Progressives Need a More Appealing Alternative Narrative

Ira Chernus, professor of religious studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder, expresses his concern in his latest contribution to Tom Dispatch, War Meets Values on Campaign Trail: Will the Big Winner of 2008 Once Again Be a Conservative Culture-Wars Narrative?

He suggests that "the so-called culture wars" have shifted from social issues to national security, and that this is McCain's "only chance" to win. He argues that McCain will increasingly try to attract the so-called "values voters" by referring to his "experience," with which they can more readily identify than with Obama's.

Pundits and activists who oppose the war in Iraq generally assume that the issue has to work against McCain because they treat American politics as if it were a college classroom full of rational truth-seekers. The reality is much more like a theatrical spectacle. Symbolism and the emotion it evokes -- not facts and logic -- rule the day.

This is an important consideration for progressive electoral strategy, and for progressive strategy more broadly. Perhaps progressives have to abandon their assumption that if people only knew the facts and gained enough insight, they would adopt their positions. Indeed, as psychologist Drew Westen argues in The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation (2007), emotions and symbolism play a key role in politics, and especially in elections. But symbolism and emotions cut both ways, which is clearly evidenced by both the excitement and the lingering concerns surrounding Obama, and McCain's enduring appeal.

In a section appropriately entitled "Creating New Stories," Chernus makes a number of important points and suggestions that progressives would to well to take into consideration and act on.

He starts out by pointing out that there is nothing "natural" about many Americans sharing a conservative understanding of certain values. Rather, it is the result of cultural evolution, which can be influenced, at least to some degree. This is very much a question of the relative power of different groups over public discourse, making their ideology more or less hegemonic.

Yet there is no law of nature that says the "ordinary American," white working class or otherwise, must value individualism, self-reliance, patriotism, and war heroics while treating any value ever associated with the 1960s as part of the primrose path to social chaos. In reality, of course, the "ordinary American" is a creature of shifting historical-cultural currents, constantly being re-invented.

Chernus attributes that fact that a conservative interpreation of certain core values is still so widespread among the white working class at least in part to progressives having neglected to develop "alternative narratives" that could address their concerns in meaningful ways. In short, their failure is in good part their own fault.

But the 1960s does indeed remain a pivotal era -- not least because that is when liberal, antiwar America largely did stop caring much about the concerns and values of working-class whites. Those workers were treated as an inscrutable oddity at best, an enemy at worst. Liberals didn't think about alternative narratives of America that could be meaningful across the political board. Now, they reap the harvest of their neglect.

It does no good to complain about "spineless Democrats" who won't risk their political careers by casting courageous votes against war. Their job is to win elections. And you go to political war with the voters you have. If too many of the voters are still trapped in simplistic caricatures of patriotism and national security created 40 years ago -- or if you fear they are -- that's because no one has offered them an appealing alternative narrative that meets their cultural needs.

It does no good to complain that such working-class views are illogical or stupid or self-destructive. As long as progressives continue to treat "ordinary Americans" as stupid and irrelevant, progressives will find themselves largely irrelevant in U.S. politics. And that's stupid, because it doesn't have to be that way.

Indeed, there is still way too much sterile scoffing going on on the left. Not that critical analysis isn't important; indeed it is essential. But if this is the main if not the only thing you do, it is counterproductive, for there is a huge opportunity cost: If you spend all the time criticizing, you don't have any resources left to develop viable alternatives. I am afraid this is in part due to convenience, if not laziness, for it is so much easier to complain and to lament than to develop realistic alternative strategies for how to achieve significant change.

What can be done to change this picture? Facts and logic are rarely enough, in themselves, to persuade people to give up the values narratives that have framed their lives. They'll abandon one narrative only when another comes along that is more satisfying.

Democrats started looking for a new narrative after the 2004 election, when the media told them that "values voters" ruled the roost and cared most about religious faith. The result? Democrats, some of them quite progressive, are creating effective faith-oriented frames for their political messages.

Yes, framing issues by using language and symbols that evoke positive emotions and that appeal to peoples' faith is important. Indeed, framing was Lakoff's favorite tactic, but he has fallen from grace, and his Rockridge Institute had to close due to a lack of funding. Apparently, framing is not enough, and this tactic should not be confused with strategy. And it remains to be seen how far Westen's ideas on emotions and politics will go.

Isn't this precisely what Obama is trying to do by appealing to our "better angels" with his emphasis on "hope" and "change," and by reaching out to religious communities? But will it be enough? As Obama himself continues to point out, there are some differences between him and McCain that he can't change: Black/white, young/old, different names, etc. What difference will these differences make in the perception and behavior of voters? Nobody knows, but some forecasing models quantify "ballot-box racism" with up to ten percentage points ...

Be that as it may, the task for progressives remains to systematically develop alternative narratives that speak to conservatives, and especially the white working class, in meaningful ways. But a change in discourse by itself is not enough. It has to be accompanied by a simultaneous change in government and policies that allow people to experience the benefits of public policies.

The problem in articulating semantic and structural changes is that the latter take much longer to bring about than the former. Perhaps this is one reason why many progressive funders seem to prefer projects that promise to change discourses: They achieve their results so much faster. But since they typically don't lead to structural changes, while valuabe in and of themselves, their effects tend to dissipate and don't build anything lasting in a cumulative way. Perhaps this is one of the reaons why the left has remained so weak over the past 40 years.

In sum, raising consciousness and changing discourses are necessary but by no means sufficient steps to achieve structural change. They need to be integrated into a larger strategy that manages to build power cumulatively in the long-term from a position of weakness. This starts with a realistic assessment of progressive resources, and requires a theory of change that can make a credible case for what tactics and operations will lead to which change and why - but this is the subject of a future post.

It's the Emotion, Stupid!?

Will Drew Westen succeed George Lakoff as the new "guru" of the Democratic Party or is it just another unfortunate case of confusing tactics with strategy? Now that Lakoff supposedly has taught all Democrats how to properly "frame" issues, is it time now for them to learn how to talk more emotionally and passionately about issues as a new strategy and not just as a different way of talking about issues, as USA Today put it rather bluntly (see below)?

Drew Westen's new book, published in late June, The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation, is getting a lot of attention these days; some even hail it as some sort of panacea for Democrats. However, there are also some important criticisms.

Iterestingly, the original subtitle apparently was meant to be "How People Vote, and How to Change Their Minds," which of course sounds much less grandiose, if not to say dramatic, than the subtitle that was eventually chosen. Perhaps this illustrates the very message of the book, to use more emotionally appealing language. But perhaps the original subtitle more precisely expresses its purpose.

Westen is a psychologist at Emory, a guest blogger at HuffPost, and the founder of Westen Strategies, a consulting firm with the motto "Persuasion is about Networks and Narratives."

This motto is also the main thesis of his book. Essentially, Westen claims, Democrats have operated for too long with the wrong theory of mind. According to Westen, the mind is not disapassionate but passionate. Voters are primarily driven by emotions, and Democrats need to adjust their rhetoric accordingly in order to win elections. The brain is a highly complex network of associations, and Democrats have to articulate the kinds of narratives that most effectively activate those networks that get them elected. Democrats need to learn how to use a new language, one that is less laden with arguments, stats and facts, and instead filled with more emotion and passion. In short, Democrats have to become less intellectual and more passionate in their public rhetoric, especially on the campaign trail.

There are some rave reviews of Westen's book out there, with no shortage of superlatives. Some even suggest that all Democrats have to do is to read and act on this book, and the country will be theirs. See, this is how easy (electoral) strategy has become. So what's all the debate about? Just read the book and you are all set:

This is the most interesting, informative book on politics I've read in many years. - Bill Clinton

In 2008 we will win the presidency if our candidate reads and acts on this book. - Howard Dean

The Political Brain is the most illuminating book on contemporary American politics I've ever (my emphases) read. By explaining how voters actually process information, Drew Westen lays bare the connection between political technique, political conviction, and the Democrats' habit of bungling winnable elections. If every leading Democratic politician reads this book, we could have a decent America back. - Robert Kuttner

Praising the journal he writes for, Ezra Klein of the The American Propect says that Westen was "largely discovered" by Kuttner, who according to USA Today, also introduced him to key Democrats. Moreover, as Klein points out, it was the Prospect that first popularized Westen's work.

According to an article in USA Today, whose title summarizes Westen's book rather nicely, "Democrats get advice on how to talk about issues," Westen is also working with the progressive think tank, Third Way (see previous post), on a "strategy memo" (my emphasis), to get candidates to focus less on what they are saying and more on how voters understand what they are saying.

This is very similar to the main recommendation in Frank Luntz's new book, "Words That Work: It's Not What You Say, It's What People Hear." Luntz, a communications "strategist," has been a longtime advisor of Newt Gingrich and other Republicans.

I highlight how the term "strategy" is used because I find it problematic. In very widespread usage, certainly in mainstream media and political discourse, it is consistently confused with tactics. This is not only a matter of semantics. The fact that not even this most basic distinction is made reflects the rather mediocre state of strategic political reflection, especially when compared with much more advanced strategic thinking in military or business affairs. This fundamental problem is compounded when one takes the interdependence, divergence and variation of means and ends into consideration.

In any case, so if Westen's insights and recommendations are of such crucial importance for Demcrats, how come no less a commentator than Kevin Drum, in one of the earliest reviews of the book, formulates what seems to be a rather devastating critique of Westen's book that - if correct - would severely limit its applicability:

The problem is that his made-up speeches are practically parodies. They're so insanely belligerent that no politician in his right mind would give them. (my emphasis) Even the wingiest of the wingnuts doing their late-night CSPAN schticks don't give speeches as aggressive as Westen's.

So, is that the case? Is Westen going too far? Is the rhetoric he recommends excessively emotional, to the point of making it impractical? If so, would that really be a problem? Isn't there much more that Democrats need to do in order to not only win elections, but make policies genuinely and lastingly - and I would be tempted to say: progressively - more progressive? After all, according to many progressives, the realization of the Clinton/Gore slogan, "It's the Economy, Stupid!," did not go far enough. How far will and can the new slogan go, "It's the Emotion, Stupid!"?

For the answer to that question depends on where you want to go, not only on how to get there. Strategy asks, are we doing the right things? Tactics only asks, are we doing things right? Again, as we find so often in these pages, how you get there depends on where you want to go. In other words, strategies vary according to ultimate objectives, and these continue to diverge between and among progressives and Democrats. How far can "we" go, with or without Westen?