans and little to control prices. It says nothing about empowering workers to organize and little about holding CEOs accountable. It skimps on any investment agenda, while promising to don a permanent budgetary straight jacket. It fails to call for either fundamental tax reform or rolling back any of Bush's top end tax cuts, while offering up a bushel of new tax credits and write offs.

And while Hillary omits mention of the war in her American Dream agenda, the DLC continues to champion the Iraq nightmare -- most recently calling for putting the economy on a war footing, raising the military budget and rallying the Americans for an extended commitment to nation-building in Iraq and transforming the Middle East.

Written before Lamont’s victory over Lieberman, Borosage concludes that the success of Lamont’s campaign suggests that this positioning is too cautiously centrist:

Some of the proposals in Hillary's American Dream Initiative will contribute to that, but she'll have to swim a lot faster and reach a lot farther if she hopes to catch the coming wave of progressive change.

Andrea Batista Schlesinger, executive director of the Drum Major Institute, in her article Middle Class Isn’t Middle Ground (TomPaine, July 26, 2006), reminds Senator Clinton and the rest of us of the importance for progressives to favor policies that truly benefit the middle class. She rejects the frequently expressed 'logic' according to which you are ‘populist’ when talking about poverty, but ‘centrist’ when talking about the increasing difficulties of the middle class:

That is the kind of shallow analysis that has divided our politics for far too long between the poor and the middle class. The truth of the matter is that, in a nation in which the very wealthy control almost all of our wealth and in which their agenda is the driving force behind most of the governing party's agenda of tax cuts and power consolidation, we are all in this together.

For a long time, people would give DMI a hard time for using the language "middle class." To us, the equation is simple. If there is no American middle class, there is nothing for the poor to work their way into. If there is no American middle class, our democracy suffers. […]

But middle class doesn't equal middle ground. Advocating for the middle class isn't inherently some kind of political compromise or centrist bargain, ala the Democratic Leadership Council. [sic] […]

Advocating for the strengthening and expansion of our middle class shouldn't just be political code for "I'm inoffensive." It should mean that you're willing to do whatever it takes to create the economic policy that will directly benefit the overwhelming majority of Americans.

Given that Clinton was one of the few who received an A on DMI’s annual Congressional Scorecard in 2005 (Obama only got a C, which will surely come as a surprise to many), she reminds her that she should not only remember all this but also say so.

In contrast, she dismisses Robert Rubin’s Hamilton Project at the Brookings Institution, run by the highly respected economist Peter Orszag, as a ‘centrist’s dream,’ and criticizes it for trying to build ‘credibility’ with conservatives rather than with the middle class.

Closely related to this divergence over policy is the struggle over primacy in the Democratic Party between Hillary Clinton and Howard Dean (and their respective networks), that Thomas B. Edsall, Washington Post staff writer and special correspondent for The New Republic reports on in The Grudge (The New Republic, July 27, 2006).

Edsall, a longtime observer of US politics, provides very interesting background information on the struggle between the Clintons and Dean, going back to Dean’s 2004 campaign and book, and his campaign for the DNC chairmanship in 2005, which Clinton had tried to sabotage:

The result? Dean and Clinton--the Democratic Party's two power centers--find themselves locked in a struggle for intraparty supremacy. Each camp considers the other's political strategy fundamentally flawed. Dean loyalists dislike Clinton's stance on Iraq and her cautious approach to leadership, and they also fear she is too polarizing a figure to win a general election. Meanwhile, Clinton partisans doubt Dean's competence in managing the DNC and believe him to be just the sort of antiwar, elitist, left-wing Democrat who will scare off white middle- and working-class voters.

Edsall points out an interesting reversal of roles: While Dean was the insurgent back in 2003, today the Clintons are the insurgents, but representing the establishment. But I doubt whether this is really the case. It seems to me that Dean is still the insurgent, in spite of being chair of the DNC, while the Clintons still represent the establishment of the Democratic Party, due to their close connection with the DLC and the centrist infrastructure:

What makes the Dean-Clinton struggle so interesting is that it represents an inversion of the party's previous power structure. When Dean began his rise to national prominence in 2003, he portrayed himself as an insurgent who would challenge both the Democratic Party's Washington establishment and the ideological legacy of Clintonism, which he argued had pushed the party too far to the center. That tactic once looked likely to propel Dean to the Democratic nomination. But, today, Dean heads the DNC, and it is Clinton who wants her party's nomination. To win, she will have to make inroads among Dean's followers and loosen his grip on the party's apparatus. This time, it is the Clintons who are the insurgents, but insurgents who represent the Democratic establishment.

Early in 2003, Dean discovered that it was viable to run on a platform critical of Clinton’s centrism. His 2004 book, You Have the Power, articulated that criticism, and claimed that Democrats made a major mistake by attributing Clinton’s success to his strategy rather than to his personality:

The schism between the two camps has its roots in Dean's early 2003 discovery that running against Clintonism held a lot of appeal for Democratic primary voters. Many liberals were hungry for a politician who would tell them what they wanted to hear on Iraq, gay rights, and the role of religion in American life--and, just as importantly, one who would denounce Democratic triangulators, equivocators, and compromisers. On all those counts, Dean delivered. During his presidential campaign and later in his 2004 book, You Have the Power, Dean offered a forceful critique of Bill Clinton's centrism. "After nearly a decade of widening income inequalities, campaign-finance scandals, noxious inside-the-Beltway compromises, and political catfights ... the American people felt equally disenfranchised by Democrats and Republicans," Dean wrote. He added, "The Democrats have made a fundamental mistake in watching Bill Clinton and thinking it was his strategy--and not his extraordinary personality--that enabled him to do all the things he did."

According to Dean, Democrats lose elections because they are too conservative. In order to win elections, they have to become more progressive. The way to get there is by rebuilding the party from the grassroots up, and not from the consultants down:

He continued to press this theme while running for DNC chair, but, instead of citing either Clinton by name, he simply lashed out at the Democratic establishment. "Here in Washington," he said, "it seems that every time we lose an election, there's a consensus reached among decision-makers in the Democratic Party that the way to win is to be more like Republicans." Dean's alternative was simple: "The way to rebuild the Democratic Party is not from the consultants down, it is from the ground up." Such rhetoric continued even after Dean won the chairmanship. This spring, Dean told a group of reporters, "We don't really have any consultants. ... We try to do everything in-house. We don't have a stable of Washington consultants telling us what to do."

But, as Edsall points out, this is not really the case. In fact, Dean not only spent more on consulting fees than his predecessor, Terry McAuliffe, but also concentrated it much more on a single company, Blue State Digital, which grew out of his 2004 campaign, and is said to dominate his consulting network.

In sum, Dean succeeded not only in distancing the DNC from the so-called Clintonistas, but also continued to enjoy the support of the emerging netroots, who viciously attacked Clinton.

Now Clinton's camp is seeking to change this landscape. Its strategy appears to be twofold. First, it is laying the groundwork to circumvent the DNC in the event that Clinton wins the nomination. Her advisers see Dean as a maverick, and they want to depend on him as little as possible during the general election. "The DNC is going to be peripheral," says one Clinton strategist. "We are going to have our own field staff, starting way before the primaries begin, right through November 7." He points out that she is prepared to reject public financing during the primaries and the general election. (Clinton does not lack for money: She has raised $32.2 million for her Senate reelection and has $22 million in the bank--all transferable to her presidential campaign, according to PoliticalMoneyLine.) This would allow her to keep the field staff she develops during the primaries on her payroll during the general election--instead of shifting it to the DNC, as previous candidates have done. Plus, in a move widely and correctly interpreted as a rebuke to Dean, Clinton strategist Harold Ickes recently established a private voter database to compete with a similar database being built by the DNC. Ickes's move--as well as Clinton's formidable array of experienced advisers, including Terry McAuliffe, Howard Wolfson, James Carville, Mark Penn, and others--will give Clinton added independence from the DNC.

Clinton’s second line of attack is to divide and conquer the progressive blogosphere, first by announcing that she would endorse the winner of the Democratic primary in Connecticut, and secondly by hiring Salon blogger Peter Daou, and Jesse Berney, who managed blog operations for the DNC in 2004, as consultants for her Senate campaign, and generally striking a more conciliatory tone towards the netroots.

Edsall believes that Clinton is in a better position than Dean to win the struggle over primacy in the Democratic Party, both in the short and in the long term, essentially because the netroots will be increasingly tempted by strong incentives to fracture, making it all the less likely to coalesce behind one single candidate.

So who will win the showdown between Howard and Hillary? In both the long term and the short term, the odds favor Clinton and her allies in the party's more moderate wing. Take the long term first. Many of the troops brought into politics by the Dean campaign are desperate to turn their avocation into a paying profession. Many left-wing bloggers are struggling to survive financially and would love to begin earning salaries as political operatives. For instance, Bowers and two friends, Hale Stewart (aka "bonddad") and David Atkins (aka "thereisnospoon"), recently announced the creation of NetRoots Research, Strategy & Analysis. As bloggers like these enter the competition for consulting contracts and campaign jobs, the pressures of the political marketplace will likely work to moderate idealism--and to make compromise and accommodation more acceptable within the netroots.

In the short term, Clinton's strategy of dividing and conquering the blogosphere will be abetted by the near impossibility of Web-based Dean loyalists uniting around a single candidate in 2007. Zack Exley--formerly organizing director for MoveOn.org, an Internet specialist on the Dean campaign, and director of online organizing and communications for Kerry-Edwards 2004--puts it this way: "I think Hillary is going to surprise everyone with the netroots. Every candidate who is flirting with the idea of running is trying to do it like Dean did it. You could have ten candidates trying to be the insurgent dark horse. All those candidates are going to split the netroots, leaving Hillary to be the standout." The netroots have simply become too large to be the exclusive agent of any one candidate. With her front-runner status, Clinton doesn't need to actually win the blogosphere outright; she just needs to make sure no one else does. And odds are there will be no repeat of 2003, when the liberal blogosphere rallied overwhelmingly to one contender.

That, in the end, may be Clinton's biggest advantage in her battle with Dean. Of course, there is always the possibility that Clinton will falter. But, if she does not, then Dean, with his supporters unable to coalesce behind a single candidate, will likely find himself without a proxy to run against her. Then again, he may not even want one. After all, there is probably only one candidate Dean could ever truly back, and he is sitting out this race. His name, of course, is Howard Dean.

On the Limits of Liberal Framing a la Lakoff

2006-08-16T18:52:00.000-05:00

This is a brief review of George Lakoff’s latest book, Whose Freedom? The Battle Over America’s Most Important Idea (2006), based on contrasting rather positive reviews with more critical ones, and focusing on the latter, since they are more substantive and have more to say about the limits of liberal framing a la Lakoff for promoting progressive strategy.

Whose Freedom? essentially argues that the liberal, not the conservative framing of 'freedom' is the dominant political tradition in the US, and makes suggestions on how to reframe issues and concepts around the core idea of freedom to counter the conservative frames.

In Reclaiming ‘Freedom’ (TomPaine, July 11, 2006), Bernie Horn, policy director at the Center for Policy Alternatives, basically agrees with Lakoff’s thesis, insisting that that progressives need to reclaim the public discourse from conservatives by reframing freedom and other core values along progressive lines, but criticizes him for not being specific enough about how to do that, and therefore not offering guidance to progressive messengers.

In George Lakoff’s Freedom Frame, Glenn Smith, who runs DriveDemocracy.org, emphasizes and illustrates the importance of Lakoff’s insight that the antagonists in the struggle over how to understand and realize freedom come from radically different worldviews.

Kevin Drum, who writes the Political Animal blog at the Washington Monthly, in his review entitled At a Loss of Words: The Latest Dispatches from the Framing Wars (Mother Jones, July/August 2006), provides interesting background on Lakoff’s rise, and criticizes him for overstating his core concept of ‘deep framing':

… the UC Berkeley linguistics professor who began a meteoric rise in progressive circles after a sympathetic activist offered him a grant in 2002 to advise liberal groups on their use of language. Within a few months, he was a rock star. He was invited to address Democratic senators at their annual retreat. Tom Daschle and Hillary Clinton sought out his advice. His think tank, the Rockridge Institute, began churning out white papers. During the 2004 campaign, Howard Dean predicted that Lakoff - then at the height of his bubble - would be "one of the most influential political thinkers of the progressive movement when the history of this century is written."

It was heady stuff, and Lakoff's notoriety came from his creation of a model of conservative ascendance that went beyond just words. Where the right has really succeeded, he said, is with "deep framing," the process of assigning a constellation of emotions to individual words so they instantly evoke an entire worldview. This idea is fundamental to Lakoff's core theory that people view politics the same way they view families: Conservatives value discipline, hierarchy, and competition, while liberals subscribe to a nurturing worldview that values empathy, fairness, and the common good.

Although this is a genuinely useful concept, Lakoff has always pushed it too far: Instead of using his model to explain some of the differences between liberals and conservatives-an effort that has the potential to be enlightening - he insists that it explains everything. […]

The result is richly ironic: A man who's made his reputation advising liberals on how to use language more effectively has written a turgid and nearly unreadable book that rests on hundreds of short, disjointed sections and dozens of long bullet lists that demonstrate how, if you strain hard enough, commonplace concepts can all be rewritten in a way that includes the words "free" or "freedom."

Drum also criticizes that Lakoff’s focus on rhetoric leads him to ignore the underlying economic reality. He contends that most Americans are simply still too comfortable for Lakoff’s (or for that reason anyone’s) economic populism to resonate successfully. He adds that conservatives won many battles, including over healthcare, not so much because of the way they framed the issues, but because they fought harder and with greater perseverance; and he calls on liberals to essentially fight more passionately:

The jargon of the New Deal and the Great Society might not work anymore, but there are still plenty of issues we can win on if we have the guts to stand up and say what we really believe, instead of watering down our values and running them through a gauntlet of focus groups before poking our heads above ground to greet the TV cameras. The right words can help, but only if they're backed up by genuine passion and principle.

Unfortunately, this ‘advice’ hardly seems more valuable than Lakoff’s which, justifiably, he criticizes so harshly.

To clarify radically different strategic orientations, Robert Jensen’s review of Whose Freedom? is the most useful. Jensen is professor of journalism and media ethics at the University of Texas at Austin. He begins his critique in The Limits of Lakoff’s Politics: Outside the Frame (CounterPunch, August 14, 2006), by emphasizing the central irony that Lakoff’s worldview, which informs his frames, seems to prevent him from engaging in the very self-criticism that he urges liberals to pursue:

One of George Lakoff's key observations in his work on contemporary political discourse is that "frames trump facts" -- when facts are inconsistent with the frames and metaphors that structure a person's worldview, the facts will likely be ignored.

Ironically, Lakoff's new book -- Whose Freedom? The Battle over America's Most Important Idea -- demonstrates that problem all too well. His worldview seems to keep him from the very critical self-reflection that he counsels for liberal/progressive people.

Lakoff's "frame," simply stated is:

(1) Right-wing Republicans are the cause of our problems, and

(2) progressives working through the Democratic Party will deliver the solutions.

So, out the window must go any facts or analyses that suggest

(1) the problems of an unjust and unsustainable world may be rooted in fundamental systems, such as corporate capitalism and the imperialism of powerful nation-states, no matter who is in power, and

(2) the Democratic Party is not only not a meaningful vehicle for progressive politics but, as a subsidiary of that corporate system with its own history and contemporary practice of empire-building, is part of the problem.

To deal with those obvious and difficult challenges to his political proposals, Lakoff fudges certain facts and ignores others. Whether he does this unconsciously -- trapped by uncritical acceptance of his own frames and metaphors -- or is aware of it, we cannot know. But the result is a book that offers little to citizens who want to deepen their understanding of our political crisis and start to strategize about a new direction that can bring this country -- and human society more generally -- back from the brink of the collapse we face on many fronts. Whose Freedom? also has a sloppy, slapped-together feel which, together with its serious intellectual and political problems, raise serious doubts about Lakoff's fitness to play intellectual guru to any liberal/progressive movement, a role to which he has been elevated by many.

Jensen’s analysis and critique is highly relevant for thinking about progressive strategy in that it shows the interdependence of analysis, ultimate objectives, and tactics.

If you believe that the many serious problems in US politics and US society are primarily due to the dominance of conservatives and their frames, you are likely to think that a stronger Democratic Party could successfully address these problems. The main challenge then becomes how Democrats can win elections, and what Democrats stand the best chance of being elected – more liberal or even ‘populist’ ones or more centrist and moderate candidates, which obviously entails different tactics. The debate over this has been intensifying for quite some time now. Nevertheless, the ultimate goal is the same: To change US society by winning elections. In short, it’s an electoral strategy.

If, on the other hand, you are convinced that the many serious problems not only in the US, but in the world, are due to an excessive concentration of power and wealth in corporations and nation-states, who advance their interests at the expense of the majority of the people, and that the Democratic Party is an integral part of that unjust system, then you are likely to abandon the attempt to transform the Democratic Party to win elections, and will look for adequate instruments to achieve significant, structural, and long-term sociopolitical change. This assessment is of course reminiscent of that of Ralph Nader and others. One option would be to try to build up a third party, for example the Green Party; but the current US electoral system, which is highly unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, makes that a loosing proposition.

If the ultimate goal of progressive strategy is to realize a just and sustainable society, which necessarily implies structural sociopolitical change, the only viable tactic seems to be to make progressive infrastructure so strong that it would be able to move the whole country further to the left. To do so, it needs to be stronger than today’s conservative infrastructure, which only shows how far progressives are from achieving their goals. In this progressive grand strategy, transforming the Democratic Party into a truly progressive organization, and winning elections with truly progressive candidates, will be but important components. As will be changing the ideological climate to make it more progressive.

Ultimately, the success of this progressive grand strategy depends, as John Kenneth Galbraith reminds us in The Good Society: The Humane Agenda (1996), on the permanent perfection of inherently imperfectible democracy:

The decisive step toward a good society is to make democracy genuine. (p. 139)

Because we do have a choice:

We can have democracy in this country or we can have great wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we cannot have both. (Louis Brandeis)

Strategic and Operational Thinking Illustrated

2006-07-13T15:04:00.000-05:00

from: A Learning Organization - Doctrine, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Tactics Trump Strategy - a problem for progressives

2006-07-13T14:58:00.000-05:00

Nobel Prize-winning economist Herbert Simon has been quoted as saying, "Short term thinking drives out long term strategy, every time." A more measured way to say this same thing is: tactical considerations tend to trump strategy. This the way Bill Bradley phrased the notion in an March 30, 2005 op-ed in the New York Times called A Party Inverted.

For reasons that should be obvious, it is a problem for progressives when tactics trump strategy. Other than relying on pure luck, the only way you can expect to win is with an articulated strategy, particularly if your opponent(s) is powerful and strategically adept.

Consequently the tendency of tactical considerations to trump strategy must be consciously resisted. A good practice would be to always put tactical discussions in a strategic context. How does the proposed tactical activity fit within the strategic plan and its priorities? How will the employment of the tactic move things forward in the strategic plan?

That way you avoid fighting battles you don't have to fight or climbing hills that don't get you closer to your objective. That way you avoid fighting the battle in the terrain your opponent has prepared.

Midterm vs. Long-Term Strategy

2006-07-06T15:50:00.000-05:00

A conflict is growing within the Democratic Party between Howard Dean’s long-term 50-state strategy and the short-term requirements of winning the 2006 midterm elections. It is essentially a conflict between the campaign strategy for this fall and a strategy for rebuilding the Democratic Party over many years, if not decades to come.

The disagreement includes differences over what kind of national message to adopt, and especially when to publicize it, but centers on the allocation of money. While Dean and his supporters emphasize the need to continue to invest heavily in their strategy to make the party competitive in all 50 states, particularly Rahm Emanuel and Charles Schumer, along with many others, are increasingly concerned that this will not leave enough money for the DNC to make sure that the Democrats win back both the House and the Senate.

The Washington Post had originally reported on this conflict, especially between Dean and Emanuel, back in May. For the very hands-on role that Emanuel and Schumer play in congressional races, see yesterday’s piece in the Los Angeles Times.

Here are some excerpts from Howard Dean and his supporters on the long-term logic, and possible short-term implications of the 50-state strategy. It is interesting to note how ultimate objectives shape both the strategy itself, including priorities and sequencing, and the criteria by which it should be judged (empahses added):

"They can say what they want, but we've been doing it the old way for a while and it's time for a change," Dean said in an interview. "To find out if the 50-state strategy is going to be successful, you'll have to wait for a couple of presidential cycles. It won't be deemed a failure, because I'm going to keep doing it."

"We're going to be in 10 states on behalf of the Senate and we're going to be in 38 to 40 House races," Dean said in the interview, disclosing such numbers for the first time. "We're going to devote significant resources, but we're going to do it in the context of preparing ourselves for '08 and beyond."

Those who support Dean's strategy of boosting Democratic performance in all corners of America - even in Republican "red states" - say the burden for winning midterm races rests with congressional leaders. They say Dean's vision to strengthen the party is a long-term approach that, in the end, could be more important than winning a few House or Senate seats this year.

"It's a difference in mission," said Mark Brewer, chairman of the Michigan Democratic Party. "If we're going to become competitive again in the national elections, we need to have a national strategy to make states more competitive."

Those close to Dean say he pays little attention to assessments from the party establishment. Since being elected 18 months ago, he has reveled in being labeled an outsider.

His most loyal admirers are far from the capital and he visits them often, traveling places seldom listed on a political leader's itinerary. On a recent day, he flew to the Virgin Islands, where locals declared him the first chairman of either national party to make an official visit.

In contrast, Emanuel, along with many Democrats, is increasingly worried that they will not have enough money to compete with Republicans on the ground, especially in close elections. By definition, the imperatives of an electoral strategy are short-term and center on the allocation of scarce resources (emphases added):

"Will we have the resources to run an effective ground campaign for this election?" Emanuel asked. "This is not a contest between the 50-state strategy and the midterm election. It's a question of whether we are going to have the money for the midterm election."

Disagreements among Democrats over campaign strategy - particularly regarding the allocation of money - are hardly new. But relations between Dean and other party leaders have reached hostile levels, according to interviews with more than two dozen well-placed Democrats. And some fear the tensions could give Republicans an advantage in on-the-ground mechanics and money for the midterm election.

Beyond state party officials, though, many Democrats wonder whether the 50-state strategy is another chapter of Dean's failed White House bid in 2004, which raised a record $50 million yet failed to win a single contest outside his native Vermont. These Democrats worry that the national party will be out of money and unable to compete with Republicans in the final weeks of the campaign.

The NDN’s Simon Rosenberg predicts that Dean will necessarily be judged by the outcome of the elections, whether he likes it or not:

"It's an audacious and bold redefinition of the party," said Simon Rosenberg, founder of the progressive New Democrat Network, who challenged Dean for party chairman. "But at the end of the day he will be evaluated more by what happens in the elections than how much money the state parties have. Regardless of whether that's fair or not, that's what the judgment will be."

Is there stil time to find a compromise between the requirements of these two very different types of strategy? The outcome of the elections and the future of Dean and his strategy will tell.

Bush's Strategic 'Incompetence'

2006-07-05T14:47:00.001-05:00

The Bush administration’s ‘incompetence,’ frequently invoked by its critics, actually misses the real issue. For in fact, as evidenced by the long list of its significant achievements, the conservative leadership is very successful and hence competent at executing a conservative philosophy. Thus, the problem is not the failure but precisely the success of conservative ideology. At least this is George Lakoff’s thesis, published in AlterNet on July 3, 2006, under the title, Bush Is Not Incompetent.

Lakoff is famous for applying the concept of framing to conservative and progressive politics. His main argument is that conservatives have managed to reframe key public debates by systematically and consistently using language in a way so as to evoke an emotional reaction that immediately relates the issue at hand to a conservative worldview. The challenge for progressives of course is to counter this conservative framing with their own framing in order to strengthen a progressive political and social philosophy. According to Lakoff, whoever dominates the worldview, dominates public discourse and thereby controls politics and policies. The Breakthrough Institute has taken up the challenge and attempts to apply and further develop Lakoff’s framing concept.

Lakoff is professor of linguistics at Berkeley, Senior Fellow at the Rockridge Institute, and the author of many influential books on philosophy, linguistics, and politics, including Moral Politics (1996), Don’t Think of an Elephant: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate – The Essential Guide for Progressives (2004) and, most recently, Whose Freedom? The Battle Over America's Most Important Idea (2006). For a harsh critique of the latter, see Kevin Drum’s review in the July/August issue of Mother Jones, At a Loss of Words.

According to Lakoff,

conservative philosophy has three fundamental tenets: individual initiative, that is, government's positive role in people's lives outside of the military and police should be minimized; the President is the moral authority; and free markets are enough to foster freedom and opportunity.

He gives three examples to illustrate how the Bush administration advanced its conservative vision beneath the veil of ‘incompetence:’ the mushrooming budget deficit, the Iraq fiasco, and the disastrous non-response to hurricane Katrina.

His basic argument is plausible and sounds disturbingly familiar. If government indeed is the problem, according to Reagan’s famous slogan, and you are in power, you will ‘govern’ as badly as you can in order to discredit government even further. If government is the problem, you have to show that it is indeed incompetent. You do so by systematically weakening it, with the exception of the few functions that are compatible with conservative ideology and that are important for your constituencies. The ultimate irony is that conservatives attribute all the failures that they have caused of course not to their governing, but to government as such, thereby discrediting it even more in the eyes of the public. All this amounts to what could be called not only tactical, but strategic incompetence.

If you want to reduce the role of government in the economy as much as possible, and ultimately limit it to assuring the functioning of the ‘free market,’ the best way to go about it is to ‘starve the beast’ (Grover Norquist). You lower taxes during wartime, which is unprecedented, in order to weaken public finances to the point that when confronted with the stark alternative to pay for social programs or for national security, you of course have to choose the latter, especially with the permanently looming danger of terrorism. To reduce the social role of the government to pre-FDR times seems to be one of the strategic objectives of right-wing organizations such as the Federalist Society, which has close ties to the government. Many Americans still don’t seem to realize that the Bush administration is one of the most radical administrations in history. Their goal is to severely and structurally weaken government for a long time to come.

One of the goals of Conservatives is to keep people from relying on the federal government. Under Bush, FEMA was reorganized to no longer be a first responder in major natural disasters, but to provide support for local agencies. This led to the disastrous response to Hurricane Katrina. Now citizens, as well as local and state governments, have become distrustful of the federal government's capacity to help ordinary citizens. Though Bush's popularity may have suffered, enhancing the perception of federal government as inept turned out to be a conservative victory.

Lakoff's conclusion is worth reading carefully, especially for its strategic and long-term implications:

The mantra of incompetence has been an unfortunate one. The incompetence frame assumes that there was a sound plan, and that the trouble has been in the execution. It turns public debate into a referendum on Bush's management capabilities, and deflects a critique of the impact of his guiding philosophy. It also leaves open the possibility that voters will opt for another radically conservative president in 2008, so long as he or she can manage better. Bush will not be running again, so thinking, talking and joking about him being incompetent offers no lessons to draw from his presidency.

Incompetence obscures the real issue. Bush's conservative philosophy is what has damaged this country and it is his philosophy of conservatism that must be rejected, whoever endorses it.

Conservatism itself is the villain that is harming our people, destroying our environment, and weakening our nation. Conservatives are undermining American values through legislation almost every day. This message applies to every conservative bill proposed to Congress. The issue that arises every day is which philosophy of governing should shape our country. It is the issue of our times. Unless conservative philosophy itself is discredited, Conservatives will continue their domination of public discourse, and with it, will continue their domination of politics. (emphases added)

It is important that Lakoff insists on the success of conservative ideology not in spite of unintentional but precisely because of intentional conservative incompetence. However, it should be pointed out that ideology of course does not succeed in and of itself. It can succeed in controlling politics and policies only if it is supported by governing power, supplemented by a strong sociopolitical infrastructure.

At least this is the conclusion drawn from the analysis of power structures inspired by Steven Lukes, John Gaventa, and Bill Domhoff. In fact, there are three levels of power: Governing power in formal political institutions, the power of the sociopolitical infrastructure, especially in setting the agenda, and the power of ideology, worldview or philosophy, if you prefer, which is the deepest, and many would say the most important level of power. All three levels of power strengthen or, as the case may be, weaken each other. In the case of the right over the past 35 years, it has built a very strong infrastructure that has consistently advanced a conservative communication strategy (including framing), which eventually has resulted – and in turn has been reinforced by – governing power.

If progressives want to have a chance to effectively weaken the conservative power structure, they have to develop their infrastructure vigorously. For without it, not enough people will hear the progressive message and will be convinced by the progressive worldview that comes with it. Given how long it took conservatives to build their power structure, and given how weak the progressive power structure still is today, especially in comparison to that of the conservatives, this will by necessity be a long-term project. There does not seem to be a shortcut to it, for social structures by definition develop slowly, and only if you invest a lot of time, money, energy and all kinds of other resources, to cultivate long-term relationships, develop lasting organizations, and build a powerful network. Of course, having a strategy for how to do all this would help, too.

The 'Whatever' and 'Do Your Own Thing' Party

2006-06-19T20:08:00.000-05:00

A 'common knowledge' refrain in national political circles is that American voters don't know what the Democrats stand for. This is thought to hurt Democratic electoral prospects, because voters are hesitant to vote for a party that seems to be a muddle of voices and messages.

Stepping up last week to her leadership role as House minority leader was Nancy Pelosi who responded to quite reasonable questions about where the Democrats stand on Iraq. She responded (as reported by Linda Feldman in the Christian Science Monitor on 19 June 2006) thus:

We don't even have a party position on the war. We don't ask members to do one thing or another.

It was another leading Democrat, Bill Clinton, who adopted a similar stance on a military matter of his day: the "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy regarding gays in the military. Pelosi's version appears to be:

We don't ask party members their position on the war, and we certainly don't tell!

Linda Feldman quotes pollster John Zogby as saying,

The war is the elephant in the living room. The Democrats need to have a firm position.

How can the American people trust the Democrats to lead on national security issues if they don't have a party position on the most important current security issue of all? Pelosi should try harder to get a unified position even if it is a minimalist compromise. Otherwise she isn't doing her job.

Charles Knight

On the Purpose of Progressive Power

2006-06-19T20:05:00.000-05:00

Power is the ability to achieve a purpose. Whether or not it is good or bad depends upon the purpose.
Martin Luther King, Jr.

Politics is the art of the possible.
Otto von Bismarck

This is a very cursory reflection on the relationship between power, strategy, ‘reality’ and contingency or in other words about what is ‘real’, what is possible, what is desirable, and how to achieve it. The problem, of course, is how to tell the difference between real possibilities and merely possible realities.

This post has been inspired by the recent launch of The Democratic Strategist: A Journal of Public Opinion & Political Strategy by Ruy Teixeira, Stan Greenberg, and William Galston. They describe their project as follows:

We are launching this publication because we believe Democrats must begin to develop political strategies that look beyond the standard two- and four-year time horizons set by the American electoral calendar. Democrats must develop a set of concrete and coherent political strategies for regularly winning elections and over the longer term - perhaps over a decade or more - winning new areas of support and creating nothing less than a stable Democratic majority in the country.

In his first post of June 16, 2006, Scott Winship, managing editor of The Democratic Strategist and responsible for its blog, The Daily Strategist, positions himself as follows:

Before I sign off, you deserve to know a bit about my own ideological predispositions. First and foremost, I am an empiricist, so I try to the extent possible to rely on evidence, data. My read of 20th-century American political history and the analysis I've done of electoral data lead me to believe that, unfortunately, there are not enough voters out there who are as secular or fiscally progressive as I am. And there are not enough who are as anti-nationalist as many of you are. As such, I am of the view that Democrats must make (modest) efforts to accomodate those who are to the right of progressives.

At the same time, I part ways with most progressives in a number of policy and political debates. I am essentially a chastened Peter Beinart hawk. I believe in a social policy that both promotes opportunity but demands responsibility. I'm sympathetic toward market-based policies. The point is, in some regards I have a real affinity for moderate Democrats rather than simply being pragmatic.

Can I win you back if I say that in my perfect world we'd have universal health care, a higher minimum wage, gay marriage, more progressive taxes, no creationism in schools, more generous family leave, more legal immigration, preschool for all, tougher fair housing laws, and - uh - polar ice caps? (emphases added)

Beyond the well-established debate between centrist ‘progressives’ and liberal ‘progressives’ or, if you prefer, between moderate and ‘progressive’ liberals, ‘position statements’ like the above raise a number of more fundamental questions.

Is politics about more than power? Many observers, especially those of a realist provenance, agree that politics essentially revolves around power: How to gain it, how to keep it, and how to use it. Politics in this sense can be understood as a technology of power. To this, so-called idealists object that if politics is not about collectively realizing certain values, it certainly should be. Pragmatists, finally, are most interested in what they think is possible, given what they see as ‘reality.’

However, this pragmatist and realist focus on power begs the question of its purpose: Yes, power, but what for? To do what? For its own sake (as in l’art pour l’art) or for a purpose other, and one is tempted to say greater than itself? Idealists insist that power first and foremost should be a means to and end, but must never become an end in itself. Among other reasons because, as we of course know from Lord Acton’s famous aphorism, ‘power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely’ – the truth of which is displayed daily by the current Bush administration, among others.

Hence, the million-dollar-question: What is the purpose of building progressive power? How we answer this question determines to a large degree the kind of strategy we are going to develop to achieve our goals. There seem to be two very different types of strategy.

If your ultimate goal is to gain power by winning elections, and if you identify as ‘progressive,’ you will devise a strategy that is most likely to help Democratic candidates win elections. If, however, your end goal instead is to achieve positive social change, you will develop a strategy that will build a base, if not a movement, that will work for social justice and environmental sustainability outside of the electoral arena, but which will also allow more and more of your preferred candidates to win elections. In each case, you obviously employ different tactics, including different spending priorities, various ways and means of organizing, different agendas and platforms, etc.

Which brings us back to the melting ice caps which – uh – are, according to a solid scientific consensus, most likely the greatest challenge facing humanity in the 21st century. Climate change is indeed An Inconvenient Truth. To summarize Scott’s position, I think it would be fair to say that while he would really like universal health care, gay marriage, and polar ice caps, along with other such desiderata, ‘unfortunately,’ in his understanding of US politics, these goals are simply unrealistic, because the electorate is too conservative. Therefore, in order to win elections, Democrats ‘must’ move to the right, i.e. towards the center. It would be unfortunate indeed if we had to neglect the health and longevity of 45 million Americans and the rest of the world, just because some observers deem the US electorate as being too conservative, since, as everyone knows, health care and ice caps are vital to quality of life and chances for survival. Wouldn’t it make more sense to try to convince US voters (if they actually are that conservative/centrist, which is controversial) in order to make not only the desirable (universal health care) but especially the necessary (mitigating the effects of climate change) possible.

In short, the point is that the ‘real’ is only one version of the possible (see the post on Epistemology As If Politics Mattered). In other words, any observation of ‘reality’ is contingent, i.e. neither necessary nor impossible. You can see things a certain way and therefore deal with them accordingly, but you don’t have to, and no one can force you to. While you may be able to empirically prove that the US electorate is not sufficiently receptive a more ‘progressive’ agenda, this view, given the infinite complexity of the world and our very finite models, is necessarily highly selective. This also might be the majority view these days, but so what? This is what life and politics is all about, different people and groups coming from different perspectives and therefore having multiple and often sustained controversies. Social life consists of a multitudes of perspectives in conversation with each other, none of which today, at the beginning of the 21st century, can pretend to have any kind of privileged access to reality and therefore superior insight. Since we cannot know ‘objective reality’, might as well concentrate on changing it. To only slightly paraphrase Marx’ famous thesis: ‘The pollsters have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.’

This is why Robert B. Reich, former Labor Secretary under Clinton and currently professor at Berkeley, in his 2004 book Reason: Why Liberals Will Win the Battle for America, criticizes ‘centrist leadership’ as a contradiction in terms:

It takes no conviction and less courage to move to the political ‘center,’ as defined by prevailing polls of likely voters. If you want to be a malleable politician, you campaign from the center. But if you want to be a leader, you define the center. [his emphasis] You don’t rely on polls to tell you where to go. [Here, in a footnote referring to polls in the appendix, he wants to reassure candidates that ‘Americans are able to hear a liberal message.’] At best, polls tell you where people are, and it’s pointless to lead people to where they already are. The essence of political leadership is focusing the public’s attention on the hard issues that most would rather avoid or dismiss. We know the problems that need fixing. (emphases added)

As Hacker and Pierson cogently argue in Off Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American Democracy (2005), one of the biggest challenges facing progressive strategy is precisely the fact that what Reich calls ‘radical conservatives (radcons)’ have managed to move the political system, but not the public (!), significantly to the right, which of course means that the center has also shifted to the right. To counter this, the goal of a meaningful progressive strategy can only be, at a very minimum, to ‘re-center’ US politics, and ideally to move it back further to the left. To accomplish this, it is not enough for progressives to build their base and win elections; it requires leadership. This, in the end, is why I have chosen King’s quote as the motto of this post and of my blog.

Politics As If Epistemology Mattered or Who Is Still a Realist?

2006-06-16T18:27:00.000-05:00

Advice Overload for the Democrats - This article by staff writer Michael Grundwald, published in the Washington Post on June 11, 2006, is a good summary of recent analyses of the Democrats' problems and advice given to them on how to win the midterm and future elections against the background of the Republicans' serious current problems.

The article makes a thoroughly constructivist argument, namely that the 'diagnoses of the party's ailments, and prescriptions for cures' tell us more about the biases of those analysts and 'advice-givers' than about 'the party's [and here one is tempted to add the word: 'real'] prospects of regaining power.'

This is an epistemologically and politically important point. Every observation always tells us something about the perspective the observer is coming from, and about his or her interests. Hence we all operate with what might be called 'interested constructs.'

Since, as constructivism instructs us, we don't have direct and - as it were - immediate access to 'reality', all we have are our observations. But if this is the case, how could we then, as Grundwald does (and along with him, many others) differentiate between the prejudices of intellectuals and consultants on one side, and the 'real' possibilities of the Democratic Party on the other?

Empiricists would respond that it's all a matter of using the 'right' methodology and research design when examining your data. To which constructivists in turn reply that given the complexity of the world and infinite cause-and-effect-relationships, any model by necessity is highly selective in its choice of variables. In short, data are 'man'-made.

If we have to abandon the correspondence theory of truth for epistemological reasons, perhaps it's time to adopt a pragmatist understanding of truth for political reasons. Since we cannot know 'reality' as it 'really' is anyway, why not finally give up this ancient 'quest for certainty' (John Dewey) in favor of an understanding of truth as that which is good for us, given our convictions. If we believe pragmatists like Richard Rorty, the choice for liberals/progressives should be easy: We should give absolute priority to reducing the suffering of others by becoming more sensitive to their pain, based on the realization of our common humanity. For this argument, see his Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America, published in 1998.

At the end of the day, for constructivists, the challenge of course is how to be 'realistic' in a world whose 'reality' we cannot access; or better yet, inspired by Robert Musil's Man Without Qualities, how to become more interested in real possibilities rather than possible realities?

"'Reality' (one of the few words which mean nothing without quotes)."
Vladimir Nabokov

'The Greatest Challenge Facing the American Center-Left'

2006-06-14T16:34:00.001-05:00

In In Search Of a New New Deal: How Will the Good Jobs Of the Future Be Created?, Washington Post columnist E. J. Dionne identifies what he sees as 'the greatest challenge facing the American center-left', including progressives. Note the crucial distinction between tactics and strategy, highlighted below, that is made much too rarely in contributions to progressive strategy. Ironically, one would expect precisely political 'strategists' to systematically draw that distinction:

It's large enough that it should swamp all the silly arguments about whether Democrats need some sort of program for the 2006 elections. That is a tactical question -- of great importance to political strategists, but far less critical than whether progressives can, over the long run, keep their core promise to expand opportunities for the middle class and the poor.

There is no sturdier liberal or Democratic slogan than "Jobs, jobs, jobs." But liberals have a problem: The old capitalist job-production machine is not working the way it used to. The venerable promise that new (progressive) leadership will create masses of well-paying jobs is harder to make and even harder to keep.

In principle this is a larger problem for conservatives, whose main economic program involves reinforcing the status quo by giving tax cuts to rich people so they have more money to invest. Conservatives simply ignore the fact that fewer jobs are being created, particularly at home, for each dollar invested. But conservatives are expected to stand up for the rich. Liberals are supposed to expand the standard of living for everybody else. That is harder than it used to be.

To make his point, he refers to recent evidence, provided by Bruce Stokes, Ron Gettelfinger, and Alan Blinder:

In the National Journal of June 10 (article not [yet?] available online), Bruce Stokes, using data from the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), states that job growth in the current recovery is the slowest since the Kennedy administration, and warns that 'the global economy's job machine may be breaking down, again.'

At the beginning of this week's annual convention of the United Auto Workers (UAW), whose membership has dropped from 1.5 million in 1979 to less than 600,000 in 2005, its president, Ron Gettelfinger, issued a report arguing that the severe problems of the US auto-industry are not cyclical but structural and demand 'new and farsighted solutions.'

In Offshoring: The Next Industrial Revolution?, in Foreign Affairs of March/April 2006, Alan S. Blinder, co-director of the Center for Economic Policy Studies at Princeton University, and former Federal Reserve vice chairman, warns that 'we have so far barely seen the tip of the offshoring iceberg, the eventual dimensions of which may be staggering.'

Given these somber prospects, and noting the public's strong desire for an improvement in their socioeconomic situation, Dionne suggests the negotiation of a new New Deal:

This week's UAW meeting is simply the most obvious harbinger: The old bargain is breaking down and is in urgent need of renegotiation. The most promising place to start would be in reforms of the areas where the old bargain worked best: health, retirement and schooling.

Because electorates are looking for a better economic bargain, the words "New Deal" never sounded more up to date -- though if the marketing specialists insist, A New and Improved Deal would do just fine.

Interestingly enough, Jeff Faux, founding president and distinguished fellow at the EPI, in his most recent book, The Global Class War: How America's Bipartisan Elite Lost Our Future - and What It Will Take to Win It Back, published early this year, comes to a similar conclusion. Arguing that globalization has allowed the political and economic elite to abandon the social contract, he offers a strategy to democratize the global economy, beginning with a renegotiation of the social contract in North America.

Indeed, it seems to be the case that as long as progressives can't offer a convincing proposal of how to create a great number of good jobs, paying, at the very minimum, a living wage, any progressive strategy is bound to remain critically deficient.

While the problem is obvious, the solution is far from clear. Dionne cautions:

For the past 15 years, progressive free-market politicians have offered an appealing mantra about how to save the middle class: What's needed, they've said, is heavy investment in education and job training to allow people to make the transition from the "old" economy -- those auto jobs -- to the new. "What you earn depends upon what you can learn," President Bill Clinton said over and over.

There's certainly some truth to that still, but in the global economy, competition is fierce even for high-end jobs requiring great skill and education. To think otherwise is to deny the obvious: that the people of India and China, to pick just the two obvious examples, are gifted, energetic, ambitious -- and numerous.

Who Is Progressive?

2006-06-14T13:28:00.000-05:00

Hillary Clinton's speech at the Take Back America conference (TBA) yesterday triggered a debate over who is a progressive. This is relevant for progressive strategy since while many centrists and leftists call themselves 'progressive', they don't seem to have too much in common. Likewise, many contributions to 'progressive' strategy, most notably The Politics of Definition (see previous post), don't differentiate between 'progressives' and 'Democrats' when they talk about the need for a common philosophy. By blurring what appears to be a crucial distinction, such analyses can lead to greater confusion rather than clarity.

Norman Solomon asks Why Pretend that Hillary Clinton Is Progressive? He questions why TBA, which promotes itself as the largest 'progressive' gathering of the year, invites Clinton to speak, but not Jonathan Tasini, who is running against her in this year's Democratic primary in New York, and who, as a longtime union activist, is considered by Solomon, Howard Zinn and many others as a 'true progressive':

But the people who "do consider Hillary progressive" could mostly be divided into two categories -- those who are Fox-News-attuned enough to believe any non-Republican is a far leftist, and those who are left-leaning but don't realize how viciously opportunistic Sen. Clinton has been. Today, in keeping with her political character, she welcomes the fund-raising support of reactionary media mogul Rupert Murdoch.

He concludes:

In the interests of truth-in-labeling, shouldn't Hillary Clinton be described as anti-progressive?

Even Teddy Roosevelt ran as a 'progressive' in 1912. (The pictured Progressive Roosevelt Battle Flag now hangs in 3rd floor hallway of the Red Lion Inn in Stockbridge, MA.)

It is also well known that the vast majority of the netroots are highly critical of Clinton. Markos Moulitsas has been very explicit on this in his recent article for the Washington Post, Hillary Clinton: Too Much of a Clinton Democrat?

The focus of the current debate is the growing conflict over Iraq policy among Democrats and 'progressives.' For a good background on reactions to her speech, see Clinton Booed on Iraq in today's The Hill. Today's New York Times highlights the division between leading Democrats: Clinton and Kerry Show Democratic Divide on Troop Withdrawal. While Medea Benjamin, cofounder of Codepink, complains in Counterpunch that the organizers of TBA did not keep their promise to let them criticize her, Shawn Macomber of The American Spectator downplays the importance of the 'antiwar protesters' in today's National Review Online (NRO). John Podhoretz in yesterday's The Corner, the NRO's blog, even went so far to assert:

There's a lot of talk about how Hillary's rep on the far Left has taken such a hit that she's going to have trouble getting the Democratic nomination. Come on. How does sounding responsible and sober about America's policy in Iraq hurt her? Scenes like this, if they continue through the campaign season, are going to get her elected.

If a co-founder of the Weekly Standard and contributor to Fox News compliments 'progressive' politicians on their Iraq policy, it ends up making more than a few other 'progressives' suspicious.

But the crucial differences are not only between individual candidates and single issues, but also concern organizations and overall political strategy. This critical difference between different types of progressives is well documented. Roger Hickey, co-director of the Campaign for America's Future (CAF), which organizes TBA, sees CAF and its allies, such as MoveOn and USAction, as a 'winning counterweight' against the DLC and other centrist groups:

The lesson we drew from the Clinton administration is that the progressive wing of the Democratic Party … needs to be better organized in order to be heard, especially given the influence of groups like the DLC and corporate influence in general.

And he adds:

The Democratic Party is a big tent, but the vast majority of Democrats are progressives. (my emphasis)

In direct contrast, DLC senior fellow Marshall Wittmann warns:

The danger to the Democratic Party right now is, they’re lurching to the left and leaving behind the middle. It’s to Hillary’s credit that she’s steering a centrist course even if it upsets some on the left, because that’s the only way the party is going to be back in control of Congress and win the White House. (my emphasis)

The time-honored battle between different types of 'progressives' over primacy in the Democratic Party seems to intensify. How much potential is there to build bridges between them for the sake of greater integration, unity of purpose, and hence effectiveness?